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ABSTRACT
This dissertation maps the role of testimonial injustice in education and the role of
pedagogy in addressing knowledge injustices. Drawing from the disciplinary positions of
philosophy of education and social justice education, this dissertation provides an analysis
of student academic work to explore intergroup dialogue pedagogy. Specifically, this
dissertation investigates if and how the educational practice of intergroup dialogue
pedagogy can facilitate epistemic justice. This analysis combines philosophical inquiry and
document analysis to describe the ways in which practices of learning are related to social
identifications. Finally, this dissertation offers applications of this theoretical analysis of
epistemic justice for education practice and research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I lack imagination you say
No. I lack language.
The language to clarify
My resistance to the literate.
Words are a war to me.
They threaten my family.
To gain the word
To describe the loss
I risk losing everything.
I may create a monster
The word’s length and body
Swelling up colorful and thrilling
Looming over my mother, characterized.
Her voice in the distance
Unintelligible illiterate.
These are the monster’s words.

-Cherrie Moraga

Anzaldúa (1981) quotes Moraga’s unpublished poem while writing about her own
experience in educational settings as a woman of color, particularly as it relates to writing
and the act of putting language to experience. In her poem, Moraga writes of the pain of
language exclusion in schools, forced to write in English and to give up her native tongue in
order to be considered literate and able to communicate. Writing in English is a betrayal of
both her mother tongue and of her mother, both of which are literate—have meaning and
intrinsic value—but not considered so by the dominant knowledge and educational
framework. Gaining English means gaining the ability to be perceived as intelligible while
possibly giving up connection to her identity and culture. Language, or rather intelligibility,
is both an internal war and an act of war; it can be used as a weapon of forced domination
or, inversely, as a tool of resistance to a monstrous knowledge system that refuses to be
1

inclusive. Anzaldúa extends from the poem to reflecting on her own experiences writing,
“white eyes do not want to know us…The schools we attended or didn’t attend did not give
us the skills for writing nor the confidence that we were correct in using our class and
ethnic languages” (1981, p. 165). Anzaldúa describes that public schooling in the United
States context was made for and by “white eyes” that neither built on or from the
knowledges of students of color nor did it permit these knowledges in the classroom.
White1 eyes exclude not only language, but (and partly by extension) also the cultures,
identities and experiences of students of color.
More than thirty years later, Sonia Nieto also discussed the power of language
identity and inclusion in education. Delivering a commissioned essay at the American
Educational Research Association’s annual meeting, Nieto (2012) observed:
In spite of widespread rejection of bilingualism and bilingual education, research
over the past several decades could not be clearer: bilingualism benefits not only
individuals but also the nation. Likewise, bilingual education, when done well, has
proven to be the most effective way to educate students for whom English is an
additional language” (para. 3).
Nieto echoes Moraga and Anzaldúa’s concern and criticism of mainstream educational
practices that exclude and demean native language practices. Additionally, Nieto (2012)
cites numerous empirical studies in education that support bilingual education (Adesope et
al., 2010; Kovacs & Mehler, 2009; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Nieto shares studies that found
students from across immigrant backgrounds with limited bilingualism were much more
likely to leave school than those who were fluent in English and their primary language(s).
Nieto cites studies additionally showing that youth who maintain their ethnic ties instead
2

of being forced into assimilation experience fewer problems adjusting (including fewer
mental health problems). In her essay, Nieto not only concludes that bilingualism and
biculturalism promote learning instead of impeding academic achievement, but,
additionally, for educators, these research findings come with a responsibility. Nieto
(2012) asserted:
For educational researchers, it [these findings] suggests that those who possess,
create, and disseminate knowledge must challenge mainstream knowledge and
conventional wisdom that jeopardizes those students least well served by our
educational system” (para. 8).
In other words, Nieto (2012) points out that is not simply enough for educators to know
that (1) Eliminating native language learning and cultural practices, although the norm, is
harmful and that (2) Incorporating and building from linguistic and cultural knowledges
has positive educational and larger life outcomes. Rather, because educational researchers
know these two things, they “must” use this knowledge to challenge mainstream practices
and policies that harm marginalized students. Her concluding remark in this invited essay
is: “it is the responsibility of researchers to hold up what we know to be true” (Nieto, 2012,
para. 8).
Objectives of this Dissertation
This dissertation walks in the spirit of Nieto’s call to educational researchers.
Specifically, this dissertation argues that educational institutions and systems maintain and
reproduce knowledge injustices experienced by students with marginalized social
identities. Because educational institutions maintain and reproduce inequalities in
knowledge practices, they have an ethical responsibility to address knowledge injustices
3

rooted in social identity(ies), or epistemic injustice. Addressing epistemic injustice should
be a goal in and of itself, not a secondary objective or byproduct of educational research,
policy and practice. By epistemic injustice, I refer broadly to the knowledge harms done to
students with non-dominant social identities based on or because of these identities within
the scope of dominant knowledge practices and frameworks (Fricker, 2007; Dotson, 2012;
Pohlhaus, 2012; Medina, 2013). Chapter two of this dissertation describes epistemic
injustice and justice in detail. Summarily, epistemic injustice is the harm done to
individuals or groups with non-dominant social identity(ies) in their capacity as knowers.
Examples of epistemic justice include: dominant knowers correcting for flaws in their
credibility judgments through critical reflection (Fricker, 2007); dominant knowers
accepting that marginalized knowers develop epistemic resources from their
situations/standpoints and dominant knowers actively learning how to utilize structurally
marginalized knowledges (Pohlhaus, 2012); dominant knowers engaging their
responsibility to seek out marginally situated hermeneutically resources (Dotson, 2012);
and dominantly (and subordinately) situated knowers restructuring their habits and
affective structures to enable them to simultaneously engage different perspectives and
viewpoints without polarizing them, and engage in collective agency and action taking
toward political and cultural transformation (Medina, 2013).
Specifically, this dissertation considers the following questions:
•

In what ways do students with marginalized racial social identities experience
epistemic injustice in educational settings?

•

Can social justice pedagogies interrupt the production of knowledge inequalities in
the educational setting?
4

•

How might intergroup dialogue, as a particular type of social justice pedagogy,
facilitate epistemic justice in educational settings?

•

What kinds of applications can a theoretical analysis of epistemic (in)justice have on
educational systems and structures?

As a philosopher of education writing a dissertation that applies theorizing about
epistemic injustice to education theory and practice, Miranda Fricker’s (2007) seminal
account of epistemic injustice has been significant to me since I was introduced to it as a
student. Fricker (2007) described the harm done to individuals and groups of people in
their capacity as knowers within the dominant social framework due to the “operation of
social power in epistemic interactions…a politics of epistemic practice” (p. 2). Upon reading
Fricker’s (2007) account, I (1) concluded educational practitioners must address
educational injustice as part of our very roles and everyday practices and (2) recognized an
immediate connection between Fricker’s account of epistemic justice and my work as an
intergroup dialogue2 researcher and practitioner. It is not common for philosophical
theorizing to be so immediately and urgently applicable to everyday practice; however, one
of the reasons I so easily connected Fricker’s (2007) theorizing and intergroup dialogue is
both share a common empirical bedrock: social psychology.
Throughout Fricker’s account (described and explicated in great detail in chapter two),
she uses studies in social psychology as evidence for her claims. For example, Fricker
draws on Claude Steele’s work on stereotype threat (see chapter two for detailed
explanation) as a way of showing the harm of one’s losing knowledge due to epistemic
injustice. Intergroup dialogue pedagogy is rooted in the field of social psychology as well.
Evolving from the study of intergroup relations and contact, intergroup dialogue is part of
5

social science’s efforts to apply research based knowledge to real world intergroup
interactions and situations including education in schools and colleges (Gurin et al., 2013).
From my standpoint as a philosopher of education, an intergroup dialogue practitioner,
and a former public school teacher, philosophers of epistemology exploring epistemic
injustice and social scientists practicing and researching intergroup dialogue are traversing
shared territory: addressing how knowledge practices harm marginalized individuals and
groups owing to social structures and inequalities toward the common goal of describing
and creating a more just society. Like these theories and researched practices, this
dissertation takes a multidisciplinary and multimethod approach towards understanding
how education institutions and practices create knowers and lesser knowers and how they
may instead create greater knowledge justice.
Studying both theories of epistemic justice and intergroup dialogue quite literally
brings together theories and practices. Therefore, in addition to introducing the questions
this dissertation engages, this chapter introduces an overview on intergroup dialogue
pedagogy and on research about intergroup dialogue. Chapters two through four of this
dissertation (as described below) either engage the features philosophers describe as
necessary for knowledge justice or give an account of how intergroup dialogue responds to
philosophers’ theorizing about epistemic justice; therefore, the following overview of
intergroup dialogue and the features summarized act as a foundation for the following
chapters.
Intergroup Dialogue
There are various forms of “dialogue” models and pedagogies. Intergroup dialogue
as named and described in this dissertation specifically refers to the praxis developed in
6

the 1980s by the Program on Intergroup Relations at the University of Michigan (Ford,
2017; Gurin, Nagda, & Zúñiga, 2013; Zúñiga, Nagda, Chesler, & Cytron-Walker, 2007). At its
broadest, intergroup dialogue is defined as:
A face-to-face, interactive, and facilitated learning experience that brings together
twelve to eighteen students from two or more social identity groups over a
sustained period to explore commonalities and differences, examine the nature and
consequences of systems of power and privilege, and find ways to work together to
promote social justice (Zúñiga et al., 2007, p. vii).
Intergroup dialogue courses are guided by trained facilitators using an educational
curriculum; they are offered mostly on college campuses but are increasingly being applied
and adopted in high school settings and as co-curricular programs at universities (Zúñiga,
Lopez, & Ford, 2012). Intergroup dialogue shares the goals of other diversity efforts in
education, and it takes a distinct and well-researched critical dialogic approach to
simultaneously addressing social identities and locations in relation to systems of power
and privilege.
Across institutions and settings, intergroup dialogue courses and initiatives share a
significant set of features (Gurin et al., 2013; Zúñiga et al., 2007). Firstly, intergroup
dialogue courses are facilitated, face-to-face, exchanges grounded in interdisciplinary
scholarly content and driven by the active co-inquiry and shared knowledge making of
participants across social identities. Facilitation means active and responsive guidance;
facilitators support and challenge participants through rigorous content, deep reflection,
group sharing and dialogues about perspectives and experiences and through the process
of developing empathy and perspective taking (Zúñiga et al., 2007). Facilitators are active
7

co-participants in the dialogic process; they also benefit from on-going training and
coaching (Zúñiga et al., 2007). As Freire (2009) describes:
Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-student and the students-of-the-teacher cease
to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with student-teachers…They
become jointly responsible for the process in which all grow (p. 80).
Intergroup dialogues usually take particular social identities as a focus, for example,
intergroup dialogues on race, on sexuality and gender or on socio-economic class.
Facilitators of these dialogues are not only trained and experienced social justice
educators, but they also represent the dominant and subordinate identities represented in
the dialogue. Additionally, students apply to participate in intergroup dialogue and the
placement process strives to ensure an inclusive dialogue in which no identity group makes
up a majority of participants.
The educational design of intergroup dialogue courses addresses hidden and
explicit issues of power and privilege through both content (what participants read and
discuss) and process (how participants engage with each other and with the information
they are learning) (Gurin et al., 2013; Zúñiga et al., 2007). Intergroup dialogue brings
together structured activities and dialogic communication to encourage student learning
and critical reflections across differences and through contested beliefs and assumptions.
Intergroup dialogue practitioners utilize a four-phase design (see Table 1 below for
overview of IGD’s four phase design adapted from Zúñiga et al., 2007, pp. 27-28) to
facilitate student learning by starting with group dynamics and discovering commonalities
and differences based on social identity to directly taking up controversial issues (e.g. can
reverse racism exist?) to taking action for social change (both individual and collective).
8

Across institutions and programs, intergroup dialogue’s four phase design includes
specific content and process objectives as well as some hallmark structured interactions
(these are explored in greater detail in chapter four). Phase one focuses on group
beginnings and the forming of relationships. During this phase, students learn how to
participate in dialogue and share in activities to build relationships across difference. Phase
two focuses on students exploring differences and commonalities of experiences.
Consciousness raising is a major focus; students learn about social identities and how these
identities reflect systems of social power, resources allocation, and conflicting relationships
among groups (Zúñiga et al., 2007; Zúñiga, Nagda, & Sevig, 2002). Readings and reflective
writing are used to help students understand issues of dominance and subordination and
their roles in maintaining systems of oppression and privilege. Phase three focuses on
dialoguing and exploring controversial and conflict laden issues. Students are encouraged
to share their perspectives and experiences with controversial issues through dialogue and
not debate (i.e. not focusing on “rightness” or “wrongness” of their position). Phase four
focuses on encouraging students to think about, plan, and take individual and collective
action towards social change.

9

Phase
Phase 1
(2-3 sessions)
Beginnings:
Forming and
Building
Relationships
Phase 2
(3-4 sessions)
Exploring
Differences and
Commonalities of
Experiences

•
•

•

•

Phase 3
(3-5 sessions)

•

Exploring and
Discussing Hot
Topics

•

Phase 4
(2-3 sessions)

•

Objectives
Content
Build knowledge for
•
dialogue
Clarify meaning of
•
“dialogue” and other
forms of communication
Increase awareness of
multiple social groups,
intersectional nature of
identities, and dynamics
of inequality
Promote understanding
of the systemic basis of
group differences and
conflicts in perceptions
and experiences

•

Encourage analysis of
systems of privilege,
power, and oppression
Interdisciplinary
exploration of some of
the roots of conflicting
perceptions and
experiences (historical,
cultural, institutional,
interpersonal)

•

Explore ways of moving
from dialogue to action

•

•

•
•

Action Planning and
Alliance Building
•

Process
Build values and
skills for dialogue
Establish foundations
for honest and
meaningful dialogue
Encourage listening
and perspective
taking of experiences
and perceptions
different from one’s
own
Explore meaning of
key terms such as
prejudice,
discrimination, and
oppression and their
impact on students’
lived experiences

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Explore differences
and similarities in
perceptions and
experiences of
controversial topics
across social groups
Encourage informed
and meaningful
dialogue and inquiry
Probe for deeper
levels of thinking,
feeling, and
responding

•

Explore range of
continuing learning
opportunities and
actions to promote
diversity and social
justice
Bring closure to
dialogue experience

•
•

Examples of
Learning Activities
Exploring goals and
expectations
Distinguishing
dialogue from debate
Practicing interactive
communication:
speaking, listening,
paraphrasing, giving
and receiving feedback
Exploring personal and
social identities
Exploring
multiple/intersectional
social identities
Discuss socialization
Web of oppression and
privilege, caucus
groups, and fishbowl
activities to encourage
introspection and
deeper dialogue
Dialogue on and debriefing about studentidentified “hot topics”
(such as gender and
media, safety on
campus; separation
and self-segregation on
campus; immigration,
affirmative action,
etc.)

Discuss liberation
Develop action plans
to illustrate various
ways of taking action
for inclusion and
social justice

Table 1. Overview of the Intergroup Dialogue (IGD) Curriculum: Adapted from Zúñiga, Nagda, Chesler, &
Cytron-Walker (2007), Intergroup dialogue in higher education: Meaningful learning about social justice
(Exhibit 1, pp. 27-28), ASHE Higher Education Report, 32(4).

These phases are sometimes referred to as stages. Whether referred to as a phase or a
stage, it is important to note that facilitators match the educational design to the flow of
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their participants’ learning and processes (Gurin et al., 2013; Zúñiga et al., 2007). As
necessary, groups may move back and forth through the processes. Of central importance,
intergroup dialogue:
is not a de-contextualized practice (Burbules, 2000), participants are encouraged
to take a critical perspective when examining how relationships among groups are
shaped and affected by the dynamics of interpersonal, institutional, and societal
power, privilege, and exclusion. Dialogue participants are also challenged to make
meaning of the various forms of information introduced in the dialogue through
sustained engagement that embraces thoughts and feelings, self-reflection,
perspective taking, and critical reflection (Zúñiga et al., 2012, p. 3).
The dialogue process is dynamic; it is both structured and responsive (Schoem & Hurtado,
2001).
In summary, the key structure and process features of intergroup dialogue include:
•

explicit focus on systems power and privilege and how these systems shape
experiences of social identities and social group membership;

•

processes that emphasize communication across differences, especially amongst
groups with histories of conflict or potential conflict, through shared knowledge
making;

•

processes that emphasize critical individual and group reflection and collective
knowledge making;

•

processes that take up conflict to develop empathy and understanding;

•

structure that “strengthens individual and collective capacities for social action by
fostering connections and alliances….and build the confidence, commitments, and
11

skills needed to support coalitional action for social justice” (Zúñiga et al., 2007, p.
viii). These skills and practices for social action extend inside and outside the
classroom (Gurin et al., 2013; Zúñiga et al., 2007).
These features will be taken up again in chapters three and four which directly describe
intergroup dialogue based programs and courses and their relationship to epistemic
justice.
Research on intergroup dialogue has identified some well documented outcomes. Using
data from a national longitudinal survey of incoming first year students (follow up surveys
were administered at the end of the students’ second year) Hurtado (2005) found white
students who participated in intergroup dialogue increased their ability to take the
perspectives of others, adopt a pluralistic world view and attribute greater complexity in
their development of analytical problem-solving skills. Zúñiga et al. (2007) report on a
controlled study comparing students enrolled in a course focused on cultural diversity and
social justice with students who participated in an intergroup dialogue course.
Researchers found that intergroup dialogue students showed increases in consciousness
raising, ability to bridge difference, and greater capacity to work for social change. These
findings held for students of color and white students; additionally, students of color
showed a significant increase in perspective taking as a result of taking the intergroup
dialogue course (Zúñiga et al., 2007). Lopez, Gurin, and Nagda (1998) utilized a similar
design comparing first year students who participated in an intergroup dialogue course
with first year students who did not participate in an intergroup dialogue course. They
found that students who participated in intergroup dialogue attributed a more structural
causal analysis to race and ethnic inequality; they exhibited more structural and less
12

individualistic thinking than students in the control group; they also applied a more
structural causal analysis to intergroup conflict. There was little evidence for selection bias
between the two groups, students who enrolled in intergroup dialogue and those who did
not, as student responses to pre-test questionnaires showed no difference between the
control and participant samples in response to questions on racial and ethnic inequality.
There was also no significant difference in political ideology between the two groups at the
start of the course.
A follow-up study of Lopez et al. (1998) intergroup dialogue and control group students
just before graduation found that the students who participated in the intergroup dialogue
course had more positive intergroup perceptions and attitudes than students from the
control group (Gurin, Peng, Lopez, & Nagda, 1999). They found that white and male
intergroup dialogue participants did not subscribe as strongly to dominant perspectives on
intergroup conflict and educational inequality as their control group counterparts, and
students of color and women participants reported more positive views of conflict and of
educational equity policies than their control group counterparts (Gurin et al., 1999).
Students of color who participated in the intergroup dialogue course also reported
perceiving more positive interactions with white students and less campus divisiveness
than their control group counterparts (Gurin et al., 1999). The intergroup dialogue course
participants were shown to have greater interest in politics and to participate more in
campus politics (Gurin, Nagda, & Lopez, 2004). Also, when compared with their matched
control group, the students who participated in intergroup dialogue showed greater
perspective taking, greater understanding of difference as not being divisive, a greater
sense of commonality with other racial and ethnic group and greater learning about their
13

own and other ethnic groups (Gurin et al., 2004). Gurin et al. (2004) posited that
participation in intergroup dialogue during their first year of college likely influenced their
curricular and co-curricular choices while on campus. Students from both privileged and
disadvantaged social groups who participated in an intergroup dialogue course showed
more positive attitudes towards intergroup life, made stronger ties with students who
were both similar and different from them and valued ethnic and racial difference more
than students from the control group. The course, then, may offer an important
counterpoint to campus life and life within the larger social context of ever increasing
segregation by both race and class in public elementary and secondary education (Orfield,
Jongyeon, Frankenberg, & Siegel-Hawley, 2016).
Additionally, multiple studies have demonstrated that intergroup dialogue students
show an increased willingness towards action for social justice (Dessel & Rogge, 2008;
Zúñiga, 2004; Nagda, Kim & Truelove, 2004). Multiple studies have also demonstrated
increased perspective taking across social groups and understanding of identity and the
impact of social group membership on social inequalities (Nagda, Spearmon, Holley,
Harding, Balasson, Moise-Swanson & de Mello, 1999; Nagda & Zúñiga, 2003; Dessel &
Rogge, 2008).
Gurin et al. (2013) report findings from a longitudinal field experiment on intergroup
dialogue across nine colleges and universities in the United States. Across the nine
institutions, students who applied for either a race-ethnicity or a gender intergroup
dialogue course were randomly assigned to either an experimental (race/ethnicity or
gender intergroup dialogue course) or a control group (students placed on an intergroup
dialogue wait-list after applying). This design allowed researchers to address questions
14

such as: were previously documented findings attributable to interest in intergroup
dialogue (as students in both groups chose to apply to participate in an intergroup dialogue
course). Changes measured in students could be attributed to participation in the course as
students in the experimental and control group took pre- and post-tests at the start and
end of the course and the following year. The post-test administered one year after
students participated in the course made it possible to test long term impacts of intergroup
dialogue courses, namely if outcomes persisted beyond the term in which students
participated in intergroup dialogue.
In total, there were 720 students who participated in the dialogues and 712 students in
the control group. Additionally, Gurin et al. (2013) also included nonrandomized
comparison groups from students enrolled in traditional university social science courses
on race and gender. The social science comparison courses were run during the same term
as the dialogue courses, and 438 students participated in them. These data included
fourteen courses on race and thirteen on gender, and they were also run across the nine
participating colleges and universities. Again, this design feature allowed researchers to
discern if previous documented outcomes could be the result of a selection bias (or a result
of student interest in enrolling in dialogue) because the students enrolling in the social
science courses also chose to participate in a course focused on race-ethnicity or gender,
Gurin et al. (2013) report findings on cognitive involvement, which measured “complex
thinking, analytical thinking about society, consideration of multiple perspectives,” and
thinking and learning about one’s identity (p. 152). They found that there was no difference
in these measures between the dialogue and control group in the pre-test; however, the
difference between the two groups in the post-test was significant. This means students
15

who participated in intergroup dialogue across the nine institutions showed an increase in
complex thinking about society, perspective taking, and identity awareness after taking a
dialogue course. The same findings were present for affective positivity (measures of
positive emotions and interactions with others), structural understanding of inequity,
intergroup empathy, and intergroup collaboration and action taking (Gurin et al., 2013).
Like earlier studies cited above, Gurin et al. (2013) found that participation in
intergroup dialogue resulted in important cognitive, affective, and behavior outcomes.
Importantly, this impressive study was able to measure these impacts across nine
institutions across the United States (varying in size and geographic location) and showed
that outcomes are not the result of self-selection or student interest; they are the result of
students participating in intergroup dialogue courses. The particular content and process
of intergroup dialogue courses increase students’ ability to think critically, engage in
critical perspective taking, address issues of identity and societal inequality, develop
empathy across difference and to take action for social change across identity lines. These
increases were not only found in intergroup dialogue students over wait list students
(experimental and control groups) but these increases were also greater in intergroup
dialogue students compared to those students who chose to enroll in social science courses
focused on race and ethnicity (Gurin et al., 2013). These findings were not the result of
students exhibiting demand characteristics, or “reporting what facilitators would want
them to say” as the effects of IGD relative to the control group and the social science group
were still evident across indicators a year later as found during the longitudinal follow-up
(Gurin et al., 2013, p. 166).
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Thus far, this chapter has linked the shared relevance of the rich field of social
psychology on theorizing about epistemic injustice and the development of intergroup
dialogue pedagogy; it then provided an overall framework for understanding what
intergroup dialogue pedagogy is and what it does. It also pointed out one of intergroup
dialogue pedagogy’s and social epistemology’s shared objectives, particularly the
theorizing of philosophers focused on epistemic injustice: calling upon knowledge making
practices to address inequality and work towards justice.
Because learning about epistemic injustice immediately connected to my work and
learnings as an intergroup dialogue researcher and practitioner and because both fields
pursue knowledge justice as social justice, it is important for me to bring both disciplines
and bodies of research together in this dissertation. Epistemologists describe the changes
in individuals and structures necessary to create the conditions for epistemic justice;
intergroup dialogue researchers and facilitators develop and enact the very types of
knowledge practices that epistemologists argue for in order to create epistemic justice. To
argue for and describe epistemically just practices without at the same time working to
create these practices seems to betray the call to disrupt and resist knowledge hegemony.
By bringing theorizing and practice in both epistemic injustice and intergroup dialogue
together in this inquiry, this dissertation hopes to not only bridge theory and practice
across disciplines but also to argue that educational institutions and stake holders must
address epistemic injustice.
Organization of this Dissertation
Figure 1. below presents a visual overview of this dissertation and its chapters.
Chapter two of this dissertation provides a theoretical framework. Chapter two introduces
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and explicates the concepts of epistemic injustice and epistemic justice. It begins with
Fricker’s (2007) seminal account of epistemic injustice and its two types: testimonial and
hermeneutic injustice. Since Fricker’s initial theorizing, philosophers of epistemology and
of race have both critiqued and richly broadened her account making it stronger with the
inclusion of more non-dominant perspectives and knowledges. Chapter two provides an
accounting of the theorizing of these philosophers with special attention to Pohlhaus
(2012), Dotson (2012) and Medina (2013). The goal of this review is to provide a robust
accounting of epistemic justice and injustice; the features of these accounts will be applied
to research in education in chapters three and four of this dissertation. Chapter two then
addresses the assertion that education institutions and stakeholders have a responsibility
to address epistemic injustice by reviewing and linking Young’s (2010) social responsibility
model and Dewey’s (1954) and Outlaw’s (2007) descriptions of the purpose of education
within the context of the United States’ democracy. These reviews of the theorizing of
philosophers of epistemology, race and education provide the theoretical framework of this
dissertation.
Chapter three moves to applying theories of epistemic ignorance and the practices of
critical pedagogy, especially intergroup dialogue, to education. Chapter three addresses the
first two questions listed above: In what ways do students with marginalized racial social
identities experience epistemic injustice in educational settings? Can social justice pedagogies
interrupt the production of knowledge inequalities in the educational setting? In applying
theories of epistemic ignorance, the chapter begins with an account of how social identity
impacts students’ experiences in education settings from pre-school through college
graduation. Students experience epistemic injustice in education in a few ways. Firstly,
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students with marginalized social identities are often not present. For example, students of
color and low-income students often do not have access to pre-school, rendering them less
prepared for kindergarten than their counterparts with dominant social identities.
Students who are not present in education settings cannot contribute to knowledge making
and they also lose out on the opportunity to make meaning from their lived experiences
within the dominant knowledge making framework. Additionally, students with
marginalized social identities are not able to benefit from public education in the ways that
their peers with dominant identities do. This persistent “gap” in student performance
reifies negative stereotypes about students of color and low-income students while
providing false support for the persistent dominance/privilege of white and high-income
students. The “gap” in student outcomes between dominant and non-dominant students
also is characterized as an “achievement gap” that puts the onus and failing of student
performance on students, their families, and their cultures.
However, when described by marginalized students, the achievement gap is indeed
an “opportunity gap” in which non-dominant students are structurally excluded from the
most beneficial and productive aspects of public education. Dominant analysis of student
performance excludes the insights, experiences, perspectives and interpretations of
marginalized students, while, at the same time, hiding or making less intelligible their
accounts of school experiences--this is a form of epistemic injustice. So long as education
settings, from kindergarten through college, limit the ability of non-dominant students to
contribute and share in public knowledge making, limit the ability of non-dominant
students to make intelligible to themselves and to others their educational experiences, and
reinforces the unearned epistemic dominance of those with privileged social identities,
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education systems and settings contribute to and reproduce epistemic injustice. This
chapter describes how educational systems are not only examples of structural inequality;
they actively create and foster epistemic harm to students of color and low-income
students by preventing their full participation in shared knowledge making and by making
their experiences un/less intelligible.
Chapter four extends from chapter two’s macro exploration of epistemic injustice in
education settings to a micro focus on two sections of intergroup dialogue on race and
ethnicity at a private research institution in the northeast. Chapter four responds to
questions two and three listed above: Can social justice pedagogies interrupt the production
of knowledge inequalities in the educational setting? How might intergroup dialogue, as a
particular type of social justice pedagogy, facilitate epistemic justice in educational settings?
This chapter offers a description of how a praxis—content, process, and context—can help
students (1) recognize lacunas in the dominant hermeneutic frame, (2) acknowledge their
role in either maintaining lacunas or seeking out alternative/additional perspectives and
hermeneutical resources, and (3) expand their understandings and interpretations beyond
the dominant hermeneutic resources to understand, analyze, and contribute to alternative
and multiple shared interpretive resources. This chapter explicitly explores how
intergroup dialogue can be a tool for epistemic justice by exploring students’ experiences of
an intergroup dialogue course in terms of their self-described knowledge shifts by
providing findings from a qualitative document analysis of students’ reflection papers and
final papers from two sections of intergroup dialogue on race and ethnicity.
Chapter five offers a review of conclusions and contributions of the preceding chapters
and offers suggestions for applications. It responds to the final question listed above: What
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kinds of applications can a theoretical analysis of epistemic (in)justice have on educational
systems and structure? Chapter five specifically looks at philosophers’ recent applications of
theorizing about epistemic injustice to education (Frank, 2013; Kotzee, 2013; Kotzee,
2017), and it presents the case that philosophers—to date—have not sufficiently
considered what philosophers and educational researchers and practitioners must do
given our understanding of educational institutions systems and institutions role in
perpetuating epistemic injustice. While this dissertation explores intergroup dialogue as a
type of social justice pedagogy that can be applied in educational settings to disrupt the
reproduction of epistemic injustice, pedagogy is not enough. Educational researchers,
institutions, and stakeholders must perceive that knowing is not enough (Nieto, 2012) and
take up research and policies that will intentionally address epistemic injustice and work to
create the conditions for greater epistemic justice.
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Framing Questions for
Dissertation:
In what ways do students with
marginalized racial social
identities experience epistemic
injustice in educational
settings?

Introduction
[Chapter 1]
Introducing questions of
epistemic injustice and
research on the
educational practice of
intergroup dialogue
(IGD)

Can social justice pedagogies
interrupt the production of
knowledge inequalities in the
educational setting?
How might intergroup
dialogue, as a particular type
of social justice pedagogy,
facilitate epistemic justice in
educational settings?
What kinds of applications can
a theoretical analysis of
epistemic (in)justice have on
educational systems and
structures?

Epistemic Injustice:
Theoretical Framework
[Chapter 2]
Grounded in philosophy of
epistemology
and philosophy of
education

Focus on PK-12:
Identity, Schooling and
Knowledge Making
[Chapter 3]

Focus on College:
Teaching for
Epistemic Justice
[Chapter 4]

Department of
Education reports

Qualitative study of IGD
students' educational
experiences and
learning processes
Document analysis of
written reflections from
IGD college course

Youth Participatory Action
Research (YPAR) examples
Youth Dialogue (IGD)
Program Evaluation

Discussion
[Chapter 5]
Institutional and social
responsibility
Connecting questions of
epistemic (in)justice to
institutional and social
responsibility

Figure 1. An overview of the dissertation project and chapter organization:
We know, now what? Teaching, Learning, (Un)knowing, and Education toward Epistemic
Justice.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework: Epistemic Injustice
“Education for critical consciousness…requires a reformulation of the knowledge-asaccumulated capital model of education and focuses instead on the link between the
historical configuration of social forms and the way they work subjectively. This issue of
subjectivity represents a realization of the fact that who we are, how we act, what we think,
and what stories we tell become more intelligible within an epistemological framework
that begins by recognizing existing hegemonic histories”
–Chandra Mohanty (2006, p. 195).
Testimonial exchanges happen throughout our daily lives. When people interact,
they are constantly sharing and assessing information. When it comes to schooling, people
generally believe these exchanges center around content. Students and teachers, though,
embody social identities that are present in testimonial exchanges. In the vignette below, I
paraphrase an experience shared often by college students in a course I teach that is
focused on race and ethnicity. Students cite this experience as an example of their identities
becoming salient in a popular journalism course. I start the lesson by defining racial
microagressions as, “subtle insults (verbal, nonverbal, and/or visual) directed toward
people of color, often automatically or unconsciously” (Solorzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000, p.
60). I then ask students if they can describe a racial microagression they have perpetrated
or experienced on campus. 3 Hands are raised and I hear:
Student: In Introduction to Print Journalism4 there is this assignment where we have
to write up an incident, this scenario, as if it just happened and we are reporters on a
deadline.
Facilitator: Can you describe the scenario?
Student: Well, the sheet says that a Latino man robs a store.
Facilitator: How does that make you feel?
Student: I feel like it’s racist because that’s all we ever see about Latino people in the
news and in the media and we are not all just thieves. There’s more to us than that, but
you never see that in the media.
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Facilitator: Have you given this feedback to the professor?
Students: The professor calls it a fictional but standard case that provides enough
information for us to use to write a journalistic article using the skills learned over
the course of the semester.
Facilitator: What does it mean for your professor not to consider your feedback?
Students: It’s frustrating because there are like maybe one, maybe two students of
color in each journalism class. The rest are all white. That’s ok, but like when there
are only one or two of you who understand what it feels like to be singled out, and then
the example only applies to one of you in particular, you feel like you don’t even matter
in the course. It makes me angry and it makes me feel like who cares what I have to say
anyway.
These students6 explicitly share with their journalism professor that this scenario
marginalizes them within the course because it is one of the few representations of Latinos
in the media and it is laden with negative stereotypes. The professor responds that the
scenario is “realistic” and, therefore, the students’ concerns are unfounded.
In this example, the professor is providing content and positioning the content as
neutral as it connects to a scenario assumed to be prevalent and commonplace. Students
whose racial social identities are made salient by the scenario are asserting that the
content is prejudicial (if not explicitly racist). What makes the scenario racist? Describing
the thief as a Latino both draws from and reinforces pernicious stereotypes prevalent in
North American society. In the United States today Latinos are often associated with
criminal behavior such as “illegal immigration” (which should be but is rarely called
“undocumented immigration” in the media; this labeling itself criminalizes Latino
populations), gangs, and drug cartels (e.g. Tukachinsky, Mastro, & Yachi, 2015; Schmader,
Block, & Lickel, 2015). These stereotypes are exaggerated caricatures and problematic
(Schmader et al., 2015). Instead of challenging these omnipresent images in the dominant
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collective imagery, the professor’s narrative mobilizes them as given and unconscious
scripts to be used in the assignment. Drawing from racialized tropes in this manner
empowers them; drawing upon racist tropes in a way that normalizes them is in and of
itself an act of racism. Rather than listening to and taking up the students’ perspectives, the
professor dismisses the students’ claims refuting the assertion that their or the fictitious
robber’s identity matters. The students provide testimony and the professor judges it to be
irrelevant or perhaps even false. I consider this to be an example of epistemic injustice in
an education setting.
This chapter addresses question one outlined in the introduction: In what ways do
students with marginalized racial and ethnic social identities experience epistemic injustice in
educational settings? by providing an account of the ways in which philosophers
characterize and describe epistemic injustice and justice. This chapter provides a short
overview of the social pathways to knowledge; it then sets out to provide a broad account
of epistemic injustice that will provide the theoretical buttressing for this dissertation. This
section will begin with a review of Fricker’s (2007) seminal account of epistemic injustice,
which is followed by a broad analysis of the critiques and extensions of Fricker’s account by
many of the philosophers concerned about epistemic injustice. This review of theories
concludes with a summary of the characteristics of epistemic injustice and justice based on
the theorizing of contemporary philosophers; this broad account is the foundation for the
theoretical analysis in this dissertation. The next section of this chapter provides an
account of why epistemic injustice matters in education. Fricker (2007) argued that “the
ethical is political” (p. 8); this section argues that the educational is ethical.
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Theoretical Framework
Knowledge as Social
The study of epistemic injustice builds from theorizing in social epistemology
(Goldman, 1999) which, broadly defined, is the “conceptual and normative study of the
relevance of social relations, roles, interests, and institutions to knowledge” (Schmitt, 1994,
p. 1). Put another way, social epistemology refers to the “social pathways to knowledge”
that include institutions and disciplinary communities (e.g. scientists, media organizations,
governmental agencies) (Goldman, 2002). From this we understand that practices of
epistemic evaluation are social; we learn from others (terms, concepts, conditions), we
make evaluations of the concepts and assertions of others, and we are able to carry out
these evaluations because of social systems that reinforce, structure and facilitate our
judgment making. Working from a social epistemology frame, we understand that a
person’s knowing is not individualistic; instead, it is a result of participation in social
exchanges. In working to understand the dynamics of these testimonial exchanges, we must
talk about identity, specifically, identity power (Fricker, 2007).
Identity & Power
Feminist standpoint theorists contribute to social epistemology by explicitly linking
social location and the politics of knowing (Wylie, 2011; Hill-Collins, 2010). Standpoint
theorists argue that implicit practices of power appear to be value-neutral in dominant
conceptual frameworks because they are normalized by social institutions (Hartsock, 1983;
Harding, 1992). Standpoint is achieved through the struggles of oppressed groups (e.g.
women, people of color, LGBT community) against dominant social groups and the political
infrastructure that buttresses their dominance. Social situatedness, for standpoint
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theorists, is not sufficient; they go on to argue that one’s position as subordinated provides
an epistemic privilege (Harding, 2006; Hill-Collins, 2000). For example, women understand
not only what it is to be a woman in the workplace, still receiving unequal pay for equal
work in 2014 (Lips, 2013), but they also understand how men perceive women in the
workplace and how to navigate a workplace which does not fully acknowledge the value of
women’s labor. Women know simultaneously their professional skills and that they must
over-perform relative to their male counterparts in order to be recognized.
The double bind experienced by women is compounded by intersecting social
identities, particularly race and class, which offer additional layers of epistemic insight
(Gutiérrez y Muhs, Niemann, González, & Harris, 2012). Illustratively, Kupenda (2012)
recalls an exchange with a white dean her first year as an assistant professor. As a junior
faculty member, Kupenda requested not to teach either in the summer of her first year or
the fall term of her second year, so she could have time to research and publish as part of
the institution’s requirements for tenure and promotion. The dean rejected her request,
requiring she teach during both semesters even though tenured faculty were available.
When Kupenda met with the dean to discuss her concerns, the dean told her: “‘We need you
to teach in the summer program because you are black, you are a woman, you are a great
teacher, and you nurture, mother, feed and nurse all the students’” (Kupenda, 2012, p. 23).
Kupenda’s reply to the dean was incisive: “‘You just described a mammy….I guess I will
have to be a mammy for you nine months a year, but I will not be a mammy twelve months
a year. Three months a year I must try to be a scholar’” (Kupenda, 2012, p. 23).
As a woman, and particularly as a Black woman, Kupenda was able to identify and
name the pernicious controlling image (Hill-Collins, 2000), specifically the mammy, the
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dean was operating from and utilizing to marginalize Kupena’s identity as scholar.
Characterizing a woman with the gendered stereotype of “nurturing mother” often times
serves to discount her emotional labor. Labeling a Black woman as nurturing and
mothering serves the same function but is additionally racialized through association with
the mammy trope (see for example, Bradley, 2005; Howard-Baptiste, 2014). Kupenda’s
experiences as a Black women provide her with the insight, what Hill-Collins (2009) calls
subjugated knowledge, to identify this act of marginalization.
Corollary to the power to know—or to benefit from the epistemic resources
associated with one’s social identities—is the power to be ignorant. In the example above,
Kupena is able to identify that the dean is looking for her to mother students (sexist) and to
be a Black woman who nurtures and mothers the students (racist). What she identifies
immediately, the dean does not have to acknowledge at all. The dean’s identity power
allows him to be ignorant of the sexist and racist content of his seeming compliment (i.e.
the students need you because you are all these wonderful things: mother, nurturer, etc.).
Epistemic ignorance is an important tool used by those with identity power to undermine
the intellectual contributions of individual knowers and members of subordinate identity
groups in ways that do harm. As described in greater detail below, when a person or social
group routinely experiences the discrediting of their knowledge contributions because of
social identities, that person or group is harmed in their capacity as givers of knowledge
(Fricker, 2007). Because knowledge practices advantage some while disadvantaging
others, knowledge and power are linked; therefore, there is an ethical component to
knowledge practice; this ethical component is explored in theories of epistemic injustice
(described in detail below).
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Review of Theories
Given social epistemology is a theoretical framework from which to consider the
relationship between institutions and social identities as a way of making, sharing and
validating knowledge, this chapter turns now to recent theoretical accounts that explore
specifically the role of race and knowledge/ignorance production with the goal of
understanding the ethical implications of racialized knowledge practices.
Epistemic Ignorance
Charles Mills (1997) described a racial contract that “[prescribes] norms for
cognition to which its signatories must adhere” (p. 11). The norms are maintained and
enforced by the racial contract that privileges white people over people of color physically
(in relation to resources, and in relation to economic opportunities) and epistemically.
According to Mills, what counts as knowledge of reality might diverge from empirical fact
when misinterpreting the world is necessary to maintain the racial hierarchy. Because of
the racial contract, one may learn to see the world wrongly with the assurance that the
misperception will be affirmed by white epistemic authority. This disconnect between
what Mills refers to as reality and normalized perception owing to white privilege gives
rise to an epistemology of ignorance. Epistemic ignorance is a “cognitive model that
precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of social realities” (Mills, 1997, p.
18). In order to maintain white privilege, a structured opacity in relation to race is
required. White misunderstandings and misrepresentations related to race are structures
of society that maintain systems of oppression.
In Mills’ (2007) update to the Racial Contract, he further develops his theory of
epistemic ignorance as it relates to race focusing on white ignorance as a historical and
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social practice that encourages misinformation and the spread of error. Even when the
cognizer is unaware (e.g. not intentionally being racist), the socio-structural nature of
white ignorance is operatively giving rise to mistaken beliefs. Mills grants that (1) not all
white people are equally complicit or participatory in white ignorance because other social
identities lead to varied experiences and socializations; and that (2) people of color can
manifest white ignorance too, owing to socialization and normative practices. Thus, Mills
(2007) argues that “white ignorance is best thought of as a cognitive tendency—an
inclination, a doxastic disposition—which is not insuperable” (p. 23). It is normative and
cognitive and, therefore, social structures maintain, reproduce, and promote the flawed
reasoning of the racial contract.
White ignorance, then, is embedded in the conceptual frame from which cognizers
view the world; it is already present in the concepts that drive perception. This is an
incredibly important connection between systemic ignorance and conceptual frames. Mills
is describing an existing error in the collective interpretive framework—epistemic
ignorance is not just missing information, but built-in bad information that drives our
normative concepts. It is because of the normative nature of white ignorance that lacunas
can come to exist. To maintain itself, white ignorance seeks to control narratives, not
correct for them, so that the “mystification of the past underwrites a mystification of the
present” (Mills, 2007, p. 31). For example, white ignorance permits contemporary society
to talk about slavery as a thing of the past while erasing the historical legacy of
entitlements for white people such as white veteran’s relative easy access to the GI Bill’s
mortgage and higher education benefits that provided access to middle-class status while
Black veterans faced institutional discrimination at the state level limiting their access to
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equally earned Federal benefits (Katznelson, 2006). Thus, people can argue for a
colorblindness that positions everyone as equal without having to worry about the
structural extent of the subordination of people of color (Bonilla-Silva, 2009). Ignoring the
history of what Katznelson calls “when Affirmative Action was white,” is not just a lacuna, it
is not just a lack of understanding or knowing; it is a crafting of collective memory (and
silencing of counter memory) for the benefit of white dominance.
Alcoff (2007) extends Mills’ account of epistemic ignorance concluding that
epistemic ignorance must be understood as a “substantive epistemic practice” (p. 56) in
and of itself (not just an absence) and, therefore, “the problem is in the cognitive norm, not
in the identity…so we need to focus on isolating and identifying these dysfunctional norms
and understand how they operate” (p. 50). For Alcoff, this understanding can be made
possible through an epistemic reflexivity that is critically aware of its relationship to the
systems in which it is produced.
Epistemic Injustice: Fricker’s Account
Over the past decade, many philosophers have taken up and critically engaged
theorizing about epistemic injustice. Most, if not all, work from, critique or make reference
to Fricker’s (2007) account. Therefore, this section starts with Fricker’s (2007) initial
theorizing and then explores theorizing by additional philosophers. In Epistemic Injustice:
Power and ethics of knowing, Fricker (2007) tries to sketch out a description of both the
distinctive type of harm done to individuals as knowers when their individual and social
group knowledge is discounted owing to identity prejudice,5while also developing an
account of how individuals can correct for these discriminatory practices. Linking social
epistemology and feminist standpoint theory, Fricker explores the spaces where epistemic
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interactions become, or—perhaps more importantly—reveal, a politics of epistemic
practice. Fricker is intentionally drafting a socially situated account of epistemic practice
that understands participants to be “operating as social types who stand in relations of
power to one another” (2007, p. 3). Fricker puts forth what she calls two forms of epistemic
injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Summarizing the difference between
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, Fricker (2007) argues:
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level
of credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage,
when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences…We might
say that testimonial injustice is caused by prejudice in the economy of credibility;
and that hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural prejudice in the economy of
collective hermeneutical resources (emphasis added, p.1).
We see clearly that Fricker acknowledges the two forms of knowledge injustice are linked;
hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage; therefore, we can infer that it is present in
the collective knowledge resource from which individuals (including perpetrators of
testimonial injustice) draw. However, Fricker does not define the two forms in relation to a
system or one another. Rather, she takes care to define each separately; this structure is
mirrored below during the review of her account.
Testimonial injustice occurs when identity prejudice, or prejudice based on
stereotypes associated with one of the speaker’s social identities, causes a knower’s
credibility to be devalued. When identity prejudice causes a listener to devalue the
speaker’s credibility, a “credibility deficit” is inflicted upon the speaker (Fricker, 2007, p.
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27). Since social constructs (e.g. gender, race, etc.) implicate patterns of systemic social
injustice in the epistemic exchange, Fricker concludes that a speaker is the victim of
testimonial injustice only if the hearer believes the speaker’s credibility to be deficient
because of the hearer’s internalized identity prejudice.
Fricker offers the treatment of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird
as an example of testimonial injustice. In the novel set in 1935 Alabama, Tom Robinson, a
Black man, is accused of raping a white woman even though he repeatedly proclaims his
innocence. As the trial progresses, evidence supplied by attorney Atticus Finch makes clear
to the reader that Robinson, who was injured by a machine years earlier at work, physically
could not have assaulted the woman. However, members of the all white jury believe
prevailing prejudicial racial stereotypes. Finch is aware of this, and in his closing argument
compels the jury to “do their duty” to dispense with the assumptions that “all Negroes lie,
that all Negros are basically immoral beings, that all Negro men are not to be trusted
around our women” (Lee, 1960, p. 202, emphasis in original).
Succumbing to the automatic and deeply rooted identity prejudice that forms the
architecture of the jurors’ perception of Robinson, the jury finds him guilty. The jurors fail
in their duty to use the evidence to make an appropriate testimonial judgment. This failed
epistemic duty wronged Robinson as it wrongs all victims of testimonial injustice, in their
capacity as givers of knowledge because they are “degraded qua knower, and they are
symbolically degraded qua human” (Fricker, 2007, p. 44).
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when “some significant area of one’s social
experience [is] obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity
prejudice in the collective hermeneutic resource” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155). Hence, the
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hermeneutical type of epistemic injustice occurs in the realm of socially accepted
knowledge (p. 155). As in the case of testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice is
systematic because the marginalization that causes it is part of a broad pattern that impacts
a social group (e.g. women of color). Thus, while testimonial injustice (the degrading of a
speaker’s testimony owing to credibility prejudice on the part of the hearer) is the primary
case of epistemic injustice, hermeneutic injustice marginalizes members of subordinated
groups by barring them from equal hermeneutical participation and, hence, their
experiences are not represented in the collective conceptual framework. Therefore, when
members of marginalized groups try to draw on their experiences they are not understood
by hearers outside of their social identity group; their knowledge, which cannot be
understood, is what Hill-Collins (2010) describes as “subjugated knowledge.”
Again, Fricker (2007) offers an illustrative example. In the case of hermeneutical
injustice, she describes the experiences of Carmita Woods. Woods requested a department
transfer after being repeatedly groped by a male colleague at Cornell University. When the
transfer request was denied, she resigned and subsequently applied for unemployment
insurance. The claims forms did not include a specific term for her experience, so Woods
listed “personal” as a reason for leaving her job, and she was therefore denied benefits.
When Woods shared her story in a class, the other women could identify with her
experience; they contacted a lawyer and decided to speak out against the condition they
named “sexual harassment.”
Woods and the women in her coalition identified a gap where the name of the distinct
social phenomena they were experiencing should be in the collective hermeneutical
resource. Certainly Woods herself suffered a wrong, but systemic social conditions
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occasioned the gap in the collective interpretive resource that caused her and other women
in similar conditions to be unintelligible. Because women lack(ed) social power, they had
unequal access to hermeneutic participation and so a significant aspect of her social
experience was marginalized and obscured from collective understanding.
Each type of epistemic injustice results in a particular type of corresponding harm
to the speaker. In the case of testimonial injustice, repeated wrongful denial of epistemic
credibility leads to a loss of knowledge for speakers because “not only is he repeatedly
subject to the intrinsic epistemic insult that is the primary injustice, but where this
persistent intellectual undermining causes him to lose confidence in his beliefs and/or his
justification for them, he literally loses knowledge” (Fricker, 2007, p. 49). Astutely, Fricker
offers social psychologist Claude Steele’s research about stereotype threat as evidence of
this phenomenon.
For over two decades, Steele has demonstrated that students sharing a social
identity for which there is a pervasive negative stereotype (e.g. women perform poorly on
math exams; Black students perform less successfully than their white peers on exams)
often have a tendency to perform to these stereotypes when the students have an
awareness that these negative stereotypes may be pertinent in a given situation (Spencer,
Logel, & Davies, 2016). In relation to racial stereotype threat, for example, Steele (2010)
found that Black students will perform less well than white students on the verbal portion
of the GRE when the test is described as a measure of intellectual ability as the students are
aware of related stereotypes that suggest their group has decreased intellectual ability
(Steele, 2010). However, when the same test is given to similar groupings of Black/white
students and the questions are instead described as “tasks,” (a non-evaluative operation)
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students with marginalized racial identities perform at the same or higher levels than their
dominant-identified counterparts as the identity related negative stereotype is no longer
relevant to the situation (Steele, 2010). Because of stereotype threat, students implicated in
socially constructed, identity-based credibility deficits functionally lose knowledge as the
fear of confirming a “broadly held negative stereotype” (Steele, 2010) about their social
group can occasion their academic underperformance (see for example Steele, 1997;
Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).
Importantly, when one is wronged in her capacity to give knowledge, as Fricker and
Steele demonstrate, one’s ability to give reason is also harmed; this is a dehumanizing act.
As Fricker compellingly argues:
The epistemic wrong bears a social meaning to the effect that the subject is less than
fully human. When someone suffers a testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua
knower, and they are symbolically degraded qua human…what the person suffers
from is not simply the epistemic wrong in itself, but also the meaning of being
treated like that…a dehumanizing meaning (Fricker, 2007, p. 44).
Given testimonial exchanges are the “primary form of knowledge in everyday life,”
excluding a subject from participating in credible exchanges marginalizes the knower in
her capacity as knower and as a social being (Alcoff & Martin, 2001, p. 236). Fricker (2007)
concludes that testimonial injustice is a form of oppression that can be “explicitly
repressive (as it was for Tom Robinson) or it can be a silent by-product of residual
prejudice in a liberal society” (p. 58).
Extending this argument, Fricker (2007) claims entire social groups can be harmed
in their capacity to understand their own social experiences because of hermeneutical
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injustice. In instances of hermeneutic injustice a group is excluded from participating in
both the pool and spread of knowledge because of identity prejudice in the collective
hermeneutical resource; the consequences of this are two-fold. In the case of Carmita
Woods, Woods as an individual was harmed because she was not able to make herself
understood to the people at the unemployment office because she lacked terms they would
understand. But the first harm occurred because of a prior harm: women as a social group
were not (are not) permitted equal participation in the shared hermeneutical resource so
their collective experiences were left out of the social interpretive framework. The latter
wrong is structural and discriminatory; it excludes groups from contributing to and from
spreading knowledge, while it also leads to a loss of epistemic confidence among
disadvantaged groups.
Fricker holds that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are related forms of
injustice. Fricker understands that hermeneutical marginalization impacts individuals
throughout their social/societal interactions (i.e. with their employers, in interactions with
state agents); this makes the injustice systemic, which renders victims susceptible to many
types of injustice just as testimonial injustice does. What is more, since hermeneutical
injustice is often situated in exchanges where the speaker cannot be heard as intelligible in
a testimonial exchange, it is often exacerbated by testimonial injustice. Fricker (2007)
concludes that both types of injustice then “bear the aspect of oppression” because “both
kinds of systemic epistemic injustice stem from structural inequalities of power” (p. 156).
Both forms of injustice lead to a decrease in epistemic confidence, which can, in turn,
perniciously impact the construction of one’s conception of self-hood. Fricker (2007)
asserts, “hermeneutical injustice can mean that someone is socially constituted as, and
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perhaps even caused to be, something they are not, and which it is against their interests to
be seen to be” so, as was the case with testimonial injustice, one’s very self-hood is
undermined (p. 168).
While making it clear that her goal is to develop a theory of epistemic injustice,
Fricker (2007) does begin to sketch a theoretical framework of epistemic justice. The
epistemically just listener is sensitive to context, to the speaker’s sincerity, and open to
trusting the interlocutor. Asserting that prejudice will always exist but will change with
history, Fricker insists that the listener has an ethical responsibility to develop a critical
link between how she was ethically socialized and her life experiences so that the listener
uses participation, practice and observation of testimonial exchanges to inform her latent
background theory.
Adjusting her judgments as she reflects and discerns that they are based on
stereotypes, the virtuous listener may undergo a change in how she generates credibility
judgments about members of certain socially constructed groups. The virtuous listener
reflects and then adjusts unfounded or erroneous judgments. Fricker posits that both
hearers and speakers have race and gender; neither party can be neutral. Again, we see
socially constructed identities are unavoidable factors in epistemic exchanges; however,
the hearer must develop a “corrective anti-prejudicial virtue that is distinctively reflexive in
structure” (Fricker, 2007, p. 156, emphasis original). A virtuous hearer must not
universalize race or gender; she must “neutralize the impact of prejudice in her credibility
judgments” through reflexive critical social awareness which, with practice, will occasion a
gestalt shift (Fricker, 2007, p. 192). I read “neutralize” to mean “to suspend” or “to adjust”
for what the listener knows to be internalized identity prejudice (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).
38

Developing this criticality requires a reflexivity that is practiced and on-going in
order to compensate for the negative impact of identity prejudices to increase the degree of
credibility one affords her interlocutor so her credibility is no longer downgraded by
prejudice. Fricker (2007) writes that epistemic justice is corrective; this means that
epistemic justice does not remove or deny the existence of societal prejudice. Rather, it
calls upon the hearer to be aware of and on the lookout for prejudices in her credibility
judgment and to make attempts to adapt her credibility assessment in order to minimize
habitually the impacts of these prejudices as to develop a pattern of “suitably
reconditioned” corrected credibility judgments (Fricker, 2007, p. 97). While Fricker’s
(2007) goal is for each listener to develop the virtue of testimonial justice, she does provide
an awareness that in our social world such a virtue will likely never be fully developed
because the nature of prejudices is that they are “ever changing and self-renewing” (p. 97).
Hermeneutical justice shares with testimonial justice the demand for reflexivity to
guard against and to correct for identity prejudice. However, in the hermeneutic context,
the listener must acknowledge that there can sometimes be more than one interpretation
of the truth, and so she should be listening to hear if her interlocutor is offering an
alternative interpretation. Listeners must correct for the credibility deficit resulting from
the speaker’s marginalization, and, as in the case of testimonial injustice, neutralize the
impact of identity prejudice which is, in this case, systemic to the shared hermeneutic
resource. Fricker (2007) argues that the virtue of hermeneutic justice is to “neutralize the
impact of structural identity prejudice on one’s credibility judgment” (p. 173). The
hermeneutically virtuous listener, then, is one who uses “reflexive critical sensitivity” to
recognize what might be a lack of intelligibility suffered by the speaker due to a lack in the
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collective hermeneutical resource, and she “adjusts or suspends” her “credibility judgment
accordingly” (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).
Epistemic Injustice: Broadening the Account
While Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice is seminal and a baseline
theory from which the concept of epistemic injustice used in this paper has developed, it
has also been critiqued and expanded in recent years. Hookway (2010) argues that there
are types of epistemic injustice that do not involve credibility (testimonial injustice) or
conceptual resources (hermeneutical injustice). Specifically, Hookway (2010) claims that
epistemic injustice can occur prior to the testimonial exchange taking place; namely, in the
silencing (or perhaps dismissing) of the possibility of an agent contributing testimony due
to assumptions about one or more of the individual’s social identities. According to
Hookway (2010) this is a genuinely epistemic injustice, but it is manifested outside of the
direct testimonial exchange in “practices that are constitutive of activities that are
distinctively epistemic” (p. 155).
Hookway offers a helpful school based example. Imagine a teacher who readily
answers a student’s question when the student raises her hand. If the student asserts that
she is confused or needs help, the teacher readily accepts her assertion and provides the
necessary information. However, when the same student raises her hand to contribute an
assertion—whether in question or statement form—the teacher dismisses the student out
of hand assuming that the student, because of her identity, cannot make a relevant
contribution. Hookway concludes that there are cases, such as these, where an individual is
assumed to not be able to contribute or to participate. The result, she argues, is that the
student no longer believes herself to be a possible participant in the inquiry or discussion;
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she loses epistemic confidence and is, in effect, epistemically silenced. Hookway (2010)
calls this the “participant perspective” of epistemic injustice (p. 155). Hookway (2010)
asserts that we must be critically aware of the way stereotypes and prejudices influence
our judgments about the relevance of an agent’s potential contributions. Epistemic injustice
can include a “refusal to take seriously the ability of an agent to provide information that is
relevant in the current context” (Hookway, 2010, p. 158).
Furthermore, Alcoff (2010) and Mason (2011) develop nuanced critiques of
Fricker’s articulation of epistemic injustice. Alcoff reads Fricker’s description of testimonial
injustice as the listener wrongly responding to speech, while hermeneutic injustice
preempts speaking. Thus, Alcofff reads Fricker as arguing that testimonial and
hermeneutical injustice are distinct but mutually supportive. These observations lead
Alcoff (2010) to raise two most interesting challenges for Fricker: “Can volitional epistemic
practice correct for non-volitional prejudices?” and “How can we address the structural
causes of credibility-deflation?” (p. 128).
For Fricker (2007), correction for identity prejudice in testimonial exchanges
requires that the listener either (1) bump up the speaker’s credibility to correct for a
deficit, (2) work to be neutral instead of skeptical or automatically misbelieving, (3) be
aware of the challenges some speakers face in making certain claims because of the
speakers’ social identity(ies). Alcoff (2010) finds these intentional and volitional acts to be
worrisome because “prejudice can operate quite effectively even when it runs counter to a
person’s own consciously held values and commitments” (p. 132). Alcoff does not reject
Fricker’s account of epistemic justice; rather, she finds the volitional virtue of testimonial
justice to be insufficient. She observes that more must be done, particularly in educational
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settings, to “correct the identity prejudices built up out of our faulty narratives of history”
(Alcoff, 2010, p. 132).
While it is important that Alcoff (2010) questions Fricker’s (2007) reliance on the
listener’s awareness and habitual corrective reflexivity, it is also relevant to consider
recent research in social psychology that finds both a person’s awareness and habits can
assist in decreasing implicit prejudices and stereotypes (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001;
Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012). Rudman et al. (2001) studied a course focused on
prejudice and conflict. They found that students experienced a reduction of explicit and
implicit prejudice through a combination of students’ motivation to be non-prejudiced,
students’ learning about their own biases, and students’ positive interactions with outgroup student peers in the course.6 Building from research on awareness of bias and the
reduction of prejudice, Devine et al. (2012) developed what they describe as a “prejudice
habit-breaking intervention” (p. 1267). These researchers found that if a person is aware
of their biases and is concerned about the consequences of those biases, that person can be
motivated to eliminate bias using five specific strategies. These strategies include:
stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, individuation, perspective taking,
and increased opportunities for contact (Devine et al., 2012).
There are some significant links between Devine et al.’s model and Fricker’s (2007)
account of testimonial virtue. Firstly, stereotype replacement helps a participant to
recognize her responses are based on stereotypes, identify them as stereotypical and then
reflect on why they occurred. This is followed by a consideration of “how the biased
response could be avoided in the future and replaces it with an unbiased response” (Devine
et al., 2012, p. 1267). Counter-stereotypic imaging requires the participant to correct for
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stereotypes by making positive counter-stereotypes accessible (e.g. the image of a smart
Black man in contrast to the common stereotype that associates Black man/people with a
lack of formal education) so one can challenge the validity of negative stereotypes.
Individuation calls upon the participant to learn more about stereotyped groups and their
members. These three strategies—stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging,
and individuation—are key practices of the virtuous listener (as described above).
Even though recent empirical research supports Fricker’s (2007) assertion that
listeners can/should correct for identity prejudice, her account is not without relevant
critique. Alcoff (2010), along with Mason (2011), further notes that Fricker’s account of
identity, particularly in the case of hermeneutical injustice, fails to acknowledge that social
identity can be the source of epistemic resources. Alcoff (2010) and Mason (2011) both
observe that, while social identity can be the source of unearned merit or marginalization,
it can also be a resource when “one is structurally positioned in society to tend to see what I
cannot” (emphasis original, Alcoff, 2010, p. 134). As Mason (2011) argues, social groups
with target identities often have “non-dominant interpretive resources from which they can
draw to understand and describe their experiences despite absences or distortions that
exist in so-called collective hermeneutical resources” (emphasis added, p. 295). Fricker
asserts that epistemic injustice leads to a loss of knowledge because people cannot name or
make intelligible their experiences. Mason re-interprets the Carmita Woods case, agreeing
it is an example of hermeneutic injustice, but Mason also thinks that the Woods case is an
example of epistemic agency. Woods sought out a feminist advocate and a women’s group;
Woods helped to organize and speak out against her rejected insurance claim with the
women in her group.
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As Mason (2011) describes:
These were not the actions of a woman mystified by her experiences of a yet-to-benamed phenomenon; rather, the silencing to which she had previously been subject
was exploded by the coalition she formed with other women who both corroborated
and supplemented her experiences with their own (p. 297).
Mason raises two important critiques: (1) it is the case that marginalized groups can name
and describe some shared phenomenon even if there is a lacuna in the collective
knowledge resources, and (2) coalition with others who share in a marginalized experience
can be an epistemic resource, one that can not only affirm an experience, but also help one
describe it and take action to resist and change it. Mason asserts that Fricker makes this
error because collective hermeneutical resource in Fricker’s account is the dominant
account. Mason wants to assert that there are multiple collective hermeneutical accounts,
including the ones shared by marginalized populations. Mason (2011) infers that this
implicit assumption about “collective” hermeneutical resources is problematic because it
does not explicitly hold members of dominant groups accountable for maintaining
distorted understandings of marginalized experiences/groups even though contrary, “and
arguably better, interpretations that fail (through systemic hermeneutic marginalization)
to gain voice in dominant discourse” are available in the non-dominant hermeneutic
resource (p. 300). This critique brings us back to Alcoff’s (2010) concern that epistemic
justice cannot rest on volitional acts. If alternative interpretations already exist and are
available, there is more to hermeneutic justice than a listener simply needing to neutralize
systemic misinformation.
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Advancing Mason’s argument that subordinate groups have a shared understanding
or knowledge resource, some philosophers describe marginalized groups’ epistemologies
of resistance (Medina, 2013; Dotson, 2011; Gilson, 2011; Bailey, 2007).7 Bailey (2007)
argues that the oppressed are simultaneously resisting subjects who learn to use the
“dominator’s tools” without replicating that dominance (p. 87). She extends this assertion
(which should be seen as an extension of DuBois’ [1994] double consciousness and Collin’s
[2000] outsider-within) to develop a notion of strategic ignorance. Strategic ignorance
takes the misconceptions of the dominant group and actively uses them to resist. So, for
example, the domestic worker who acts childlike and simple is knowingly performing to
the employer’s prejudices. As Bailey (2007) admits, strategic ignorance is not an answer for
white epistemic ignorance; it needs to be part of a “broad coalition of resistance” that
includes engagement between white people and people of color (p. 90). I believe this to be
an important extension of Fricker’s work because Bailey connects the clear need for white
people (people with dominant identities) to do the work of critically reflecting on their
knowledge assumptions and practices but while doing so in coalition with people of color
(people with non-dominant identities), so as to broaden their epistemic resources and
interpretive frames.
Bailey (2007) begins to articulate what I call a knowing in coalition with—an
important epistemic practice that can work against what Dotson (2011) characterizes as
epistemic violence, or the intentional silencing of marginalized groups. Black feminist
theorists (e.g. Patricia Hill Collins) have long argued that they are discounted as possible
knowers because there is widespread belief in the social narrative (social imaginary, as
Fricker calls it) that they are, for example, mammies or matriarchs. These controlling
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images prevent Black women from being perceived as knowers able to offer testimony.
Because white people are not aware of the narratives that permeate their immediate
responses to marginalized givers of testimony, they lack a contextual understanding of the
epistemic exchange. As Gilson (2011) powerfully argues, “A refusal to recognize historical
context constitutes ignorance about race and facilitates an ignorant preservation of white
privilege, which is simultaneously a way of remaining ignorant about oneself and one’s
share in that history” (p. 120). Gilson offers an important extension to Dotson’s critique: an
unwillingness of white people to be epistemically vulnerable, or open to an understanding
of themselves in relation to those with marginalized social identities, constitutes an
epistemic ignorance. Epistemic vulnerability is what makes learning and, thereby, reducing
ignorance epistemically possible because it repositions the listener not just as a knower
and a judger of epistemic credibility, but also as an interlocutor who understands that she
can learn from the experiences of others. This practice of epistemic openness is a “resource
for ethical response and political resistance to oppression” (Gilson, 2011, p. 324).
However, epistemic vulnerability should not only be practiced by those with
dominant social identities. Gilson (2011) foregrounds an intersectional understanding of
identities arguing that that those who experience both privilege and oppression must
practice epistemic vulnerability because all interlocutors have lapses and gaps “in our
experience and attunement that demand alterations in our knowing” (p. 325). Gilson
(2011) understands that Fricker’s lacunas in the shared interpretive resource do not only
impact the oppressed as those who cannot be made intelligible and the privileged as those
who cannot understand the oppressed, but, rather, that the lacunas impact all knowers
differentially relative to their social locations. In other words, everyone stands to learn
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from others to alter beliefs, ideas and a sense of self; Gilson (2011) does not leave people
who experience oppression out of the process of creating hermeneutic justice. This is not to
suggest that everyone stands to learn equally or that we can discount power. Rather, it
serves to include the active work of marginalized groups in creating epistemic justice.
There are many examples of marginalized groups raising awareness and taking
action towards epistemic justice, including the vignette described at the start of this
chapter. Reflecting on my own journey as a white woman in education, I realize that when I
began teaching as a twenty-one-year-old in an alternative certification program, I very
likely would have read a writing prompt like the journalism assignments as “man robs
store” with no awareness of its problematic assumptions and harmful implications. It is
through content learning about identities and inequalities, contact with my students of
color and through the habitual practice of perspective taking as a critical educator that I am
now able to identify both the problematic nature of the assigned scenario and the
testimonial injustice experienced by the students in the course. Still, it was only after
multiple semesters of hearing this scenario, in this particular journalism course, raised by
Latina/o students that I am able to perceive the pervasive, harmful impact of these
exchanges on students. When the professor ignores students’ feedback semester after
semester, students feel offended and de-valued as learners in the course. Students’ agency
as learners and as journalistic writers is undermined by their professor’s denial of their
insight and dignity as racialized knowers in the course.
If hermeneutic justice is something to strive for, it will need interpretations of
marginalized groups to join with the developing critical awareness of dominant groups.
Meaningful interactions (e.g. course based dialogue) with marginalized groups is what
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informs the critical self-reflection of dominant identified individuals (this too is shown by
the social psychology Fricker is so keen to draw from, for example, Gaertner & Dovidio,
1986). Acknowledging the influence of marginalized collective resources can also help to
account for the understanding individuals can develop owing to their multiple social
identities. For example, white women experience marginalization as a result of being
women, but also dominance owing to their whiteness. This allows for access to both
dominant and non-dominant collective hermeneutical resources. This combination can be
powerful and epistemically invaluable; although, too often, white women rely on the safety
of their whiteness and fail to act on their access to the marginalized experience of women
across race and ethnicity. A productive account of hermeneutical justice needs to consider
the ways that those with dominant identities come to understand their privilege. This
includes listening to the voices and experiences of those with marginalized identities
because we know these experiences provide knowledge that is otherwise inaccessible in
the dominant framework (Alcoff, 2010: Hill-Collins, 2000).
The practice of centering the experiences and voices of marginalized groups is easily
captured when we consider the “achievement gap” in urban education. When popular
media imagines the “under achievement” of students of color in school, films like
Dangerous Minds and Freedom Writers rely on the archetypes of the white savior and poor,
criminalized bodies of color to depict white teachers as heroes and young Black, Latino and
Asian students as pathological problems (Yosso & García, 2010; Giroux, 1997). Even federal
policy, like Race to the Top, relies upon and rewards “damage centered” (Tuck, 2009)
research and initiatives that concern themselves with “at risk” low-income youth of color
who need to be “saved” or “fixed” (Baldridge, 2014).
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However, when urban students of color provide the analysis, the “achievement gap”
is reframed as an opportunity gap caused by inadequate educational resources and the low
expectations of teachers and administrators (Fine et al., 2005). When the students
themselves tell the story of urban education, we learn that students care about learning,
school, and their communities, which is a stark contrast to the angry, disengaged youth
prevalent in the media, public policy, and the dominant social imaginary. Another layer of
analysis, still, can be engaged via attention to scholars of color researching education
inequalities. For example, challenging the “achievement gap” framing of education
inequalities, Ladson-Billings (2006) posits an “education debt” accumulated over time on
the part of public education systems and owed to students with marginalized racial
identities. Powerfully, Ladson-Billings (2006) identifies that this educational debt has
historical, economic, socio-political and moral dimensions, positioning racialized
disparities not as a pathological deficit, but a systemic and intentional reproduction of
power and inequality. The reframing of the “achievement gap” as an opportunity gap by
students of color and as an education debt by Ladson-Billings (2006) illustrates why
marginalized knowledges play a key role in creating hermeneutic justice.
Moreover, taking race as an example of identity prejudice, George Yancy (2012)
offers a powerful argument for why unconcealing whiteness is necessary for addressing the
power latent in hermeneutic injustice. Yancy (2012) describes the need to intentionally
name and identify whiteness; he asserts:
After all, without this pre-conditional critical work of naming whiteness, of critically
engaging whiteness, “diversity” might simply function to serve the hidden values of
whites as a group; diversity might function as a way of feeding white moral
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narcissism; and, diversity might function as a way of making whites comfortable,
giving them a false sense of post-racial and post-racist arrival (p. 44).
It is insufficient to seek diversity or inclusion without first asking who is doing the
including and into what are we asking people to be included. People of color are not
welcomed into a “diverse” educational setting, for example, if they are asked to ignore their
cultures, stories, and knowledges to adopt normative whiteness. This is neither diversity
nor inclusion; it is protecting whiteness within the narcissistic guise of including them in
us; it recenters whiteness and the invisibility of power.
Hermeneutic virtue must include a critical engagement of dominance and power,
not simply alternative collective epistemic resources, if epistemic virtue is to do more than
feed the moral narcissism of those with dominant identity. Like diversity, neutrality
becomes hijacked when it does not hold itself open for critique. Without a critical analysis
of privilege, in this case white racial dominance, epistemic justice cannot be achieved. It is
not enough simply to become aware, for example, that urban students of color do care
about their education. This may alter one stereotype or prejudice. However, without the
further understanding that urban students of color are constructed as educationally
disengaged in the dominant interpretive framework precisely because this construction
serves to marginalize urban youth of color, all we are doing is replacing one stereotype
while leaving untouched the knowledge practices that systemically privilege some (e.g.
white people and white teachers) at the expense of others (e.g. people of color and students
of color). In calling for critical self-reflexivity Fricker (2007) is hoping to encourage those
with dominant identities to practice a vigilant awareness, but, by excluding non-dominant
perspectives (Hookway, 2010) and non-dominant epistemic resources (Mason, 2011;
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Alcoff, 2010), one can see how Fricker can be read as reinscribing dominance and giving it
far too much social power. Whether or not the experiences of marginalized people can be
easily read within a dominant framework, it is essential that non-dominant interpretive
schemas be centered through alliances and action with and across social groups. This
knowledge making in coalition with others is at the heart of what I perceive to be a socially
just epistemic virtue.
Epistemic Justice: Broadening the Account
Since Fricker (2007) published her theory of epistemic justice, philosophers have
critiqued and expanded her account (McKinnon, 2016). We now review some of these
critiques with the goal of incorporating both diverse voices and diverse perspectives to
explore a more hermeneutically inclusive theory of epistemic justice. As Mason (2011)
argued, acknowledging multiple hermeneutical frames is an important step for listeners
with dominant social identities working towards epistemic justice (Pohlhaus, 2012).
Pohlhaus (2012) extends this idea to develop a theory of willful hermeneutical ignorance:
“which occurs when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge
epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated
marginally. Such refusals allow dominantly situated knowers to
misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world” (p. 715).
In describing willful hermeneutic injustice, Pohlhaus (2012) also bridges Fricker’s (2007)
responsibility gap between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Fricker’s (2007)
account states that individuals are responsible for testimonial injustice, but, in the case of
hermeneutic injustice, individuals are merely the vehicle for injustice since the cause is
structural. Pohlhaus (2012) describes willful hermeneutical ignorance as “simultaneously
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an agential and structural injustice” (p. 725). Pohlhaus (2012) takes up Fricker’s (2007)
example of Tom Robinson’s trial in To Kill a Mockingbird to re-theorize hermeneutic
injustice in terms of willful hermeneutical ignorance.8 Tom Robinson is a Black man
accused of raping a white woman in To Kill A Mockingbird; his white attorney presents the
testimony of Tom Robinson and additional evidence to prove he is innocent. However, the
jury still finds Tom Robinson guilty.
Pohlhaus (2012) argues that not only is the jury unwilling to believe Robinson, but
the members of the jury cannot believe him because they are using epistemic resources
that “do not allow for the intelligibility of what Robinson has to say” (p. 725). The structural
error is not only in what the jurors don’t know because they only access the dominant
racist hermeneutic frame; the jurors are also unwilling to engage with Tom Robinson, a
knower “outside dominant social positions” (p. 725). Pohlhaus (2012) powerfully points
out that the unwillingness of jurors to earnestly engage epistemic interdependence with a
marginalized knower “results in a current structural problem with regard to the transfer of
knowledge” (p. 725). Members of the jury are failing to use the appropriate epistemic
resources and they are instead actively using faulty epistemic resources to systemically
understand a marginalized knower. The jurors’ unwillingness to engage an alternative
situated knowledge is both an agential and a structural wrong. This is a powerful and
compelling extension of hermeneutic injustice.
As a feminist epistemologist, Pohlhaus (2012) utilizes standpoint and social
epistemology to explain what the jurors specifically, and dominant hearers generally, can
do in epistemic interactions with marginalized knowers. Pohlhaus (2012) acknowledges
that epistemic resources are maintained and developed in conjunction with others,
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interdependently. As Pohlhaus (2012) importantly describes, “When epistemic agents
refuse to allow the development of or refuse to acknowledge already developed epistemic
resources for knowing the world from situations other than their own, they contribute to
epistemic injustice and maintain their own ignorance about whole parts of the world” (p.
733). However, if those with dominant social positions take an active interest in the world
as it is experienced from those with subordinate social positions they can participate in a
more critical standpoint. Dominant knowers do not have to choose to maintain their
ignorance.
Instead, Pohlhaus (2012) argues, “When one genuinely cares to know something
about the world as experienced from social positions other than one’s own, one must use
epistemic resources situated to (and developed from) those situations” (p. 731). How does
one do this? Pohlhaus (2012) suggests: (1) allowing those resources to be well developed
by those who are situated in them, (2) to trust marginalized people who have developed
situated knowledges, (3) to take an active interest in learning how to use epistemic
resources that are structurally marginalized. When a dominantly situated knower refuses
to take these steps, Pohlhaus (2012) argues they are culpable for willful hermeneutic
ignorance.
Dotson’s (2012) critique of Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic justice takes a far
more critical assessment than Pohlhaus’ (2012). Dotson (2012) cautions,
“One can advocate for better, more responsible epistemic conduct capable of
reducing epistemic oppression, without also harboring unrealistic expectations for
superior epistemic conduct and abilities necessary for eliminating epistemic
oppression entirely” (emphasis original, p. 25).
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In fact, Dotson (2012) claims Fricker’s (2007) theory contributes to epistemic injustice by
only offering accounts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, effectively foreclosing
the possibility of other forms of epistemic injustice. One such form is what Dotson (2012)
calls “contributory injustice.”
Dotson (2012), like Mason (2011) and Pohlhaus (2012), calls Fricker to task for
assuming in her writing that there is one hermeneutic resource to which knowledge is
included in or structurally excluded from. For Dotson (2012), contributory injustice is,
“caused by an epistemic agent’s situated ignorance, in the form of willful hermeneutical
ignorance, in maintaining and utilizing structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources
that result in epistemic harm to the epistemic agency of a knower” (p. 31). Because there
are different hermeneutical resources a hearer could chose to utilize instead of the
structurally prejudiced dominant hermeneutic resource, the hearer plays a role in
contributory injustice by “willfully refusing to recognize or acquire requisite alternative
hermeneutical resources” (p. 32). Importantly, Dotson (2012) argues this unwillingness on
the part of the hearer compromises her agency as a knower. Dotson (2012) importantly
extends Pohlhaus’s (2012) conception of willful hermeneutic ignorance by arguing that
contributory injustice includes,
“an epistemic agent’s willful hermeneutical ignorance in maintaining and
utilizing structural prejudiced hermeneutical resources thwarts a knower’s ability
to contribute to shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community by
compromising her epistemic agency” (p. 32).
This is an extremely important extension in theorizing the possibility for epistemic justice.
Fricker (2007) identified the harm dominant knowers perpetuate against marginalized
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knowers based on structural identity prejudice. She only highlighted the harm done to
marginalized knowers (an important point to be sure). Mason (2011) and Pohlhaus (2012)
showed that marginalized knowers have not only agency but also access to alternative
hermeneutical frames. Dotson (2012) further argued that dominantly situated knowers
have a responsibility to seek marginally situated hermeneutical resources.
Dotson (2012) is asserting that dominant knowers, in their unwillingness to engage
alternate epistemic resources, compromise their own agency as a knower; dominant
knowers cannot be contributors to shared epistemic resources when they are unwilling to
give up the structural prejudiced resources that benefit them. We see now that a concept of
knowledge justice does not only have to include the agency of those with marginalized
knowledge while acknowledging the complicity of dominantly situated knowers, but it
must also incorporate a degradation on the account of dominantly situated knowers ability
to contribute knowledge owing to the structural prejudice they willingly accept when only
engaging the hegemonic epistemic resource. All knowers, dominantly and marginally
situated, lose epistemic agency when exclusively engaging the hegemonic hermeneutic
resource because the dominant hermeneutic resource is self-preserving.
Medina (2013) offers an exceptional analysis of what he calls active ignorance that
can help us expand not only Bailey’s (2014) and Dotson’s (2012) critiques, but it will also
help us expand our understanding of hermeneutic epistemic harm. Medina (2013) expands
Dotson’s (2012) concept of hermeneutic ignorance with his own similar active ignorance,
which he describes as a type of meta-ignorance. Active ignorance, like Fricker’s (2007)
hermeneutic injustice, has sociopolitical roots, but Medina (2012) further describes active
ignorance as supported by psychological structures that prevent agents from “corrective
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misconceptions and acquiring knowledge because they would have to change so much of
themselves and their communities before they can start seeing things differently” (p. 58).
Individuals and groups are made desensitized to phenomena and bodies of evidence
because active ignorance is self-preserving and protects itself. Because of these defense
mechanisms protecting active ignorance, Medina (2013) asserts that active ignorance is a
form of meta-ignorance. As Applebaum (2016) summarizes, “we not only don’t know, but
we do not know that we don’t know and think we know. Such ignorance becomes a form of
collective denial of certain social facts and uncomfortable truths by those who benefit from
such ignorance” (p. 449).
Medina (2013) charges that Fricker (2012) excludes the harm of meta-ignorance
from her account of hermeneutic injustice because she does not perceive the harm of
credibility excess (afforded to knowers with dominant social identities) because of her
focus on direct, momentary testimonial exchanges. However, as Medina describes, if we
track the intersecting trajectories of testimonial exchanges and understands what happens
before and after the momentary exchange, we can appreciate the unfair character and
harm of credibility excess. Medina (2013) powerfully asserts that when he affords others
with more dominant identities than his (for example, white or heterosexual people) greater
credibility than they actually deserve it “can have the effect of my voice feeling inhibited,
my becoming vulnerable to gullibility, my self-trust shaken or fading in comparison to the
disproportionate epistemic trust given to the speaker, and so on” (p. 61).
Importantly, Medina describes the problematic nature of epistemic dominance in
holistic terms:
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“By assigning a level of credibility that is not proportionate to the epistemic
credentials shown by the speaker, the excessive attribution does a disservice to
everybody involved: to the speaker by letting him get away with things; and to
everybody else by leaving out of the interactional a crucial aspect of the process of
knowledge acquisition: namely, opposing critical resistance and not giving
credibility or epistemic authority that has not been earned. Insofar as the
transmission of knowledge is affected, there is an epistemic harm that affects all
involved in the testimonial exchange—speaker, hearer—attributor, and other
interlocutors included” (emphasis original, p. 61).
Medina (2013) argues that because those with dominant social identities receive an unfair
upgrade to their credibility, those with non-dominant epistemic identities are indirectly
affected by receiving comparatively less epistemic trust. As an example, Medina (2013)
points to social science research that shows students ascribe greater authority to male
teachers than to female teachers, and, similarly, to white teachers over teachers of color;
thus, even though all professors occupy positions of intellectual authority, students, from
the first day of class, ascribe to professors differing levels of credibility based on social
identity. Medina (2013) shows deep appreciation for the relational and situated nature of
credibility appraisals, and he pays attention to their role in hermeneutic in/justice.
Medina (2013) uses Fricker’s (2007) example of Tom Robinson’s trial in To Kill A
Mockingbird to highlight the relational nature of credibility judgments. Medina (2013)
writes that jurors are able to disregard Tom’s testimony (even after Atticus proves he was
unable to assault Mayella Ewell, a white woman) not only because Tom was Black, but
because of a “hierarchy of credibility presumptions at play” in the shared dominant
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hermeneutic resource; this hierarchy asserts that white women are more credible than
Black men and that white men (like the prosecutor) are more credible than white women
(p. 66). The novel illustrates how credibility deficits and excesses go hand in hand, in a
compare and contrast relationship: the credibility excess of a white woman (Mayella) and a
white man questioning (the prosecutor) a Black man (Tom Robinson) lead to the near
complete diminishing of the Black man’s credibility causing him physical, sociopolitical,
and epistemic harm.
Medina (2013) then circles back to meta-ignorance. The jurors’ resistance to know,
their unwillingness to genuinely consider alternative evidence, comes from what Medina
calls the social imaginary and what this dissertation, like Fricker, is calling structural
prejudice in the dominant hermeneutic framework. The dominant hermeneutic framework
“produces a strong form of epistemic laziness that blocks evidentiary explorations. This
laziness becomes an epistemic obstacle in the pursuit of knowledge that can easily lead to
epistemic injustices” (Medina, 2013, p. 68). Those who experience the epistemic injustice
may be disadvantaged by being unable to recognize or properly conceptualize the
phenomena they are experiencing (as Fricker argues) or they may not only be able to
describe the phenomena but also the hermeneutical gap (as Mason and Dotson noted).
Medina (2013) contends that the experience of oppression does “afford the opportunity to
go beyond the received dominant view, to recognize its limitations and flaws, and
occasionally to develop an alternative viewpoint, a dual consciousness, or even a
kaleidoscopic consciousness that can hold and maintain active multiple perspectives
simultaneously” (emphasis original, p. 74).
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Medina’s (2013) introduction of a kaleidoscopic consciousness is an important
contribution to the discussion of hermeneutic justice. Bailey (2014) summarized Dotson’s
(2012) argument clarifying, “The biggest obstacle to epistemic liberation (the one Fricker
misses) is that our shared epistemic resources are themselves inadequate for
understanding their inadequacy” (emphasis original, p. 66). As Dotson (2012) and Bailey
(2014) are arguing, the flawed, dominant hermeneutic resource is an epistemic system that
contains within it the structures for preserving and legitimating insufficient epistemic
resources. How then can knowers, particularly dominantly situated knowers, do as
Pohlhaus (2012) and even Dotson (2012) suggest: become acquainted with differently
situated, particularly marginally situated, epistemic resources?
How indeed? We know they can, as the social science research summarized in
chapters one and four describe that white students are able to critically engage new
information about others and demonstrate a decrease in prejudice and racist attitudes (see
for example Gurin et al., 2013). Medina (2013) offers us philosophical insight with the goal
of hermeneutic justice in mind. Medina describes the necessary habits or behaviors
necessary for addressing and correcting meta-ignorance. He argues justice requires the
“restructuring of habits and affective structures…it also involves political action and deep
cultural transformation” (Medina, 2013, p. 76). Privilege knowers must remain open to
engaging the perspectives of others (like Fricker, 2007, suggests) but they must
additionally develop the ability to:
“move back and forth among alternative sensibilities, to look at the world from
more than one perspective, to hold different viewpoints simultaneously so that they
can be compared and contrasted, corrected by each other, and combined when
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possible. It is important to entertain different perspectives without polarizing them,
dichotomizing them, and presenting them as exhaustive” (Medina, 2013, p. 78).
Privileged knowers must demonstrate a critical openness that is both cognitive (open to
new information and interpretations) but also affective (practicing empathy and
perspective taking). Medina describes this as developing a kaleidoscopic consciousness.
Medina rightly observes that different experiences of oppression do not only bring rise to a
double consciousness (the experiences of the oppressed and their awareness of how their
experiences are interpreted by others) but a multiplicity of perspectives. Medina also calls
for white agents (dominant knowers) to develop a multiplicitious perspective. One way
privileged knowers can do this, as Applebaum (2016) describes, is to learn about the
discursive moves dominant knowers use to avoid confronting their implication and
participation in oppression. Privileged knowers need to broaden their cognitive and
affective openness to others, but they also must become continuously, critically aware of
the habits they use to conceal their own participation in epistemic injustice.
Kaleidoscopic consciousness involves developing particular habits, “the continuous
exposure to and a serious engagement with multiple and conflicting viewpoints”
(Applebaum, 2016, p. 450). Medina (2013) like many social scientists described in earlier
chapters, emphasizes the importance of (1) contact with others, (2) critical engagement of
new knowledge (including the self-awareness that raises consciousness about privileged
knowers moves to self-conceal their participation in oppression) and interpretations of
phenomena, and (3) affective engagement with others (which includes empathy and
perspective taking) (see for example, Gurin et al., 2013).
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However, given meta-ignorance is structural—rooted in flaws within the dominant
interpretive resource—it is not enough for the epistemically privileged to only work on
their own knowing and unknowing; structural change is required as well. Medina (2013)
explicitly calls for political action and deep cultural transformations. Collective agency and
action taking are required to expand, broaden and correct the social imagination, or the
shared hermeneutic resource. The dysfunction of epistemic injustice is not merely
epistemic, but structural and political. The structural conditions in which people live must
be changed in addition to peoples’ mind and ethical character in order to work towards
epistemic justice. Medina (2013) candidly observes that such a transformation would take
multiple generations. As Medina (2013) summarizes, “In order to overcome situations of
oppression, we need to transform the polis and its citizens simultaneously, and in multiple
ways; we need to change their ethical, their political, and their epistemic ways of relating”
(p. 85).
Moving Towards Action: A Social Responsibility Model
Epistemic injustice occurs when identity prejudice harms people with salient nondominant social identities in their capacity as knowers; it occurs when and because nondominant knowers’ perspectives, interpretations and experiences are left out of the
dominant hermeneutic resource because of a structural failing/inequality (Fricker, 2007).
However, there are multiple hermeneutic resources (Alcoff 2010; Mason, 2011), and
dominantly situated knowers have a responsibility to willfully engage other (i.e. nondominant) interpretive resources through epistemic interdependence with differently
situated others (Pohlhaus, 2012). When dominantly situated knowers refuse to access and
acquire alternative hermeneutic resources, they are contributing to hermeneutic injustice;
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Dotson (2012) calls this contributory injustice. Choosing to use flawed knowledge
resources without attempting to access other perspective, interpretations or
understandings is simultaneously a choice to maintain hermeneutic injustice (Dotson,
2012). Dominantly situated knowers do not seek out alternative interpretive frameworks
because they (1) do not know (that the dominant hermeneutic frame is flawed and limited
and that there are other interpretive resources available) (2) don’t know what they need to
know but (3) believe that they know; for privileged knowers, active ignorance becomes a
form of collective denial, an unwillingness to know, which Medina (2013) describes as
meta-ignorance.
Thus, epistemic injustice is rooted in structural oppression, in the intentional
exclusion of non-dominantly situated hermeneutic resources from the dominant, shared
hermeneutic frame; it is caused by socio-political injustices, and also by the contributory
injustice of privileged knowers who participate in the marginalization of non-dominant
knowers and knowledges (Fricker, 2007; Alcoff, 2010; Mason 2011; Pohlhaus 2012,
Dotson, 2012; Medina, 2013). In order to work towards epistemic justice, individuals need
to develop a kaleidoscopic consciousness and collectively work toward socio-political
transformation (Medina, 2013). Developing a kaleidoscopic consciousness allows us to
hold multiple perspectives simultaneously, comparing and contrasting them while
practicing affective awareness (Medina, 2013). These personal knowledge habits must be
combined with social-political and institutional restructuring through shared responsibility
(Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007).
Young (2011) offers a blueprint for a social connection model of justice that is
helpful for understanding educational institutions’ and stakeholders’ responsibility for
62

epistemic justice. When thinking about responsibility for justice, both individual and
institutional, in relation to structural injustice, Young (2011) introduces and describes a
social connection model, which finds that “all those who contribute by their actions to
structural processes with some unjust outcomes share responsibility for the injustice” (p.
96). In order to illustrate her theory of a social connection model, Young (2011) offers the
example of “Sandy” and housing markets in the US context. Summarily, Sandy is a single
mother of two who lives in an apartment in a building in a city. Sandy commutes for three
hours to work as a store clerk in a suburban mall every day. A developer buys Sandy’s
apartment building and decides to convert it into condominiums; Sandy has two months to
find a new place to live, which she is happy to do because the building was poorly
maintained and the rent was too high. She decides to look for an apartment closer to work
on the bus line. She diligently searches for an apartment but the rents are too high; she
seeks the help of a rental agent who goes out of his way to help her. Sandy applies for a
housing subsidy program and is told the wait is about two years; rental housing along bus
routes is expensive and the bus commute is very long, so Sandy decides to use some of her
housing funds for a car. Sandy gives up her quest for a two-bedroom apartment and settles
on a one-bedroom apartment in a building with no amenities that is a forty-five minute
drive to her job. However, with her eviction deadline looming, Sandy learns that rent for
three months is required as a deposit for the apartment and, having used her savings on a
down payment for her car, she cannot afford the apartment deposit.
Sandy’s story is at once common and complicated. Young (2011) points out, “The
median asking rent for a two-bedroom apartment in 2004 was $974, far out of reach of the
40 percent of renters with incomes less than $20,000. Only one in eighty subsidized
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apartment units is located in an area with strong job growth, and one-fifth are located in
areas whose employment opportunities are declining” (p. 44). Young (2011) asserts that
she intentionally crafted this story so that no one person is doing something wrong; for
example, the rental agent goes out of his way to help Sandy, and Sandy is a working adult
pays her rent and works hard. Sandy’s position—the position of being vulnerable to
homelessness—is a social-structural position (Young, 2011). Young argues that the wrong
experienced by Sandy in this story is a structural injustice, not a wrong attributable to
single person or policy.
We see a parallel pattern of structural injustice in the educational experiences of
students of color and low-income students. As we reviewed in chapter two, inequality in
educational settings accompanies students with non-dominant social identities from preschool through beyond college graduation; it is not caused by students, just as Sandy’s
experiences in the housing system are not caused by her or others in her position.
According to the Department of Education’s research, students living below the federal
poverty level showed the lowest kindergarten readiness, and Black and Hispanic student
populations had the highest percentages of students living in poverty (Kena, Musu-Gillette,
Robinson, Wang, et al., 2015). Low-income students are more likely to be concentrated in
schools where there is also a concentration of low-income students (Orfield &
Frankenberg, 2014). Federal education reports reveal that white and Asian students score
higher than Black and Hispanic students on national reading and mathematics exams (Kena
et al., 2015).
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Similarly, less Black and Hispanic high school students graduate on time than their
white and Asian counterparts, and less Black and Hispanic students immediately enroll at
colleges (Kena et al., 2015). College enrollment rates were higher for students from high
income families than those for students from low income families (Kena et al., 2015).
Students with college degrees earn more than 65% more than those without college
degrees (Synder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016). Thus, students from low-income families and
students of color are more likely to begin their engagement with school systems less
prepared then students with higher-income and White students, and they end their
educational engagement in the same position, locking them—or at least pushing them—
into a cycle limiting their abilities to excel academically and socio-economically. This
mapping in education, like the mapping of Sandy and the housing market, fits Young’s
(2011) conception of a structural injustice.
Educational Institutions’ Particular Social Responsibility
This chapter argues that because educational institutions maintain and reproduce
epistemic injustice, they are responsible for addressing it. However, one could rightly raise
the issue that many institutions and systems contribute to epistemic injustice, and, yet, this
dissertation argues that education institutions in particular have a responsibility for
addressing epistemic injustice (Robertson, 2013). Why? This question, in many ways,
harkens to perhaps the most fundamental questions in educational theorizing: In a
democratic society, what is education for, who is education for, and what is the role of
education?
While many philosophers and theorists across disciplines have attempted to answer
these questions, it is John Dewey who advanced these questions most, offering invaluable
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insights and a copious foundation from which to consider why education institutions in
particular should work to address epistemic injustice. Dewey (1954) characterizes
democracy as, above all, community life in which the citizen is participant who shares in
the good produced by conjoint civic activity. Individual citizens are not simply voters, but
they are manifestations of society who, taken together, produce a national consciousness.
For Dewey (1888), democracy is more than a political relationship; it is an ethical one.
Dewey (1888) asserts:
Democracy, like any other polity, has been finely tuned in the memory of a historic
past, the consciousness of a living present, the ideal of the coming future.
Democracy, in a word, is a social, that is to say, an ethical conception, and upon its
ethical significance is based its significance as governmental. Democracy is a form of
government only because it is a form of moral…association (p. 240).
For Dewey, it is in acting as a public, in which the action of the individual expresses the
consciousness of the majority, that the ethical grounds of a democracy is constituted. When
a member of a participatory democracy acts corruptly, this corruption is “the expression of
society through him” (Dewey, 1969, p. 234). There is a mutual responsibility inherent in a
democracy because the people who constitute it are members of a shared system. Dewey’s
(1954; 1969) characterizations of democracy are marked by some key features. Firstly,
Dewey is acknowledging the importance of individual agents and individual agents in
relations to others. Dewey names the importance of considering the past, present and
future: issues and actions cannot be taken as snapshots in time but, rather, in relation to
the dynamic temporal movement of the issue/action. While this is very different from
standpoint theory, it is important that Dewey is theorizing an understanding of democratic
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relations as situated. Lastly, Dewey expresses a concept of shared responsibility; each
member of society shares responsibility for societal corruptions.
For Dewey, a great difficulty in a democracy is that of the public coming to recognize
itself and to “define and express its interests” (1954, p. 146). Dewey perceived
communication and education as essential for public participation and identification.
Dewey (1954) used the analogy of a pie to describe communication as neither given nor
shared, or passed from one person to the next; rather, Dewey (1944) described
communication as “participation in a common understanding” (p. 4). For there to be
consensus, there must be a common purpose; if there is to be a common purpose shared
among citizens, they must be able to communicate with each other. When interlocutors
communicate, they share experience in such a way that it becomes a “common possession”
that “modifies the disposition of both the parties who partake in it” (Dewey, 1944, p. 9). In
this way, participation in a democracy is a communicative experience. Therefore, we once
again see an ethical connection. A just society makes provisions for free discourse among
all its members on equal terms. Each member must have both a personal interest in and
access to communication in order to engage in participatory deliberation.
Dewey (1954) describes education and knowledge making as an essential method
for the democratic public to constitute itself. Dewey (1954) envisions knowledge as a
function of communication and association because objects of our knowledge are
constituted by “habits reflecting social customs” (p. 161). Although knowledge is a
reflection of habit and custom, change can occur over time when observations of
consequences lead to “reflection, discovery, invention, [and] experimentation” (p. 162). As
such, changes in knowledge, particularly socio-political knowledges, should be publicly
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accessible so it can be both obtained and tested. Dewey (1954) observed, “For public
opinion is judgment which is formed and entertained by those who constitute the public
and is about public affairs” (p. 177). The public needs information to deliberate (if the
consequences are known, Dewey calls this knowledge) and make choices (on a decision
which is to impact the future, Dewey calls this opinion) to form a national consciousness.
Knowledge is not simply something in the mind; it is an interaction with the world.
People, the everyday public, are possessors of knowledge as are the experts. In fact, Dewey
(1902) called for a “socialism of the intelligence” during his speech entitled School as Social
Center delivered before members of the National Education Association. Dewey argued
that community requires sharing of the full range of intellectual resources. Knowledge is
not something for one to possess or own, it is social in both its creation and in its use.
If knowledge is a public transaction, we can infer communication is essential for its
dissemination. A public requires, “full publicity in respect to all consequences which
concern it…Without freedom of expression, not even methods of social inquiry can be
developed” (Dewey, 1954, p. 167). The function of knowledge is to provide information for
action (Dewey, 1944). For the public to use knowledge, it must be communicated. However,
communication is not sufficient. False information can be disseminated. Deception is an
inherent risk where there is free exchange of information.
In our society, the public is too large, too multiple and too ill-defined for each
participant to investigate all knowledge claims; what is more, knowledge is too specialized
for the public to investigate on its own (Dewey, 1954). Dewey describes experts as
reciprocal informants of the public. The masses must be able to inform the experts of their
needs; the experts must be assured their testimony will be used for public deliberation. In a
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society as technical as ours, where each citizen has affinities with multiple social groups, it
cannot be the case that each member of the public can “have the knowledge and skill to
carry on the needed investigation;” however, it must be the case that each member of a
participatory democracy has the ability to “judge…the bearing of the knowledge supplied
by others upon common concern” (p. 209)
Therefore, Dewey describes communication, open discourse, and education, socially
generated knowledge making, as essential for democratic participation and deliberation.
However, given the theoretical and empirical claims presented in this dissertation thus far,
we must ask if this is possible. Is open discourse and public knowledge making possible in a
society with structural inequality built into its epistemic infrastructure? Dewey argued it is
not. Dewey acknowledged inequality and participatory disenfranchisement based on social
identity. He called for the “breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national
territory” precisely because they prevent citizens from being perceived as knowers, as
communicators of experience and perspectives (Dewey, 1944, p. 87). When a group is
denied their opportunity to contribute to public knowledge making and social discourse,
their ideas are prevented from becoming the “possession of the multitude,” and democracy
cannot be brought about (1954, p. 208). In 1927 (the original printing of The Public and Its
Problems) Dewey offers a precursor to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007); he wrote that
denying a group the ability to produce and share knowledge in the dominant social
discourse forestalls the development of knowledge for the “multitude” and prevents
democratic participation; he outlined some hallmark features of hermeneutic injustice.
What is more, Dewey (1944) forwarded schools as a site for addressing this
inequality. He wrote, “The intermingling in the school of youth of different races, differing
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religions, and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment” (1944, p. 21).
Crucially, Dewey argued that there is a direct connection between education and the ability
for individuals across social groups to participate in and benefit from social life.
Presciently, Dewey (1944) wrote:
Since education is a social process…a criterion for educational criticism and
constriction implies a particular social ideal (emphasis original). The two points
selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in
which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and
freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other
words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse
and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for
participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures
flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of
associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of
education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and
control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes (emphasis added)…” (p.
99).
Dewey (1944) writes that education is the social process for bringing about shared
participation in knowledge making; it is supposed to bring about open communication of
experience. The social function of education is to make sure students across identities can
participate in the social good, in institutions, in democratic life. Democratic society requires
education systems and institutions which ensure individuals can participate in social
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relationships and create social change. The epistemic habits and equity that education
systems are responsible for are essential for democratic participation.
Dewey (1944) originally wrote Democracy and Education in 1916. Since 1916, some
have critiqued Dewey (a founding member of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People) for not making public statements about race and
imperialism (Margonis, 2007). Specifically, Dewey has been criticized for not calling
attention to lynching, violence against African Americans, and U.S. colonialism abroad; even
though, he did take strong and public stands against “racial reasoning and racial policies”
(Margonis, 2007, p. 175). While this is not the place for an exploration of Dewey’s cannon
or his scholar activism, it is very important, particularly within the scope of this
dissertation, to acknowledge Dewey’s white ignorance and, even if unwitting, participation
in white epistemologies of ignorance. Not even Dewey, a white man writing about the
unethical role of racial inequality in education and democratic life at the turn of the 19th
century, was able to stand completely outside of white hegemonic norms.
Thus far, this chapter has presented Dewey’s arguments for the essential role of
education in knowledge formation and communication in a democracy. Now, it is important
to explore the role of education institutions in ensuring “children—black, brown, yellow,
red, mixed—would be miseducated to be racially inferior adults subordinate to white
adults and children” (Outlaw, 2007). Outlaw (2007) describes the systemic production and
distribution of ignorance across generations to order life as:
This miseducation would involve the deliberate, ethnically sanctioned production of
ignorance in folks of all races, too often with concomitant dehumanizing notions: of
themselves as superior white persons and race, others as inferior races of nonwhite
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nonpersons—and these doings and consequences were both legal and ethical (p.
197).
Dewey (1944) acknowledged that education for democratic participation was not possible
due to structural inequality. What Outlaw argues is far more pernicious—education was
and is used as a tool for systemically producing structural inequality to maintain a
racialized hierarchy.
Outlaw (2007) specifically argues that teachers, administers, schools, institutions of
higher learning and even philosophers and scientists contribute to:
epistemologies by which to produce and legitimate ignorance (emphasis original).
That is, lack of knowledge…would be a consequence of the certainties produced by
the sanctioned and legitimate knowledge that would render it unnecessary to
engage with fully and humanely, with empathy and openness
to people of color (p. 198).
To put it in terms relevant to central argument of this dissertation, it is not only the case
that educational institutions maintain and reproduce epistemic injustice because epistemic
injustice is structural. Rather, the role of educational institutions has been to create,
develop, and legitimate epistemic ignorance. Put more bluntly, the social role of
educational institutions has been to produce epistemic injustice. Educational institutions
are not simply “one of the pathways” to injustice; they are the primary state actors in the
structural production of epistemic injustice.
Outlaw (2007) argues that schools were and continue to be the principal means of
the social ordering that privileges white students at the expense of students of color.
Outlaw (2007) traces this ordering historically, from schools for “Indian” children which
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were devoted to assimilating Native American children to “Euro-American white people”
by relocating these children from their communities to isolated boarding schools where
indigenous languages and knowledges were erased. Similarly, racial apartheid existed in
public schools in the United States until the Brown verdict in 1954, and, as chapter two of
this dissertation showed, this racialized segregation still exists today.
Schools are and have always been racialized in structure and content. Powerfully,
Outlaw (2007) writes:
Knowledge productions and knowledge mediation, including ethical knowledges
practiced within school, and institutions of higher learning, were thoroughly
conditioned by the…imprimatur of whiteness (emphasis original) …In knowledge
production, too, the norms structuring hierarchic reality were at play.
Epistemological matters of truth and falsity and validity and fallacy were ordered in
keeping with the racial hierarchy of White Supremacy” (p. 202).
Outlaw argues that every aspect of formal knowledge making in the United States has
served the production of white racial hierarchy. While the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas named that separate schools are inherently
unequal and unjust and brought to light the unethical nature of academic apartheid, Outlaw
(2007) argues much more must be done to reeducate and redirect the work of “knowledge
workers” to correct for the “miseducation” that is still present in educational institutions
across academic levels. Thus, we see, that educational institutions and stakeholders bare a
particular responsibility for epistemic justice because they participate in systems that have
and continue to be producers of epistemic injustice.
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Educational Institution’s Social Responsibility
Using the analysis of philosophers like Dotson (2012) and Medina (2013) we can
understand educational structural inequality—described above—as a particular type of
harm, as hermeneutic injustice. Structures within education systems create, maintain and
reproduce the marginalization of non-dominant knowers and their knowledges. Education
institutions and those involved (administrators, educators, policy makers, etc.) with them
participate in the exclusion of non-dominant knowers and their perspectives,
interpretations, and experiences from the dominant interpretive framework; they also
prevent those with dominant epistemic identities from learning about multiple
hermeneutic frameworks with epistemic agents who are different from them. Medina
(2013) and Dotson (2011) argued that participating in hermeneutic injustice is indeed
simultaneously contributing to hermeneutic injustice. Individuals, with and in their
relationship to institutions and social structure, are responsible for the flaws in the
dominant, shared knowledge framework. This contribution to structural injustice is
distinctly epistemic in nature because it maintains, reproduces and extends (generational)
hermeneutic injustice.
Again, structural injustice in education contributes to hermeneutic injustice; it
produces an epistemic harm. As participators in systems of education, dominantly situated
knowers share responsibility for this wrong. To be clear, this does not mean that
professors, teachers, principals, provosts or parents choosing homes based on school
districts are aiming to marginalize our society’s epistemically vulnerable knowers and their
knowledges—just as Young (2011) does not charge a particular landlord or rental agent for
the harm Sandy experiences in the housing example above. In fact, Young (2011) argued
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most of the actors in that scenario were doing their best within structures and policies that
produced injustice. Agents relative to educational structural injustice, just like agents
relative to housing structural injustice, share responsibility as participators in a collective
that participates in the production of injustice. Young (2011) clarifies:
“The ground of my responsibility lies in the fact that I participate in the structural
process that have unjust outcomes. These processes are ongoing and ought to be
transformed so that they are less unjust. Thus I share with others the responsibility
to transform these processes to reduce and eliminate the injustices they cause. My
responsibility is essentially shared with others because the harms are produced by
many of us acting together within accepted institutions and practices…”(p. 110).
Clearly, dominantly situated knowers who participate in educational structural
injustice, which produces hermeneutic injustice, share the responsibility to transform the
process, policies, practices, and false ideologies that produce these injustices. They must do
this, as Young (2011), argues in collective action with others independent of and in
conjunction with state policies and programs. As this educational structural injustice is
epistemic in nature—producing and maintaining hermeneutic injustice (and therefore
testimonial injustice which is rooted in testimonial injustice)—collective action must be in
conjunction with non-dominantly situated knowers.
Dominantly situated knowers cannot access multiple hermeneutic resources unless
they act and learn in conjunction with differently situated others. Righting educational
structural injustice requires dominant knowers to actively face their contributions to
hermeneutic injustice. Therefore, taking responsibility for educational structural injustice
requires epistemically privileged agents to address hermeneutic injustice in the ways that
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Medina (2013) outlined: in collaborative contact with others through the critical
engagement of new knowledge and affective engagement with the perspectives of others.
Further, educational institutions share in both accountability and responsibility.
Anderson (2012) argues that structural injustice in education is distinctively epistemic in
nature. Anderson (2012) points out that when disadvantaged social groups are
systematically deprived access to education those groups will tend to be excluded from
participation in inquiry. Because of this exclusion:
An original structural injustice—denial of fair opportunities for education—
generates additional structural inequalities in opportunities of exercising full
epistemic agency, which is an injustice to the speakers (Anderson, 2012, p. 169).
Further, Anderson (2012) argues that because epistemic injustice is structural, it requires
structural remedies. Anderson (2012) asserts that epistemic justice for institutions is
required for the “universal participation on terms of equality for all inquirers” (p. 172). Just
as individual are accountable for individual acts, “we are responsible for how we act
collectively. Epistemic virtue is needed at both individual and structural scales” (Anderson,
2012, p. 171). Anderson connects epistemic injustice and structural injustice by asserting
that educational injustice is simultaneously structural and epistemic. Because it is
structural, it requires structural remedies in addition to individual ones so marginalized
individuals and groups can exercise full epistemic agency.
Conclusion
This chapter presented foundational literature on social epistemology which helps
us to understand knowledge and knowledge making as both situated and relational. This
was followed by a detailed explication of Miranda Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic
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injustice as testimonial (when a hearer wrongs a speaker in the speaker’s capacity as a
giver of knowledge) and hermeneutical (when a gap in the dominant framework wrongs a
social group by systemically excluding it, and its members, from the social production of
knowledge). This chapter then used recent critiques of Fricker’s account to broaden
epistemic injustice to include not just the testimony but also the epistemic resources,
strategies, and advocacy of persons and groups with target social identities. Additionally,
this chapter offered a review of current and extended theorizing about Fricker’s account of
epistemic justice. Taken together, philosophers describe epistemic justice as including the
following characteristics:
(a) Dominant knowers correcting for flaws in their credibility judgments through
critical reflection (Fricker, 2007);
(b) Dominant knowers accepting that marginalized knowers develop epistemic
resources from their situations/standpoints; privileged knowers trusting
marginalized knowers and their situated knowledges; and dominant knowers
actively learning how to utilize structurally marginalized knowledge (Pohlhaus,
2012);
(c) Dominant knowers engage their responsibility to seek out marginally situated
hermeneutically resources (Dotson, 2012);
(d) Dominantly (and subordinately) situated knowers restructure habits and
affective structures to enable them to simultaneously engage different
perspectives and viewpoints without polarizing them (develop a kaleidoscopic
consciousness), and engage in collective agency and action taking toward
political and cultural transformation (Medina, 2013).
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The following chapters in this dissertation will call upon these four characteristics of
epistemic justice while exploring the guiding questions detailed in chapter one: do students
experience epistemic injustice in education settings, can social justice pedagogy help to
address epistemic injustice, and what are the theoretical implications for considering
epistemic justice as it relates to educational institutions.
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Chapter 3
Identity Matters: Schooling and Knowledge Making
“African American students are gifted and brilliant. They do not have a culture of poverty
but a culture of richness that can be brought into classrooms to facilitate learning. African
American students learn when they are taught. They must be helped to overcome the
negative stereotypes about themselves and their communities that permeate our culture”
–Lisa Delpit (2012, p.25).
As Delpit (2012) argues, student identity matters in the classroom. This chapter
offers responses to two questions raised in the introduction. First: In what ways do students
with marginalized racial social identities experience epistemic injustice in educational
settings? This chapter will use the Department of Education’s recent data to give an account
of the ways in which, as social groups, marginalized students experience a systemic form of
educational inequality. Specifically, reporting by the Department of Education in the
Condition of Education 2015 (Kena et al., 2015) and in The Digest of Education Statistics
2016 (Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016) offer a comprehensive account of student academic
performance as measured by standardized exams across the nation at consistent grade
levels (for example, fourth and eighth grade); these data are important as they represent
the government’s own reporting on the outcomes of public education. Additionally, the
governments’ reporting (Kena et al., 2015; Snyder et al., 2016) is consistent with scholarly
research on inequality in education (Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014; Orfield et al., 2016)
further explored below. Providing depth and context for the reported government data,
this chapter then reviews some analysis offered by scholars of color researching the
experiences of marginalized students to understand how some of this systemic
marginalization occurs. Finally, the chapter then explores the voices of students
experiencing epistemic injustice themselves. By reviewing literature on Youth
Participatory Action Research (YPAR) and youth involved in programs based in intergroup
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dialogue (IGD) pedagogy, the second half of this chapter begins to unpack question two
raised in the introduction: Can social justice pedagogies interrupt the production of
knowledge inequalities in the educational setting?
Creating Knowers & Lesser Knowers: Identity and Education
At its most basic, epistemic injustice, occurs due to gaps in the dominant
interpretive framework (Fricker, 2007). Described in detail in chapter two, philosophers’
characterizations of epistemic injustice, most specifically the hermeneutic type, include:
•

When a lacuna in the collective interpretive framework puts members of
subordinate social groups at a disadvantage when making meaning of their
own experiences, rendering it difficult to make the experiences of those with
subordinate social identities intelligible to those who only utilize the
dominant interpretive framework (Fricker, 2007);

•

When members of marginally situated groups can name and describe shared
phenomena even when a lacuna exists in the dominant interpretive frame.
Coalition with others who share a marginalized experience can be an
epistemic resource (Mason, 2011);

•

When tools developed by marginally situated knowers are not
acknowledged by dominantly situated knowers (Pohlhaus, 2012; Dotson,
2012);

•

When marginally situated knowers are silenced because dominantly
situated knowers assume they do not have a contribution to share
(Hookway, 2010);
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•

When knowers do not maintain multiple perspectives simultaneously
(Medina, 2013).

Across characterizations, hermeneutic injustice harms members of subordinated groups by
barring them from equal epistemic participation (at the very least). The first half of this
chapter asks: Do schools (pre-primary through university) do this? Do schools create
environments in which students with subordinate social identities—for example students
of color and low-income students—do not and cannot thrive academically? Are schools
environments that, instead of developing the intellectual abilities and habits of all students,
functionally track students into groups of “knowers” and “lesser knowers” based on social
identity? Let us start answering these questions by reviewing data that make clear how
learners fare in public institutions in the United States based on their social identities.
Patterns: Preprimary. The Federal Government shared data looking at the
demographics of students through the 2013 academic year (Orfield et al., 2016; Kena et al.,
2015; Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014) and offered a broad sketch of students’ identities in
relation to features and outcomes of education. Differential educational experiences across
social identity groups begin at age three, when students begin to enroll in preprimary
programs focused on children ages three to five (Kena et al., 2015). The National Center for
Education Statistics found that 41% of white students, 31% of Hispanic9 students, 37% of
Black students, and 41% of Asian students were enrolled in preprimary education
programs (Snyder et al., 2016, p.64).10 The National Center for Education Statistics further
found that enrollment in preprimary programs varied by parents’ highest level of
education (Snyder et al., 2016).11
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Preprimary programs, while not required, play a significant role in preparing
children for the elementary school experiences. Kindergarten teachers assess “approaches
to learning” at the start of kindergarten; positive approaches to learning include behaviors
such as completing tasks independently, paying attention in class, organizing materials, and
following classroom rules; these positive behavior traits are associated with academic
achievement in kindergarten and first grade (Kena et al., 2015). As part of the Early Child
Longitudinal Study, teachers ranked members of the 2010-11 kindergarten class on their
“approaches to learning” based on a four-point scale where a rating of one equated to a
child never demonstrating a behavior while a ranking of four equated to a child
demonstrating a behavior very often (Kena et al., 2015). Students with the most access to
preprimary programs demonstrated greater positive approaches to learning than those
students who did not have access to preprimary programs. The average rankings were
higher for Asian (3.1) and white (3.0) kindergarteners than they were for Hispanic (2.9) or
Black (2.8) students (Kena et al., 2015).
Just as the there is a synchronicity between the races/ethnicities of children
attending preprimary school and students demonstrating positive approaches to learning
(as conceptualized in this report) in kindergarten, there is also a parallel synchronicity to
parent(s)’ highest levels of educational attainment. In 2013, the percentage of children
attending a preprimary program was highest for children whose parent(s) obtained a
graduate degree or higher and lowest for children who parent(s) obtained a less than a
high school credential; 75% verses 55% respectively (Kena et al., 2015). As noted
previously, students with the most access to preprimary programs demonstrated greater
positive approaches to learning than those students who did not have access to preprimary
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programs. Students’ household incomes are similarly parallel. Snyder et al. (2016) reports
that, “Approaches to Learning rating was highest for kindergartners in households with
incomes at or above 200 percent of the federal poverty level (3.1) and lowest for those in
households with incomes below the federal poverty level (2.8)” (p. 4). In 2013, 13% of
white and Asian students, 32% of Hispanic students, and 39% of Black students under the
age of 18 lived in poverty (Kena et al., 2015, p.52).
Thus, by age five, white and Asian students who are most likely to have a parent
with a college or graduate degree, more likely to have higher income levels, and who are
most likely to attend preprimary school are also most likely to demonstrate high levels of
positive approaches to learning at the start of kindergarten (based on the criteria
measured by Kena et al., 2015). Conversely, by age five, Black and Hispanic students, who
are most likely to live in poverty and to not attend preprimary school, and whose parents
are less likely to have college degrees demonstrate lower levels of academic preparation
based on the teachers’ assessment of their approaches to learning (Kena et al., 2015).
Patterns: Public Elementary & Secondary School. From fall 2002 through the 2012
school year, the number of students enrolled in public12 elementary school increased and
the racial/ethnic identities of the students enrolled shifted dramatically (Kena et al., 2015;
Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014). The number of white students enrolled in public schools
decreased from 28.6 million to 25.4 million (decreasing their share of public enrollment
from 59 to 51%), and the number of Black students decreased from 8.3 million to 7.8
million (17% to 16%); the number of Hispanic students increased from 8.6 million to 12.1
million (from 18% to 24%) (Kena et al., 2015, p. 80). However, the number of students
enrolled by racial/ethnic identity is not the most striking characteristic of the demographic
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shifts impacting public schools in the United States. Rather, when looking at which students
are attending schools together, we learn that 64 years after the Supreme Court’s Decision
in Brown v The Board of Education of Topeka Kansas, schools are indeed still deeply and
problematically separate (Orfield et al., 2016).
After years of residential re-segregation and court ruling limiting the impact of
Brown, the public schools in the United States are now comprised of largely white or largely
student of color populations (Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014). Specifically:
At a national level, the typical white student is now in a school whose student
composition is nearly three-fourths white, one-eighth Latino and one-twelfth
black…That is, in a classroom of 30 students, the classmates of the typical white
student would include 22 whites, 2 blacks, 4 Latinos, one Asian and one “Other.” On
the other hand, the typical black or Latino student would have 8 white classmates
and at least 20 black and/or Latino classmates. The typical Asian student would
have 12 white classmates and 7 Asian classmates, meaning about two-thirds of the
classmates of the Asian student would be from groups with higher average parent
education levels, higher incomes and considerably higher levels of test scores. These
data begin to sketch out the divergence in the experience of different student
groups. The typical Latino student is now in a school that is 57 % Latino, more
segregated than black students are with fellow blacks and second only to whites in
the level of in-group isolation. Nationally black students are in schools that are
already more than one-sixth Latino, with much higher ratios in some regions
(Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014, p.12).
Regardless of geographic setting, the majority of white students are enrolled in majority
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white schools; they are learning in relative racial isolation. Meanwhile Black and Latino
students have low exposure to white students in large metropolitan areas, midsize central
cities and rural areas (Kena et al., 2015; Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014). Black students will
have greater exposure to white students in suburbs than Latino students will (Kena et al.,
2015; Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014). This means Black and Latino students are exposed
mostly to students of color while white students are exposed mostly to other white
students. Does this matter?
Resoundingly yes. While the experience of students enrolled in re-segregated
schools in the United States will be explored below, let us return to the link between socioeconomic status and students’ racial/ethnic social identities. During the 2011-12 school
year, 45.8% of all public school students were designated as low income; however, the
schools with the highest concentrations of low-income students were also schools with the
lowest concentrations of white and Asian students (Orfield & Frankenberg, 2014). The Civil
Rights Project refers to the concentration of Black and Latino students in schools where
there is also a concentration of low-income students as “double segregation” (Orfield &
Frankenberg, 2014, p. 15). The pernicious implications of double segregation are expressed
through both student learning and attainment outcomes.
On national reading assessment exams, white and Asian students score higher than
their Black and Hispanic counterparts (see Table 2 below based on Kena et al., 2015). In
fact, white students’ performance on the fourth grade reading test improved in 2013 (over
2011) when no other racial group experienced a significant increase in performance (Kena
et al., 2015). Student test scores reveal that in fourth, eighth and twelfth grades (grades in
which national exams are administered) white and Asian students consistently score
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higher than their Hispanic and Black counterparts. In 2013, NES (2015) reports that exam
scores (on a scale of 0 to 500) in the fourth grade by race were: 232 for white students, 235
for Asian students, 206 for Black students, 207 for Hispanic students (p. 135). In 2013,
eighth grade reading test scores by race were 276 for white students, 280 for Asian
students, 250 for Black students, 256 for Hispanic students (Kena et al., 2015, p. 135). For
twelfth graders in 2011, reading test scores by race were 297 for white students, 296 for
Asian students, 268 for Black students, 276 for Hispanic students (Kena et al., 2015, p. 136).
Consistent with reading scores, the same racialized differential exists in
mathematics scores for fourth, eighth, and twelfth graders tested in 2013 (see Table 3
below based on Kena et al., 2015). In 2013, fourth graders by race scored the following on
national math exams: 250 for white students, 258 for Asian students, 224 for Black
students, 231 for Hispanic students (Kena et al., 2015, p. 142). For eighth graders during
the 2013 school year, math scores were: 294 for white students, 306 for Asian students,
263 for Black students, 272 for Hispanic students (Kena et al., 2015, p. 142). Twelfth grade
scores (measured on a scale of 0-300) were 162 for white students, 172 for Asian students,
132 for Black students, 141 for Hispanic students during the 2013 school year (Kena et al.,
2015, p. 144).
Student Population
White Students

Fourth Grade
Scale 0-500
232

Eight Grade
Scale 0-500
276

Twelfth Grade
Scale 0-500
297

Asian Students

235

280

296

Black Students

206

250

268

Hispanic Students

207

256

276

Table 2. Summary of National Reading Test Results by Race. Based on Kena et al., 2015, The Conditions of
Education 2015, US Department of Education National Center for Educational Statistics.
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Student Population
White Students

Fourth Grade
Scale 0-500
250

Eight Grade
Scale 0-500
294

Twelfth Grade
Scale 0-300
162

Asian Students

258

306

172

Black Students

224

263

132

Hispanic Students

231

272

141

Table 3. Summary of National Math Test Results by Race. Based on Kena et al., 2015, The Conditions of Education
2015, US Department of Education National Center for Educational Statistics.

Across academic school years and across years (1973-2013), white and Asian
students scored higher on national reading and math exams than did Black and Hispanic
students (Kena et al., 2015.). Given Orfield and Frankenberg’s (2014) descriptions of the
double (re)segregation of schools—white and Asian students both attend schools that are
predominantly white and middle-high socio-economic status while Black and Hispanic
students mostly attend schools that are majority Black and Hispanic and low socioeconomic status—we see from student test scores Black and Hispanic students’ learning is
negatively linked to demographic isolation in public schools.
These harmful racialized patterns continue as students graduate from both high
school and secondary education institutions. During the 2011-12 school year, 81% of high
school students graduate on time with a regular high school diploma (Kena et al., 2015, p.
174). On time regular graduation rates by race were 93% for Asian students, 85% for white
students, 76% for Hispanic students and 68% for Black students (Kena et al., 2015, p. 175).
After graduating from high school, 66% of high school graduates immediately enrolled in
college during the 2012-13 school year (Kena et al., 2015, p. 184). However, when
differentiated by race, 81% of Asian students, 67% of white students, 66% of Hispanic
students and 57% of Black students immediately enrolled in college after graduating on
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time from high school (Kena et al., 2015, p. 187). By income, for the 2012-13 school year,
college enrollment rates for high school students who graduated on time with a regular
diploma were 31 percentage points higher for high income students than the rates from
those in low income families (Kena et al., 2015, p. 186).
It is not only that low-income students and students of color were less likely to
directly enroll in college; we must also consider the intersections of race and class which
disproportionately leave low income students of color outside the “Ivory Tower” and,
therefore, outside the cycle of economic and educational advancement. This summary of
recent Department of Education reports on the state of education in the United States
(Kena et al., 2015; Snyder et al., 2016), illustrates a not only a pernicious cycle but also a
two-tiered education system. Low-income students, and, most specifically, low-income
students of color, enter pre-school demonstrating fewer school readiness markers then
their high-income and Asian and white peers. This trajectory continues with decreased test
scores in reading and math through elementary and middle school, and it culminates in
decreased high school graduation and college enrollment rates.
Government data reporting the relationship between post-graduate earnings and
students’ identities demonstrates the intersections of race and gender in terms of level of
education and related economic achievement; specifically, white men earn more than men
and women of color and white women. In 2013, men with a Bachelor’s degree earned 67%
more than men with a high school degree as their highest level of educational attainment;
women with a Bachelor’s degree earned 65% more than woman with a high school degree
as their highest level of educational attainment (Snyder et al., 2016, p. 746). Again, social
identities matter as women with Bachelor’s degrees earn 32% less than their male
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counterparts, while women with high school degrees earn 31% less than men with high
school degrees as their highest level of educational attainment (Snyder et al., 2016, p. 746).
This gender-based wage gap can also be differentiated by race. Specifically, in 2015, white
women earned 82% of the hourly wage as white men, while Asian women earned 87 cents
per dollar of white men, and Black women earned 65 cents per dollar of white men, while
Hispanic women earned 58 cents per dollar earned by white men (Patten, 2016).
Ability to participate in shared public life, both economically (pay gap) and
intellectually (“achievement” gap), is negatively linked to education inequality.
Importantly, these inequalities mean that students of color and low-income students are
less likely to thrive in schools and not persisting from pre-school through to college. If
these students are not present, their experiences are not present. The knowledges they
bring from their homes and communities are not present. As philosophers have argued,
hermeneutic injustice occurs when the epistemic resources and interpretations of those
marginally situated are not acknowledged (Dotson, 2012; Mason, 2011; Pohlhaus, 2012). A
curriculum in which marginally situated knowers are being positioned as “underperforming” and in which marginally situated knowers are pushed out as they age through
the educational system, is one in which the experiences, interpretations and knowledge
resources of those students are not acknowledged. Given, marginalized students and their
intellectual tools are not acknowledged in educational systems, dominant knowers (and to
some extent marginalized knowers) are not able to develop kaleidoscopic perspectives;
they cannot maintain multiple perspectives simultaneously if only one dominant
perspective is present in schools; this is also a form of hermeneutic injustice (Medina,
2013).
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Perniciously, marginalized students are not then developed as “knowers” in the
education system. Their identities as knowers, as givers of knowledge, in the public sphere
(the dominant socio-political framework) is diminished because these students experience
systemic marginalizing in education systems. To be clear, this dissertation does not argue
that this marginalization is merely passive. These statistics do not merely show that
marginally situated students are not benefiting from the education system. Rather, as will
be argued more below, education systems are intentionally marginalizing the knowledges
of non-dominant students at the expense of students’ academic achievement. Take, for
example, the Federal court case over Arizona’s law barring ethnic studies in schools as a
response to the growth of “La Raza” studies courses focused on Latino/Hispanic students
(Depenbrock, 2017).
In the 1990’s, teachers in the Tucson Unified School District sought to address the
“achievement” gap experienced by Latino students by offering courses that not only
focused on Latino history but also developed confidence and self-esteem among Latino
students (Depenbrock, 2017). Students enrolled in these elective courses graduated from
high school at higher rates than their peers and also scored higher on state-wide exams
(Cabrera, Milem, Jacquet, & Marx, 2014). Even though courses that (1) acknowledged the
cultural histories, experiences and perspectives of Latino students while (2) celebrating
their identity as learners improved student outcomes, the Arizona legislature outlawed
ethnic studies courses. Legislators argued that courses should not focus on race, on
students’ identities, or acknowledge systems of oppression. Elected government officials
are attempting to prevent marginally situated knowers from (1) learning about their
histories and culture, (2) collectively interpreting their histories and experiences together
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as part of their schooling and from (3) naming the marginalization they experience within
the context of structural inequality (oppression) (Planas, 2017). This is hermeneutic
injustice operating in and being reproduced in the education system.
What of the broader implications? One could ask if these government data thus far
presented reflect not a lack in a collective system, but rather if they perhaps point to
deficiencies students bring to education systems. Inferring that students from particular
social identity groups consistently experience less positive outcomes in education settings
because of a flaw in their families or communities is a prime example of a false narrative
appearing plausible due to a lacuna in their shared knowledge resource. Education
scholars, particularly researchers of color, have researched and thoroughly rebutted this
deficit perspective (Delpit, 2012; Ladson-Billings, 2006). It is not because of students or
families that students with subordinate identities are systemically disadvantaged in
education systems. It is because of systemic inequality that marginalized students and their
experiences are left out of the public production of “knowers” in the primary, secondary
and post-secondary education systems.
Further, it is because of hermeneutic injustice—a gap in the shared dominant
knowledge resource—that conversations about academic success focus on poverty and
racial identities as pathologies and “risk factors” (Noguera, 2009) instead of focusing on
factors such as teacher quality and turnover, implementation of culturally relevant
curriculum and pedagogies, and school structures that do not disproportionately punish
Black students with severe penalties like suspension (Delpit, 2012; Noguera, 2009; Madrid,
2011).
Delpit (2012) compiled her decades of research and current work in Baton Rouge,
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Louisiana, and generated a ten-point list of characteristics that would, taken together,
create quality public, urban schools. In contrast to the current standardized test focused
model of education, which punishes students, teachers, principals and schools based on
test scores, a successful urban school focuses on teaching. Delpit calls for a focus on good
teaching, on offering more content, not less, to poor, urban students, on critical thinking
while also teaching fundamentals; providing students with socio-emotional support; on
building from and recognizing students’ strengths; on using metaphors and experiences
from the children’s lived experiences to connect them with knowledge taught in the school
room; on building a sense of community in the classroom and in the school; on continually
assessing students’ needs and utilizing diverse strategies to address them; on respecting
children’s home cultures; on fostering students’ connections to their communities outside
of school.
Delpit’s list is a comprehensive prognosis for what must be done to close the
“achievement gap” documented with the most current Department of Education in the first
half of this chapter. These data are necessary to provide an account of the ways in which
students suffer or benefit differently from education institutions from pre-school through
college based on their social identities; students of color and low-income students suffer
from systemic marginalization while white students benefit from a system in which they
benefit most and are allowed to operate as the “achievers,” as the standard knower that
other students are not measuring up to. However, too often, we (we include well-meaning
researchers and educators as well as the general public and politicians) look at these
differential education outcomes and ask: Why aren’t Black students becoming proficient
readers? Why are Latino students struggling with math? Or Why are low-income students less
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prepared for school than their middle and high-income peers? We are placing the onus and
responsibility for systemic problems in education on learners, on families, on social groups
(Delpit, 2012; Milner, 2013; Ladson-Billings, 2006).
As Milner (2013) argues, the consequences of focusing on an “achievement gap”
include: forcing the comparison of “culturally diverse students with White students” out of
context or without an understanding of “the reasons undergirding and behind the causes of
disparities and differences that exist between and among groups” (p.4); holding white
students as the norm to which other students are compared which may “covertly and
tacitly construct [white students] as intellectually and academically superior to others”;
prevent researchers and others from focusing on the assets that students and families with
education “deficits” bring with them; and achievement gap explanations and explorations
focus on social groups and not the inequitable structures, systems, contexts, policies and
practices that lead to a perceived achievement gap (p. 5). Milner argues that deficit laden
achievement gap explanations focus on outcomes from standardized tests, graduation
rates, school discipline and what students do not have (i.e. certain, narrowly defined
knowledge and skills); they do not focus on the opportunities that students are denied.
Expanding the Hermeneutic Frame: The Educational Opportunity Gap
Rather than focus on an achievement gap based social group membership, some
education scholars have argued we must shift the narrative or, to place in the context of
epistemic justice, expand the hermeneutic framework, to instead focus on the “opportunity
gap” (Darling-Hammond, 2012; Torre & Fine, 2011) or “education debt” (Ladson-Billings,
2006). Drawing from the work of Darling-Hammond, Torre & Fine (2011) launched the
Opportunity Gap Project with youth gathered from across the New York City tri-state
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region. Working with youth across race, class and geographic boundaries, Torre and Fine
set out to document the “racialized distributions of opportunities in local schools” (p. 112).
Some “opportunities” that students from the diverse regions found salient were those of
school finance inequality, racialized academic tracking, the differential impact of high
stakes standardized testing based on class, race and ethnicity; and suspension-school
discipline inequality. Students, with the support and guidance of university researchers and
involved high school teachers, developed, distributed and analyzed surveys.
They did not stop at analyzing their data, the students (and researchers) set out to
present it to stake holders in their communities and on their school boards. Torre and Fine
share (2011), however, that when students presented their data to school boards,
Evidence of ‘disparities’ became an opportunity to blame children of color and
poverty for their own failures. Mistaking the dependent variable of racial
disparities to be the independent variable, the cause of the problem, audiences
peppered us with questions pointing to poor youth and youth of color—What’s
wrong with them? (p. 115).
Responding to this seemingly reflexive move—to harken back to the dominant deficit
narrative—the students and researchers turned to developing performances and artistic
artifacts that would not only document their findings but also give voice to their feelings
and experiences in segregated schools. Collectively, the students and researchers called
their performance the “Educational Opportunity Gap Project” (EOGP) and they turned the
legal, social, and political history of re-segregated public schools into poetry and
performances. Powerfully, students participating in the EOGP were able to identify that
their differential educational experiences were not the result of deficiencies among
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particular student populations, but structural characteristics imbedded in school systems,
and they developed a language for communicating this through academic presentation but
also performance art. This is an example of disrupting the dominant interpretive frame and
then expanding it to include the experiences and perspectives of those most marginalized
through alternative means of knowledge dissemination (i.e. performance).
Ladson-Billings (2006) similarly disrupts and expands the dominant interpretive
frame observing that “focus on the ‘Achievement Gap’ moves us towards short term
solutions that are unlikely to address the long-term underlying problems” (p. 4). Instead of
focusing on the achievement gap, we must instead focus on the education debt owed to
students with non-dominant social identities. The educational debt Ladson-Billing (2006)
describes is based on race; she looks particularly at Black, Latino and Native students and
traces the debt historically, economically, socio-politically and morally.
Historically, Ladson-Billings (2006) traces the education debt to the very founding
of the United States during the time of slavery when the education of Black slaves was
forbidden. After emancipation, Ladson-Billings (2006) writes, schools maintained the
servant class and the need for farm labor meant Black students only attended school for
about 4 months out of the school year. When they did attend schools during the time of
legalized segregation, Black students attended schools in which books and materials were
the used cast offs of white-only schools. For Native Americans, the historical context of
formal education is equally as harmful and unjust. Mission schools attempted to convert
Native American children and to “use Indian labor to further the cause of the church”
(Ladson-Billings, 2006, p. 5). Schools were vehicles for forced assimilation and cultural
violence. Ladson-Billings (2006) reports similar disparities in the education of Latino
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students dating back to 1848. This historical debt extends far beyond school regulations
(e.g. segregated schools).
The historical education debt includes more progressive schools in New England
benefitting from the labor of enslaved Black people in the south. For example, in 1827
Massachusetts made all grades of public school free of charge and open to the public
(Ladson-Billings 2006). In 1837, a wealthy factory owner, Edmund Dwight, supplemented
the budget of the newly formed Massachusetts State Board of Education because he felt an
educated labor force was essential for the state. How did Dwight accumulate his wealth?
Through his textile mills, mills that used cotton grown in the South. The Northeast
developed a complex economy complete with banks, insurance companies and railroads off
of 100 million pounds of Southern cotton. This cotton was, as we know, farmed by Black
slaves. Public schools and school boards were created in the Northeast using the unpaid,
abusive labor of Black Americans who were denied—among every other basic human
rights—the right to an education.
Moving from her summary of the historical debt, Ladson-Billings (2006) turns to
look at the economic debt owed to students of color in the United States. She documents
how predominantly white school districts spend more per pupil than do school districts in
which students of color comprise the majority of the school population. Given the pervasive
school re-segregation documented (Orfield et al., 2016) above, it is especially alarming that
white dominant schools are often the most financially well resourced. Similarly, LadsonBillings (2006) reports that, economically, students with more schooling will earn more
than students with less schooling throughout the course of their lives. We see this earning
discrepancy documented above as well (Snyder et al., 2016). Less possibility for earnings
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leads to a long-term wealth gap that results in a decrease of social and political influence
for people and communities of color (Ladson-Billings, 2006).
This lack of social and political influence is what Ladson-Billings (2006) calls the
sociopolitical debt. Damagingly, the sociopolitical debt “reflects the degree to which
communities of color are excluded from the civic process. Black, Latina/o, and Native
communities had little or no access to the franchise, so they had no true legislative
representation” (Ladson-Billings, 2006, p. 7). This separates families of color from the
decision making about the quality of education their children are receiving. This lack of
participation for families of color include the parent-teacher organization level, school site
councils, and larger city, state and federal education agency appointments and decisions.
One could suggest this is all the more salient today, when the future of public education is
often held in tension to the future of charter schools and parent choice in the form of school
vouchers (Westervelt, 2016).
Finally, Ladson-Billings (2006) concludes that taken together, the historical,
sociopolitical and economic debt owed to students of color amount to a moral debt.
Students of color have been wronged as a matter of policy and law repeatedly and in
multiple ways with respect to education. If we do not address the moral debt, LadsonBillings argues, we cannot create a better educational future for students of color. We
cannot address differences in students’ educational outcomes and attainment if we do not
address the debt owed to students of color. The language and narrative discourse of
“achievement gap” does not and cannot even begin to capture the weight, the cost, and the
moral responsibility owed to students of color because of the continuing impact of state
accumulated educational debt.
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The first aim of this chapter was to respond to question two posed in the preface: In
what ways do students with marginalized racial social identities experience epistemic
injustice in educational settings? As asked above: do schools create environments in which
students with subordinate social identities (for example students of color and low-income
students) do not and cannot thrive academically? Are school environments functionally
tracking students into groups of “knowers” and “lesser knowers” based on social identity
(e.g. Oakes, 2005)? This chapter has presented Department of Education data that shows
students of color and low-income students do not benefit from pre-k through higher
education experiences in the same ways as white and middle-high income students. This
chapter then provided descriptions from scholars of color that explain how students of
color and low-income students historically have been and presently continue to be
marginalized by educational institutions. These analyses of students’ experiences in
education provide a counter-interpretive framework for understanding student
educational outcomes.
As Tatum (1997) describes, none of us as individuals or as social agents can step
outside of the dominant interpretive framework. In Tatum’s profound words, “Prejudice is
one of the inescapable consequences of living in a racist society. Cultural racism—the
cultural images and messages that affirm the assumed superiority of Whites and the
assumed inferiority of people of color—is like smog in the air” (p. 6). As members of
society, we are all always breathing the smog; on same days it may be more apparent than
others, but we cannot avoid breathing it in. Yes, the extent to which we perceive or are
oblivious to the smog may very well depend on our social identities (i.e. dominant
members of society may be least aware of the smog), but we are all live with the negative
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consequences of the smog. However, as both Tatum (1997) and philosophers of
epistemology (Fricker, 2007; Pohlhaus, 2012; Dotson, 2012; Medina, 2013) argue, it is our
responsibility—as individuals and also social institutions—to broaden our understanding
and make visible that which we do not know, namely the experiences and perspectives of
those most marginalized. To that end, we turn now to the experiences of students in the US
education system.
Creating Knowers & Lesser Knowers: Identity and the Educational Experience
Presenting these data, as a roadmap displaying the ways in which students’
identities impact their educational experience and prospects, one might conclude the intent
of this chapter is to make a case solely that educational injustice exists, and that it exists
most specifically as an example of distributive injustice or the unequal distribution of
society’s goods (Gewirtz, 2006). However, such a conclusion would only partially capture
the unjust nature of public education system in the United States. To be sure, there is no
defense for an education system, an institution that should be a vehicle for public
participation and active engagement with democracy, to unfairly benefit those with the
greatest economic advantages and racial identity privilege while those from less resourced
economic classes and students of color experience an inferior system where, at every step
of the way, there is less educational opportunity and therefore less possibility for economic
mobility. But this chapter aims for more. Education and concomitant economic inequality
has been well documented for decades, if not a century. Thus far, this chapter has
presented recent government data documenting those inequalities, and analysis from
scholars of education who provide a critical race re-framing of deficient analysis of these
demographic data.
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However, understanding that marginally situated students may be disadvantaged
because of their identities is insufficient. Rather, as Paula Moya (2006) asserts, “To the
extent that we are interested in transforming our society into one that is more socially and
economically just, we need to know how identities work in order to effectively work with
them” (p. 99). Therefore, this chapter also seeks to connect inequalities based on identity to
knowledge making; this chapter puts forward the argument that educational injustice is
distinctly epistemic as students’ identities impact them not only as participants in society
and society’s goods, but, more specifically, as knowers and knowledge producers in society.
With this goal in mind, we turn now to scholars across disciplines who are working with
youth to offer accounts of the ways in which students of color and low-income students
create new knowledges that speak directly to the structural inequalities within the
education system. It is these epistemic contributions that bring to light the ways that
marginalized learners resist and persist in unequal education situations. It is also these
epistemic contributions that high-income students and predominantly white students miss
out on because their educational environments are persistently segregated.
Learning from Youth of Color: Voices from the Margins
How do marginalized students interpret, discuss, and speak back to the systemically
unequal education experience described above? The energized and growing body of
research about Youth Participatory Action Research (YPAR) projects are a particular type
of scholarly research/pedagogy that offer insight into student’s perspectives, insights that
cannot be gleaned from test scores, graduation rates, or even traditional scholarly research
in education. YPAR is characterized by students learning about social injustices, mobilizing
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for change, and students addressing injustices; in these ways it is not dissimilar to other
types of social justice education (Cammarota & Fine, 2008).
Critically, YPAR also includes students learning about and participating in research
as members of a collective; the collective structure allows students to work together to
address a shared concern or problem (e.g. lack of educational opportunity for students)
across identities, generations and perspectives. Members of these collectives are “insiders”
or “they are stakeholders within a particular institution, organization or community”
(Cammarota & Fine, 2008, p. 5). While there are additional features of YPAR pedagogy and
projects, the collective nature of researchers and the research products means students
perspectives and voices are highlighted in both the research content (i.e. the research
questions, goals, collection processes, data analysis) and also the research products (e.g.
papers, presentations, performances, installations). Because YPAR foregrounds students’
perspectives, YPAR projects are a helpful source for trying to uncover how students
process their experiences with educational institutions.
The Social Justice Education Project (SJEP). The SJEP offered through the Tucson
Unified School District provides an example of YPAR work with students enrolled in a
public high school through core course offerings in US History/US Government courses
(Romero, Cammarota, Dominguez, Valdez, Ramirez, Hernandez, 2008). The central
organizing goals of the Social Justice Education Project are to meet the needs of Latino/a
students—culturally, socially, intellectually—through curriculum and pedagogy that
centers social justice, critical race theory and the intentional inclusion of students’
perspectives and experiences (Romero et al., 2008). As part of these courses, students
conducted PAR projects rising from the very problems that limit or prohibit them. Students
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presented these research findings to elected officials from the local to district to the
national level. Students participating in the Social Justice Education Project (SJEP)
produced concrete results as a result of learning about and actively researching the
educational inequalities they experienced daily in their schools. Specifically, Cohort 1
influenced school district officials to address serious infrastructure problems like missing
urinals in bathrooms, falling tiles in the gym ceiling, and water fountains from which no
water would flow (Romero et al., 2008). Later cohorts successfully argued for updated
books in the libraries and actual classrooms for students in the “exceptional students”
program instead of a former woodshop with heavy and dangerous equipment in it (Romero
et al., 2008).
For the purposes of this chapter, SJEP is highlighted because the project is grounded
in a “dialogical authoring process, in which students take ownership over their education
by consistently voicing their concerns, thoughts, and opinions in the classroom” (Romero et
al., 2008, p.136). The authors do not merely state this, students helped co-produce
intellectual products that articulate their positions as teacher and student in the SJEP
classroom. When asked by Professor Cammarota why students chose to attend their SJEP
course but intentionally avoid (or skip) others, students state that they are interested in
SJEP because it is grounded in learning about their school and what is going on there: “we
are the ones putting in all the input so it was cool. We had a part in it. That is why. We had a
big part.” (Romero et al., 2008, p. 137). Another student shared, “‘Cuz in other classes we
had no part at all-we are just chillin’ in the back.” (Romero et al., 2008, p. 137). Students are
describing their willingness to attend and participate in the class precisely because they
find themselves in it: in the content, in the questions, in the direction.
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Even the way SJEP is presented in current YPAR literature centers students’
authorship more than other very critical and robust YPAR projects. Given students’ crafted
two-thirds of the Romero et al. (2008) research paper explored here, this chapter could
very well simply list quotes from the students to animate their perspective. As the purpose
of our review is to put a spotlight on the ways in which youth enrolled in public education
interpret and make sense of the educational inequality the experience, relevant quotes are
presented that offer an introduction, a sketch, of what students are describing in their own
words. So, for example, student Kim Dominguez wrote that she began to fail classes and not
attend school during middle school. But she writes:
I loved writing and history, but I hated the history classes that I was forced to take in
order to meet graduation requirements, and I hated reading the boring English
assignments with boring typical White authors because I had nothing to write about
afterwards. In a society in which most successful people….all needed education to
achieve their success, our schools, communities, and institutions were setting up the
youth of color and the impoverished youth to join the military or drop out of the
irrelevant Eurocentric schools that supposedly lead us to a ‘career’ after high school
or maybe a community college with equally as high drop-out rates (Romero et al.,
2008, p.140).
Dominguez’ entire section, but particularly the quoted excerpt, shines a light on the deep
feelings of alienation students feel in our nation’s schools, the painful awareness of how
important education is for them to succeed, and their decreased chances of obtaining this
success in their school precisely because they are students of color or low-income students.
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Louis Valdez shares the emotional significance of participating in an education
project that provided emotional support through positioning him as an important knower
and knowledge maker. He writes:
Being involved with the project also meant that I would constantly be surrounded
by very positive adults that I could look up to—on nearly an everyday basis, dozens
of people who have graduated college and now have very successful careers:
teachers, college professors and administrators who I can identify with. These were
people who work to change the structure of the entire system to make these
opportunities more relevant to all people and not just the ruling class (Romero et al.,
2008, p.142).
This liberatory model of education allows students who experience historically entrenched
inequality every day to feel valuable and relevant in educational environments. Shouldn’t
public school be like this for all students?
Liz Hernandez writes with great ownership about her community organizing, “This
past spring, I was one of the key organizers for the walkouts in Tucson, Arizona. We
protested the racist bill HR4437 that would criminalize my people…we made history by
coming together in solidarity to help others” (Romero et al., 2008, p.145). As a result of her
history course focused on her identity, her culture, her value as a member of civil society,
Liz organized fellow high school students for large scale protest for equity and justice. This
is remarkable and powerful. It provides hope that public education that “sees” students can
itself be illuminated by students’ perspectives.
The SJEP program helps researchers to understand how students can feel alienated
from school because of irrelevant content and poor physical conditions, and, perhaps more
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importantly, how disenfranchised students can be drawn back into school-based learning
by a curriculum and pedagogy that mobilizes their identities, life experiences and future
hopes inside and outside of the classroom.
The Youth Dialogue on Race and Ethnicity (YDRE). Another way researchers and
activists are working with students to (re)engage students in learning and active civic
participation is through the combination of youth participatory action research pedagogy
and intergroup dialogue pedagogy. The Youth Dialogue on Race and Ethnicity (YDRE)
program based at the University of Michigan in collaboration with community groups
throughout the city and suburbs of Detroit provides an example of a longstanding program
that combines both YPAR and IGD pedagogy towards youth co-inquiry, democratic
knowledge making, and active civic engagement. Checkoway and Aldana (2013) summarize
intergroup dialogue as:
a form of civic engagement which features face-to-face structured discussions about
social identities—such as gender, race-ethnicity, and religions—and systems of
power—such as racism, sexism, and heterosexism—between identity groups (p.
1896).
The Youth Dialogues on Race and Ethnicity in Metropolitan Detroit is an eight week
summer program offered to high school youth across identity backgrounds drawing from
both urban and suburban metropolitan Detroit and from across socio-economic
boundaries. Students are brought together through a collaboration of community groups
and the University of Michigan. University facilitators guide students through an intergroup
dialogue to “discuss racial and ethnic issues within and across their communities” (Aldana,
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Rowley, Checkoway, & Richards-Schuster, 2012, p. 124). The two-months long program
culminates in a retreat focused on youth activism and social activism skills.
Thus, pedagogically, through the eight weeks long intergroup dialogue on race and
ethnicity and the intensive advocacy training, high school students participating in the
Youth Dialogues on Race and Ethnicity experience a program designed for youth that
bridges the content and process of IGD pedagogy with the civic action focus of YPAR
pedagogy. Bridging both types of pedagogy, the YDRE program begins with the
foundational premises that young people are collective knowledge makers and that they
can and should be active agents of change (Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013). Research
studies conducted on the YDRE find that students participating in the dialogues increase
their understanding of their own racial and ethnicity identities, increase their knowledge
about others who are different/have social identities that are different than their own,
increase their understanding of the structural role of race and ethnicity in society and
increase their willingness to take action against racism and segregation (Aldana et al.,
2012; Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013).
Richards-Schuster and Aldana (2013) conducted a case study of student participant
evaluation data, including the student co-produced participatory program evaluation, from
the Youth Dialogues on Race and Ethnicity (Summer 2007 cohort) to explore youth
engagement and learning about race in a group setting. The results of their study offer
insights into students’ learning and perceptions in the students’ own words, highlighting
how students express their own learning.
In their coding of the program materials, Richards-Schuster and Aldana (2013)
identified four major themes throughout the students’ feedback and student generated
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participatory program evaluation. Themes include learning to critically discuss race,
communication skills across differences, learning about intersecting systems of privilege
and oppression, and leadership skills. In an effort to center the voices of students who live
the epistemic injustice of re-segregated schools with white-dominant curricula and
pedagogies, this chapter will focus on the student quotes presented in Richards-Schuster
and Aldana’s (2013) analysis.
As an example of students talking about naming the opportunity to actively discuss
race and ethnicity as a result of participating in the race dialogues, the authors offer quotes
from students across race and location. An African American youth from a suburb of
Detroit shared, “Once it is all out in the air, we can remove the façade” (Richards-Schuster
& Aldana, 2013, p. 338). Richards-Schuster and Aldana (2013) identify this as students
getting an opportunity for both new knowledge and for the sharing of life stories. From the
lens of this chapter, though, it seems like this student is additionally highlighting the hidden
nature of race and ethnicity in the United States context. Race, and sometimes ethnicity, are
often visually marked on peoples’ bodies; they can be seen regardless of one’s effort to
observe race and ethnicity or not. And yet, as the student highlights, race and ethnicity are
often not “out in the air” because colorblind rhetoric and white-dominant narratives and
structures push race insights out of the classroom (Bonilla-Silva, 2009). Take, for example,
the Arkansas state legislature’s introduction of a bill to prohibit publicly funded public and
charter schools from teaching the work of Howard Zinn, historian and author of A People’s
History of the United States (2003), a text which intentionally disrupts white dominant
narratives by offering a historical narrative that centers the experiences of women,
workers, and people of color (Arkansas Bill Would Ban, 2017). The State Legislature of
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Arkansas is trying to ban the work of an author who explicitly sought to expand/correct the
hermeneutic frame, so getting issues of race and ethnicity out into the air is no simple act,
and it is a first step for students developing new knowledges.
Richards-Schuster and Aldana (2013) also provide quotes highlighting the ways
students identified particular lessons about stereotypes as opportunities to critically
discuss race and ethnicity. An Asian American youth from the suburbs wrote, “Personally, it
[learning about stereotypes] helped me want to change the way I think and want to help
others feel the way I did and change” (Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013, p. 399). This
quote highlights knowledges and knowings ability to change student behavior. Chapter two
of this dissertation explored epistemic justice—the ameliorative response to epistemic
injustice which Fricker (2007) grounds in a knowers ability to use new, more full,
information—to change their knowledge behaviors. The student quoted is speaking
directly towards this shift; the student says the new information learned about stereotypes
leads to a change in the way they think.
Reflecting on the same lesson, a white youth from the suburbs wrote, “It was the
hardest part but it made us face some things that we didn’t want to” (Richards-Schuster &
Aldana, 2013, p. 340). White students, the people who benefit the most from epistemic
injustice, must do the work of facing something unfortunate and difficult (i.e. white
privilege) in order to make the epistemic shifts necessary to not perpetuate epistemic
injustice and, ideally, work towards epistemic justice. But learning to think critically about
race and ethnicity is not only about learning about one’s own feelings or about the
experiences of others. It is also about making sense of one’s own experiences as a member
of social groups. An Arab-American youth from the city wrote, “I also learned many
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historical facts about my group and other groups” (Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013, p.
340). As this student describes, intergroup dialogue can be empowering for marginally
situated students. Intergroup dialogue provides students with knowledge making spaces
and practices that school and institutional structures either fail to provide or intentionally
withhold. Namely, intergroup dialogue offers marginalized students the opportunity to
learn about and make sense of their own experiences in a structural and historical way.
The second outcome researchers identified in their analysis of students’ evaluations
was that of learning communication skills (Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013). Some of the
quotes provided include: “I think I’ve become more caring of others. I want to help make an
equal playing field for everyone” (white suburban youth), and “I have learned how to work
with many people with different points of view. How to address race and racism” (African
American youth from the city) (Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013, p. 341). The ability to
work across difference and to use the knowledge of how to communicate across difference
to create social change are two abilities not traditionally focused on in schools (Tatum,
2007). Communicating critical analysis (e.g. how to address racism) is essential for
disrupting the errors and intentional gaps in our shared knowledge resource that lead to
exclusion of and false narratives about subordinate peoples; participating in the Youth
Dialogues on Race and Ethnicity helped students from dominant and subordinate racial
and ethnic groups to develop this communication skill. Learning communication skills is
valuable to students; one African American youth from the city wrote, “I learned so much
about myself and how I communicate…I learned about why I’m like this. I just really
understand what might be ahead and I interpreted my past really well also” (RichardsSchuster & Aldana, 2013, p. 341). Building the meta-cognitive skills to help students
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understand why they think the way they think is a first step to helping students understand
their own biases and the socialized ways of interpreting others; it helps students develop
critical consciousness. The development of critical consciousness works towards correcting
unjust epistemic practices.
Richards-Schuster and Aldana (2013) also provide reflections from white students
that highlight intergroup dialogue’s ability to help student with dominant identities
become aware of their epistemic privilege and their complicity in reproducing white
normative narratives in the dominant social frame. For example, one white suburban
student reflected, “I realized so many things…even though I didn’t feel privileged, I am
because of my skin color and that needs to change. It will impact me to work harder to
change the amount of racism in the US and the world” (Richards-Schuster & Aldana, 2013,
p. 343). Another white suburban student wrote, “After this program, I think when I see
racial things on TV, I won’t just change the channel, I’ll do something about it.” (RichardsSchuster & Aldana, 2013, p. 344). The white youth participating in this educational
opportunity across race and geography learn to name and began to see the racialized
aspects of their experiences while learning how race impacts the experiences of people of
color in the United States. This knowing that takes account of race, both in structure (interracial group learning) and in content, is a stark contrast to what students experience in
public schools (Tatum, 2007).
Student action taking includes presenting to their communities’ stakeholders.
Significantly, students also express a desire to be action takers, to be members of society
who act on issues of racial and ethnic injustice. One African American student from the
suburbs wrote that participating in the dialogue “has made [him] step out there and believe
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that [he] can make a difference and face controversial issues that we face today.” (RichardsSchuster & Aldana, 2013, p. 343). Some students were so eager to work on action taking,
they requested to continue working with the University of Michigan facilitators throughout
the academic year on Youth Participatory Action Research projects (Aldana, RuckardsSchuster, & Checkoway, 2016). In fact, in 2015, the Detroit Free Press reported that
students from the Detroit Youth Dialogues met with policymakers to discuss needed
changes to the state history curriculum (Hinkley, 2015).
Spotlighting Justice: Youth Dialogue & Program Evaluation in Syracuse. Similarly, the
intergroup dialogue program at Syracuse University13 has offered youth dialogues for
urban and suburban high school students in the Central New York area and, consistent with
the Detroit Youth Dialogues, found that students developed a greater sense of awareness,
agency and engagement (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012). Specifically, Syracuse University’s
intergroup dialogue program collaborated with both a high school in the Syracuse City
School District (comprised predominantly of students of color) and a neighboring suburban
high school (comprised predominantly of white students) for five years to develop and
implement a unique partnership. This collaboration featured students in both high schools
taking the same simultaneously taught English elective focused on race and inequality in
the United States; students visited one another in their respective schools twice a year, and
students from both courses/schools attended a once a year high school institute day at
Syracuse University organized and facilitated by the faculty and staff of the intergroup
dialogue program (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012).
After the completion of the fourth high school institute, themed “Raising our Voices,”
the intergroup dialogue program conducted a program evaluation centering two questions:
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what do students take away from the day-long institute premised on dialogic principles
and facilitated by university staff and students and also what do teachers and university
facilitators observe or believe students learn from the experience. To address these
questions, Lopez & Nastasi (2012) provided a summary of student work and an analysis of
students’ responses to survey questions. Our findings on student learnings are similar to
the Detroit Youth Dialogue’s evaluation analysis, which also explored student learning in an
inter-district collaboration premised on intergroup dialogue pedagogy.
During the high school institute, high schoolers worked in small groups of six to
seven students from across both schools partnered with one university facilitator. For the
morning portion of the institute, the students listened to guest speakers and poets discuss
self-expression and the power of language to communicate complex ideas. In the afternoon,
students worked on an advocacy project that applied the lessons of the morning’s speakers
to their own lived experiences and concerns. Together, the students discussed, agreed on,
and generated an outline for an advocacy letter; students were not given topics. Rather,
students were encouraged to discuss their personal concerns within their small group and
to agree upon the issue of greatest shared concern. Each group shared a summary of their
proposed action letter to the full institute group; groups chose to write to audiences such
as fellow students, the New York governor, the United States Secretary of Education, and
stakeholders like local teachers and school administrators. Students wrote about issues like
lack of socially diverse interactions among students in their school, classroom
environments and unequal opportunities across schools, school segregation and the cost of
education.
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Following the institute, students were asked to complete open-ended surveys,
which, as in the case of the Detroit Youth Dialogues, offered access to students describing
their experiences and perceptions in their own words. In an analysis of student responses
on the program evaluations, three themes emerged: students talked about growing
awareness, agency and engagement (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012).
Students from both the urban and suburban schools discuss their new realizations
about the social contexts in which they lived. Discussing education, a student from the
urban school wrote, “It surprised me how many of the groups’ presentations were about
the schooling system, shows how much it really has to change” (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012, p.
151). Similarly, a student from the suburban high school wrote, “One group talked about
education and that it should be equally available to everyone. I already agreed with this,
but hearing other kids’ perspectives made me realize it is an issue everywhere” (Lopez &
Nastasi, 2012, p. 151). Additionally, students from both schools made connections to and
about racism. An urban high school student wrote, “Something that I got out of being part
of this was that racism has always been there, and if we as people don’t try and do anything
nothing would change” (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012, p. 151). Congruously, a student from the
suburban high school wrote, “I learned how much racism is still in society…I knew racism
was a big problem throughout the world, and when I left I discovered new ways to stand
against racism” (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012, p. 151). These students, from geographically close
yet very differently resourced public schools, together were learning and sharing about
developing new understandings while simultaneously beginning to understand their roles
as change agents.
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Students from both schools further discussed and raised the issue of agency by
talking about voice and “coming to voice” (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012). A student from the
suburban high school wrote, “I think writing and speaking for one’s self can become an
enormous tool for many obstacles in one’s life. I learned that our voices can change an
entire room and in turn can change the false perceptions of the racially charged and
ignorant words that are used” (Lopez & Nastasi, 2012, p. 151). This student is expressing
the power of language for not only communicating for one’s self but for also changing
narratives, changing perceptions, and for correcting for falsehoods based on race.
Perhaps the most hopeful theme to emerge from students’ responses to the
evaluation survey was the expression of a strong desire for continued engagement with
each other. A student from the urban high school wrote, “I would change the time. I wish
we had more time so we could discuss more” (Lopez & Nastasi, 2013, p. 152). Similarly, a
student from the suburban high school wrote, “I think we should go [to campus] more than
once but also have less scheduled. Let our interests drive the time limits” (Lopez & Nastasi,
2013, p. 152). The sentiments of these two students were echoed repeatedly across the
evaluations from both schools. These high school youth, who spent an entire academic year
learning the same content, visiting each other’s schools, communicating via email and other
forms of digital technology, wanted more. Urban youth, predominantly students of color,
and suburban youth, predominantly white students, separated geographically by school
district and residential re-segregation, clearly expressed a desire to interact more with
each other and to talk with each other about issues of race, access and inequality. Not only
did they want more opportunity to dialogue and engage, but they also wanted the
opportunity to lead and provide guidance for the content of these exchanges. This is an
114

expression of both agency and engagement. Students wanted not only the opportunity to
trouble dominant narratives about identity and school outcomes, but they wanted even
more leadership and authority in the process.
One of the key features of intergroup dialogue pedagogy is that it is responsive to
the needs of students—to use a common education colloquialism—intergroup dialogue
embraces “meeting students where they are at.” In the case of the High School Institute, the
Intergroup Dialogue Program hosting the institute worked to meet the expressed interests
of the students and the teacher at the majority student of color urban high school (Lopez &
Nastasi, 2012) by piloting a full year academic partnership during the 2011-2012 school
year (Lopez, Nastasi, & Benedetto, 2012). The aim of this partnership was to incorporate
intergroup dialogue’s pedagogical process and content into an established tenth grade
English class. A team from the Intergroup Dialogue Program which included the faculty
director, program coordinator, and an experienced facilitator (myself) of intergroup
dialogue on race and ethnicity14, partnered with the English teacher from the urban high
school that had previously participated in the High School Institute. The partnership was
designed to incorporate dialogic communication and content on race and identity within
the learning standards and outcomes of the English curriculum (Lopez et al., 2012).
This section draws from the co-authored evaluation report that was compiled at the
end of the 2011-2012 school year by members of the intergroup dialogue team (the
Intergroup Dialogue Program’s Faculty director and facilitator and the high school English
teacher). This section uses the information compiled in the evaluation report (Lopez et al.,
2012) exclusively to describe how the project grew from YPAR and IGD traditions in ways
that were responsive to students’ intellectual engagement and development (this is
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different from the evaluation report which provides a rich summary of the program’s
development, initiatives and reported outcomes). Although this program evaluation
approach builds from preceding work, including the Detroit Youth Dialogues and YPAR
studies described earlier in this chapter (Checkoway & Aldana, 2013; Cammarota & Fine,
2008), there are important limitations to note. The evaluation materials included
reflections and evaluative surveys from students, teachers, administrators and parents. The
materials do not include interviews or focus groups, and clearly conducting interview or
focus groups with stakeholders would provide valuable information on how participants
perceived the collaboration and what they perceived the outcomes to include.
Furthermore, these evaluation data are based on self-reported experiences and reflections
or perspectives. While there are limits to self-reported materials such as these, there is also
a need to share out the perceived outcomes of community/youth initiatives (Cammarota &
Fine, 2008).
Developed during the Fall 2011 academic term, the in-class collaboration extended
from the English curriculum in line with the New York State literacy standards. Although
the course began in September, by October, the students were suggesting and advocating
for changes. The students felt the class period was too short and the English curriculum
limited their freedom to explore topics of immediate importance and urgency to them. The
students suggested an after school club that would meet once a week after school; the club
would use intergroup dialogue processes as the standard for communication and would
focus on the “hot topics” of direct interest in students’ lives. By the end of November 2011,
the twenty-four students participating in the class--morphed into a club, had experienced
phases one and two of intergroup dialogue pedagogy, learning to practice dialogic
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communication and learning about social identities (Zuñiga, Nagda, Chesler, CytronWalker, 2007). The students named the club Spotlighting Justice because their primary goal
was to put a spotlight on issues of justice directly impacting their lives. To this end, the
students generated a short yet clear club mission statement:
As a group we, the members of Spotlighting Justice, would like to: Bring
attention to the social issues that are not normally focused on. These issues
include: sexism, marriage inequality, helping young children understand
inequality and injustice, school culture, racism, teen bullying. We will work
together to address these issues with other members of our community (Lopez et
al., 2012, p. 10).
While not all students involved in the club participated in the previous year’s High School
Institute, the themes that students focused on, including school culture, marriage inequality
and racism, were areas of interest that students raised and cited wanting to engage more at
the High School Institute. The club was providing students with a channel to deepen their
learning and activism around these issues.
In November and December of 2011, students were engaged in phase 3 of the
intergroup dialogue pedagogy, hot topics. The students, majority young women, wanted to
use the analytical skills we were honing (critiquing media, analyzing reports and publically
available data) to examine the gender pay gap. Students worked collaboratively to compile
data about the pay gap while also giving attention to the intersectional nature of social
identity, probing, for example, how the wage gap is not simply pay inequality between
those who identify as men and women, but also exists between women based on race,
geography and degree of education debt (Miller, 2018). The club’s exploration of the
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gender pay gap allowed the students to actively use their dialogic communication skills and
their growing critical analysis skills to further their understanding of an issue of
importance and interest to them.
In December 2011, students began to focus on phase four of the intergroup dialogue
curriculum: collective action taking. Students began to repeatedly raise the issues of
conflict in school and what they perceived as the total absence of talking about race,
specifically Black history and culture, in their school. Specifically, students expressed
frustration with the conflict between students and between students and teachers; they
described feeling like if “everyone” knew how to communicate dialogically, if everyone
would just “change their tone” then there would be less conflict in school and less students
receiving punishment for insubordinate behavior in class.
To address these concerns, the students began to plan Spotlighting Justice Presents:
An Evening of Black History Then and Now to take place at the high school on the last
evening of February (Black History Month) in 2012; they also began planning Change Your
Tone, a dialogic workshop planned and facilitated by club members for fellow students,
teachers, and administrators. Working in collaboration with school stakeholders, namely
their assistant principal and principal, the students not only planned but also implemented
programs in their school space that centered their voices, their experiences, and their
values. Throughout February 2012, club members shared information about Black History
during the morning announcements and hosted tabling sessions during lunch periods to
share information about Black History, and to express to fellow students, faculty,
administrators and school visitors why it was important for them to ensure this
information was shared within the context of their majority student of color school. These
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announcements and tabling sessions laid the foundation for their Spotlighting Justice
Presents: An Evening of Black History Then and Now. The evening, attended by students,
faculty, administrators, family members and community members, featured a Civil Rights
era speaker talking about her personal experience as a life-long participant in social justice
action, a dance performance, a power point presentation prepared by club members
focused on the historical roots and significance of anti-racists civil action in the US, and an
open mic featuring poetry by students, community members and school teachers and
coaches.
Over 80 participants attended Spotlighting Justice Presents: An Evening of Black
History Then and Now. As participants left the event, they were asked to comment on poster
board responding to the prompt “I thought…”. Participants commented that the evening
was: “Beautiful! Especially the poetry! Should have them more often!”; “Please again with
more next year all year.”; “Empowerment”; “Best event I’ve been to.”; “This was awesome
and I am glad [Central] finally has a space for this kind of work! See you at the next event!
Congratulations!!” (Lopez et al., 2012, p. 13). Attendees expressed a sense of celebration at
the students’ achievement of bringing this informative and entertaining event to their
school, and they also expressed a desire for more events like these, just like the students
did.
At the club meeting following Spotlighting Justice Presents: An Evening of Black
History Then and Now, students were asked to practice critical reflection on their activism.
Specifically, they were asked to think about how the event was important to them, their
school and their community. Student reflections on why the event was important to them
include: “It is important to learn about part of my heritage.”; “Because I feel like I need to
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remember an important part of my culture; it is important to know.”; “Because it is
important to learn about my history.” (Lopez et al., 2012, p. 10). On reflecting why the
event was important for their school, students shared: “To learn about people not usually
focused on.”; “Because many people in our school know the basics or not very much at all.
In this multicultural school, it gives everyone a chance to learn about African American
culture/struggles.”; “It is good to have cultural exchanges in school; it is important for a
school. It is especially important for people to understand black history.” (Lopez et al.,
2012, p. 11). In reflecting why the event was important for their community, students
wrote: “Because everyone should know about black history no matter what their race is.”;
“Our community should become empowered with knowledge and to give people’s
questions to Black History Month an end.”; “We live in a very diverse community where lots
of cultures are celebrated including black history.” (Lopez et al., 2012, p. 12). In their
reflections, students repeatedly highlighted that their identities matter in their education;
they want their identities, histories and cultures not only to be acknowledged at school but
to be a part of their school experience in their learning and in their co-curricular
engagements.
In March 2012, the Spotlighting Justice students began to organize and plan their
Change Your Tone dialogic communication workshop. High School administrators gave
permission for the club to host the workshop (which took all tenth graders out of class for
an entire period) for two reasons. Firstly, administrators were eager to discern productive
ways to address conflict between students and teachers that were leading to disciplinary
measures, and the administrators felt included in the club’s activity and mission because of
the long standing collaboration and open communication between the university’s
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Intergroup Dialogue Program and the high school English teacher; the club was also
developing credibility due to the success of Spotlighting Justice Presents: An Evening of
Black History Then and Now.
By April 2012, students had developed both a guiding rationale and desired
outcomes for Change Your Tone. The rationale and goals for hosting Change Your Tone
were:
•

We want there to be equality between all speakers at [Central] High School.
Regardless of who is speaking, a teacher or a student, that person should have
the respect of the listener;

•

We are frustrated by the way members of [Central’s] community, teachers and
students, sometimes talk to each other. When people talk down to others, it
makes everyone feel unsafe and unwelcome;

•

We think there is apathy in our community, where people do not really care
about our school, our teachers, our students;

•

We would like other members of [Central] to learn communication and dialogue
as a life skill;

•

We would like to build a sense of belonging and community at [Central] so
learning can happen (Lopez et al., 2012).

Students clearly name the tension that exists between teachers and students and between
students because of the lack of understanding on how to communicate using empathy and
perspective taking, key dialogic communication skills. They connect these lack of
communication skills to apathy and a general sense of disconnect in their school. Further,
students expressed a belief that this apathy was negatively linked to the ability for students
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to learn. Students wanted to address these issues by sharing the skills they learned by
practicing dialogic communication as members of Spotlighting Justice.
The Spotlighting Justice students generated learning outcomes for Change Your Tone
participants. These outcomes were:
•

Students will develop skills for negotiating conflict with each other;

•

Students will learn to think about and reflect about their emotions;

•

Students and teachers will start to build a community with high expectations for
all members;

•

Students will practice communication through dialogue (Lopez et al., 2012).

While Spotlighting Justice students did not read Delpit (2012), they were able to discern
key features of her prescription for creating successful learning environments for
marginally situated students through their own experiences as students at [Central] High
School. They wanted to engage emotion in the classroom, they wanted to develop a sense of
community, and they wanted to teach/learn to navigate—not avoid—conflict.
Spotlighting Justice students spent a day at the Intergroup Dialogue Program’s office
and classroom with members of a 300 course level college dialogue class. Together, the
college and high school students, in collaboration with university facilitators and their
English teacher, brainstormed, rehearsed and devised activities and processes that could
be used for Change Your Tone. Interestingly, by this time in the school year, the Spotlighting
Justice students’ confidence was incredibly high; they were identifying not only as learners
but very much as teachers. They made clear in their planning sessions with their teacher
and multiple members of the Intergroup Dialogue Program’s team that this was their show;
they, the student club members, were going to be the event’s facilitators; however, they
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invited and wanted the university facilitators to help co-facilitate small group discussions
and processing during the event. Change Your Tone was an interdisciplinary, intergenerational, student-led workshop. The agenda included: a welcome by the English
teacher, an introduction by a club member, an ice breaker led by a club member, two skits
performed by club members, a skit processing session led by two club members, an opinion
generating activity led by two club members, and an interactive dialogue practice led by 6
facilitation teams of club members. During the skits, one club member played a teacher
while another played a student. In the first skit, they acted out a common classroom scene
of a teacher becoming exasperated with a disruptive student and forcing the student to
leave the class to receive disciplining from an administrator; in the second skit, the student
and teacher again experience conflict over the student’s classroom behavior, but instead of
the disruptive student being removed from class, both the teacher and the student talk
through the student’s disruptive behavior to find a positive way for the student to
contribute to the class. The skits were met with laughter from the workshop’s student
participants and spontaneous exclamations like, “yo, that is so true.”
After the Change Your Tone workshop, members of the Intergroup Dialogue
Program’s team administered an evaluation to the tenth grade students who participated in
the workshop that included three open ended questions: If you had to describe Change
Your Tone to a student who did not attend, what would you say?; Describe what you think
was most the most important part of the workshop; What would you recommend we do
different next time? (Lopez et al., 2012). Students’ responses focused on the importance of
learning how to engage in dialogic communication and a shared feeling that this type of
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communication is important for students and teachers so more people should attend the
workshop. A sample of students’ responses included:
•

We learned the difference between dialogue and debate;

•

It helps you with communication, and it’s interesting;

•

I learned more about dialogue (verses debate), and how to be a more intentional
speaker when talking with adults and students;

•

The two skits really illustrated what Change Your Tone is about;

•

I think the most important part of the workshop was when we discussed dialogue
verses debate;

•

The small groups and large group helped with understanding dialogue;

•

Would love to see this with a mix of students, teachers and administrations;

•

I would recommend more people come and participate (Lopez et al., 2012, p. 23).

The student participants expressed an interest and value in learning about dialogue; they
felt the workshops were helpful, and they recommended having more time and more
participants in the workshops.
The students had their request met; the following year, Change Your Tone was
included as an orientation event by the school administrators; club members facilitated
Change Your Tone for the entire incoming ninth grade class and their teachers. Additionally,
prompted by the students urging, Spotlighting Justice transformed from a club to an
independent elective during the 2012-2013 school year; students wanted to receive
academic credit for the learning and teaching they were doing within the scope of their
participation within the Spotlighting Justice club. Again, the English teacher with
Intergroup Dialogue Program facilitators co-facilitated a course that built from Spotlighting
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Justice’s mission statement. The course was open to both club members (most of whom
chose to continue their engagement) and to interested students from across grade levels at
the high school; enough students enrolled in Spotlighting Justice to fill two sections of the
course. Based on the ideas and activism of the students, the 2012-2013 school year at
[Central] High School included two sections of a course based on the student-driven club,
the inclusion of their Change Your Tone workshop in orientation and Spotlighting Justice
Presents: An Evening of Black History Then and Now as an anticipated and celebrated annual
event. Additionally, the Spotlighting Justice students extended their work in many ways.
Two members became active (one even the president) of their local NAACP youth
organization, two members spoke as part of the White House Young America series on
youth civic engagement, multiple club members with their facilitators presented at a
national conference focused on civic engagement and action (Cannito-Coville, Nastasi,
Lopez, Smith, Villasenor, & Benedetto, 2013); and the students have gone on to study
disciplines including sociology, women and gender studies, ethnic studies and social work
in undergraduate and now graduate school.
Both YPAR and IGD pedagogy prioritize teaching students about social injustices,
mobilizing student identity with respect to their learning, and empowering students to take
action towards greater equality (Aldana, Richards-Schuster, & Checkoway, 2016;
Cammarota & Fine, 2008). Critically, YPAR and IGD also center co-inquiry or collective
learning and action (Zuñiga, Lopez, & Ford, 2012; Cammarota & Fine, 2008), which allows
students to work together—across differences in social identity—to address problems of
shared concern. YPAR, in particular, engaged stakeholders across generations, institutions,
and degrees of power (i.e. students working with teachers and community leaders)
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(Cammarota & Fine, 2008). Spotlighting Justice is an example of a student-centered,
student driven, collaboration that exemplifies these shared characteristics of YPAR and IGD
pedagogy.
Specifically, the students who participated in Spotlighting Justice during the 20112012 school year engaged multiple stakeholders across generations and degrees of power.
In order to plan and implement An Evening of Black History Then and Now, the students
worked with teachers, administrators and community leaders. When planning and
facilitating Change Your Tone, the students worked with college students and graduate
facilitators, teachers, and school administrators. It is not often that youth are able to—and
take the initiative to—work collaboratively across such varying degrees of institutional
power. But Spotlighting Justice students felt passionately about their objectives,
empowered by their learning, and supported by their English teacher and university
facilitators, allowing them to engage in action with and across degrees of social power. Like
Members of the Education Opportunity Gap Project (described above), members of
Spotlighting Justice created non-traditional epistemic products that at once highlighted
their social locations and their learning. Spotlighting Justice Presents: An Evening of Black
History Then and Now and Change Your Tone are both examples of innovative and authentic
knowledge making. Students’ learning about structural inequality (namely their identities
as Black students and students of color not being incorporated into their schooling
experience) and students’ experiences of equality through communication (namely
learning how to engage in dialogic communication) led to and guided their creation of
these events. Students critically centered the knowledge that was structurally excluded
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from their traditional learning and made it accessible to other students, teachers,
administrators and community members.
Consistent with intergroup dialogue pedagogy, students learned about structural
inequality and how to take action to collectively address them, and they also became
empowered as knowers. The Spotlighting Justice students not only researched, planned,
and facilitated their events, but they also demanded that they be the teachers. Particularly
in the case of Change Your Tone, the Spotlighting Justice students provided the information
and the processing for their fellow students throughout the workshop. This was nonnegotiable for the club members; they clearly communicated to their English teacher, their
university-based facilitator, and to the assistant principal that Change Your Tone was their
opportunity to share information—a dialogic process—they had learned with other
students and teachers in ways that were accessible and relevant to those constituents.
Spotlighting Justice also created institutional change by establishing an elective course and
an orientation workshop. The desire of students empowered by intergroup dialogue and
youth participatory action research pedagogy to produce and share knowledge is relevant
to this dissertation’s broader engagement with the pursuit of epistemic justice;
implications for what these pedagogies may contribute to education towards epistemic
justice are discussed below.
Conclusion & Implications
This chapter sought to provide an account of how social identity(ies) matter in
education and to illustrate how social justice pedagogies can interrupt unjust epistemic
practices. In the first half of the chapter, recent research in education demographics
compiled by the Department of Education and university researchers was presented to
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map the ways in which students experience disadvantage or benefit from participation in
educational institutions based on their racial/ethnic and socio-economic class identities.
The chapter then turned to scholars of education to provide a critical race lens with which
to interpret these data in order to prevent assuming a deficit perspective on marginally
situated students’ academic opportunity. Next, this chapter turned to the perspectives of
marginalized students themselves as shared through social justice initiatives that include
Youth Participatory Action Research and Intergroup Dialogue.
As explored in chapter one, philosophers describe epistemic justice as including:
accepting that marginalized knowers develop epistemic resources from their
situations/standpoints; privileged knowers trusting marginalized knowers and their
situated knowledges; and dominant knowers actively learning how to utilize structurally
marginalized knowledge (Pohlhaus, 2012); and dominantly (and subordinately) situated
knowers to restructure habits and affective structures to enable them to simultaneously
engage different perspectives and viewpoints without polarizing them (develop a
kaleidoscopic consciousness), and engage in collective agency and action taking toward
political and cultural transformation (Medina, 2013). IGD and YPAR help facilitate youth
reflections and action taking, provide examples of how social justice pedagogy can
interrupt the reproduction of epistemic injustice in educational settings.
Specifically, in the YPAR and IGD youth programs presented in this chapter,
marginalized youth, and marginally situated youth in collaboration with dominantly
situated youth (The Detroit Youth Dialogues, the High School Institute and Spotlighting
Justice) created and disseminated new knowledges from their perspectives and
experiences. Dominantly situated youth actively learned to acknowledge the perspectives
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of youth of color while learning to practice perspective taking and holding multiple,
sometimes conflicting perspectives, at once. Additionally, these youths took action to
change their schools and communities (Aldana et al., 2012; Lopez et al., 2012; Torre & Fine,
2011). Through their participation in social justice education, these youths are practicing
the habits necessary for epistemic justice while learning to work for the types of
institutional and structural changes necessary to make epistemic justice possible.
I was able to work with the students participating in the High School Institute and
Spotlighting Justice as a facilitator. During this time, I was engaged in academic coursework
as a philosopher of education learning about epistemic injustice, and I was also developing
my practitioner skills as a social justice educator learning and practicing intergroup
dialogue and YPAR facilitation. Even as someone developing a great deal of content
knowledge, I cannot adequately express how much I learned about education for epistemic
justice from the youth at Central High School. My goal in partnering with the English
teacher at Central was to re-create the intergroup dialogue on race and ethnicity that I was
facilitating at the university level to the high school level. Even in retrospect, I am amazed
by how high school students in the tenth grade transformed that goal and made it into
something so much richer, developing skills and knowledge among themselves, their
school and their community. The next chapter in this dissertation (chapter four) is linked
to my work as a facilitator of intergroup dialogue at the university level. Chapter four
explores intergroup dialogue pedagogy at the university level; specifically, I analyze the
course documents of students who participated in an intergroup dialogue on race and
ethnicity. Through this analysis, I seek to respond to question three outlined in the
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introduction: How might intergroup dialogue, as a particular type of social justice pedagogy,
facilitate epistemic justice in educational settings including higher education.
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Chapter 4
Teaching for Epistemic Justice
“For as long as white people maintain power and black and brown people are their
subordinates we will never have to address the race issue. Ultimately, race is one of those
privileges white people have the benefit of deflecting. White people can go through there
(sic) day to day and avoid people of color where as unfortunately people of color can’t do
the same. My ultimate hope for this class was to create a set of conscious people, especially
conscious white people so they can go back to their communities and help begin to fix the
issues in their own communities as people of color continue to improve and further advance
their own.”
–Alyssa15 (emphasis added)
Alyssa, a participant in intergroup dialogue on race and ethnicity, powerfully
describes the normative architecture undergirding how white people know relative to her
hopes and goals for a college level intergroup dialogue course on race and ethnicity. As
Alyssa insightfully surfaces, white people have the privilege of not knowing how race
influences the daily experiences of people of color in U.S. society. As described in chapter
one, intergroup dialogue is a specific type of social justice education that brings students
together across differences in identities and power to explore social inequality while
mobilizing students towards collective action (Gurin et al., 2013). This chapter continues to
explore students’ descriptions of learning through intergroup dialogue pedagogy and
practices by pivoting from the high school setting to the college setting. Specifically, this
chapter analyzes student course writing across two sections of intergroup dialogue on race
and ethnicity. Student writing was analyzed to develop an understanding of how students
describe the impact of intergroup dialogue pedagogy and course content focused on race
and ethnicity on their learning and thinking. In the context of the overall dissertation
project, this chapter thoughtfully takes up question four raised in the introduction: How
might intergroup dialogue, as a particular type of social justice pedagogy, facilitate epistemic
justice in educational settings? This chapter begins with a brief review of research about
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intergroup dialogue pedagogy with particular attention to research that utilizes qualitative
content analysis as it relates to the study described below. After describing the themes that
emerged from students’ course writings, the chapter begins to make connections between
how students are describing the impact of intergroup dialogue pedagogy on their learning
and teaching for epistemic justice; these connections will be further explored in the next
chapter of this dissertation.
Literature Review
Intergroup dialogue pedagogy
Intergroup dialogue pedagogy refers to a specific type of social justice pedagogy
developed at the University of Michigan and practiced nationally in higher education
(Zúñiga et al., 2007). By dialogue it refers to sustained, co-facilitated face-to-face
communication over the course of a semester. By intergroup, it refers to the bringing
together of students across differences in identities (e.g. race, gender, social class).
Particular forms of communication are emphasized in the dialogic classroom; these include
active listening and the practices of empathy and perspective taking to build understanding
across difference. In emphasizing the development of understanding across differences,
practitioners facilitate a critical analysis of social issues with and among students; this
criticality incorporates the dynamics of structural inequality in “addressing issues of social
identity and social location in the context of power and privilege” (Zúñiga et al., 2007, p.
vii). Students are encouraged to consider taking action towards social justice.
On most campuses, intergroup dialogue takes place over four phases (Dessel &
Rogge, 2008); an overview was provided earlier in this dissertation (see Table 1 adapted
from Zúñiga, et al., 2007, pp. 27-28). Phase one provides a space for students to form
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relationships and to learn about and practice dialogic communication. Phase two facilitates
the exploration of commonalities and difference across group identities and an
examination of power. Phase three engages students in the exploration of hot topics in
which students explore systems of power and privilege relative to current or historical
events introducing “students to critical histories [offering] new pathways of understanding
how today’s racist society evolved” (Rozas & Miller, 2009, p. 29). Phase four focuses on
action taking and alliance building. Students work in small groups on action projects; these
are called Intergroup Collaborative Projects (ICP). Since action is taking place in
conjunction with learning about race with others across social identities, students with
dominant identities are prevented from re-centering power through “doing for” (Nagda,
Gurin, Sorensen, Gurin-Sands, & Osuna, 2009). Similarly, subordinate groups are not forced
or reified as “doing it/making it on their own.” Instead, students are taught to and practice
working with one another across differences in identities—they can practice alliance
making.
Intergroup dialogue is co-facilitated. The co-facilitation format demonstrates
multiple epistemic markers of Intergroup Dialogue. Firstly, knowledge is seen as belonging
to members of multiple social identity groups; facilitators represent both the marginalized
and dominant identities centered in the dialogue (e.g. a facilitator who identifies as a
person of color and one who identifies as white in a dialogue on race and ethnicity).
Secondly, co-facilitation embodies the practice of democratic knowledge making, or making
meaning with. Zúñiga et al. (2012) call this process “co-inquiry.” Co-inquiry models alliance
building and action across differences in identities and inequalities for the purpose of social
justice action (Nagda, Timbang, Fulmer, & Tran, 2011).
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Research on Intergroup Dialogue Pedagogy
Findings from research across intergroup dialogue programs at nine participating
universities finds that students enrolled in intergroup dialogue developed greater
awareness of inequality, empathy and motivation to bridge difference, and efficacy in
taking action than did wait-list students who were interested in but not able to enroll in
intergroup dialogue courses the same semester (Gurin et al., 2013; Lopez & Zúñiga, 2010).
Students enrolled in intergroup dialogue courses have also demonstrated increased
perspective-taking and more complex thinking about differences across social identity
groups (DeTurk, 2006). Intergroup dialogue courses have also been shown to decrease
belief in stereotypes and prejudice among participants, while also increasing racial identity
awareness among white students and students of color (Dessel & Rogge, 2008). In higher
education settings intergroup dialogue pedagogy has repeatedly demonstrated an increase
in awareness and understanding of others while building students’ confidence to take civic
action towards greater social justice. More recently, intergroup dialogue researchers have
studied and analyzed intragroup dialogue courses (Ford & Malaney, 2012; Ford &
Orlandella, 2015). Intragroup dialogue courses allow students to learn and analyze the
same or very similar content of traditional intergroup dialogue course, while allowing
students to engage these learnings, topics and issues in an in-group setting (e.g. among
students who identify as multi-racial or as white).
Ford & Malaney (2012) conducted an IRB approved analysis of students’ papers in
five sections of intergroup dialogue (comprised of students of color and white students) on
race and ethnicity and one section of a multiracial intragroup dialogue16 on race and
ethnicity (enrolling students who identify as multiracial/students of color students only,
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providing the opportunity for multiracial students/students of color to explore race among
similarly identifying peers); the study including a sample of 31 students. Ford & Malaney
(2012) conducted an inductively derived qualitative analysis of students’ four-page
preliminary paper and of their eight-page final papers at a small, pre-dominantly white
liberal arts college in the Northeast. Students reflected on their experiences and
understandings of race for both papers; students were asked questions about social
identities, social structures, and about their experience with the dialogue course (Ford &
Malaney, 2012).
In an analysis of student writing, Ford & Malaney (2012) found students selfreported growth. Furthermore, students learning was coded into seven themes: (1)
saliency and meaning of racial identity, (2) complexity of racial identity development, (3)
relationship between skin color and self-esteem, (4) individual biases and prejudices, (5)
structures of power and privilege/agent and target identities, (6) experience of race at the
college, and (7) personal accountability and responsibility. At the start of the race
dialogues, most students of color expressed a nuanced understanding of race and racism,
which “is not surprising given the socio-historical context of race relations in the U.S.;
generally, targeted racial identity groups are more aware of systematic dis/advantage
based on power structures” (Ford & Malaney, 2012, p. 23). These students emphasized the
centrality of race at the start of the dialogue and were able to further re-define or
communicate the significance of race at the end of their dialogue.
In the multi-racial intra-group dialogue (MRID) students discussed the complexity
of racial identity development in their preliminary papers. Some MRID students discussed
identity confusion even including some cases of internalized oppression/self-hatred (Ford
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& Malaney, 2012). Some students, for example, described feeling torn between identities;
one biracial man wrote he was teased about being the “least black, black kid” by his Black
peers, while being treated like the “token black kid” by his white peers (Ford & Malaney,
2012, p. 25). According to Ford & Malaney (2012), the multiracial students who expressed
a sense of being torn between identities at the beginning of the semester moved to
describing how they were making sense of a fluid racial identity by the end of the semester;
they began to embrace complexity. The same biracial man who felt neither at home among
Black or white peers at the start of the semester described himself as “not divided within
myself…these realizations inspired a satisfaction with and growth of my character, and I
now harbor more pride in my race than I had ever before” (Ford & Malaney, 2012, p. 25).
In terms of skin color and self-esteem, Ford & Malaney (2012) found that students
of color in both inter and intragroup dialogues struggled with positive racial sense of self in
their initial papers, and they expressed a more positive sense of self and future outlook in
their final papers. Similarly, students from both dialogues were also able to more fully
articulate, dissect and express an awareness of their individual biases and prejudices from
the preliminary to the final papers. One Black woman wrote in her final paper, “Like all
problems, the first step is to acknowledge that it is there…Not only do I have biases against
other races, but I’ve learned that I have several against my own race as well” (Ford &
Malaney, 2012, p. 27).
While the students of color and the multiracial students in both the inter and the
intragroup dialogue generally began the course with a deeper understanding of race,
power and privilege than their white counterparts, students of color and multiracial
students from across both courses developed a deeper appreciation of these issues through
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their engagement with the dialogue (Ford & Malaney, 2012). As a result of participating in
the inter/intra group dialogue course, “SOC/multiracial students began to more fully
recognize the complicated structures of power and privilege in the US as well as its
relationship to racial hegemony” (Ford & Malaney, 2012, p. 28). Additionally, many of the
students of color and multiracial students developed a more complex understanding of
their multiple and intersecting identities, furthering their understandings of
advantage/disadvantage.
For students of color and multiracial students across both dialogue courses, the
experience of being students with non-dominant racial identities at their predominantly
white college was a challenge at the beginning and the end of the course. Students found
the racially homogeneous environment to be shocking and isolating (Ford & Malaney,
2012). However, participating in these courses helped students identify that they are not
alone in their struggle. Students of color and multiracial students described growing in
their sense of personal accountability and responsibility in creating social change from
their preliminary to their final papers. One Asian American woman wrote in her final
paper, “I also found through this class, how to empower my target status, to de-victimize
myself,” while a Latino man wrote, “Gone are the days where I would not speak up when
someone uses a derogatory comment. I will not conform and accept the privileges that
come with it. I will use my knowledge to challenge the status quo” (Ford & Malaney, 2012,
p. 30). Students across both dialogues expressed a desire to create positive social change.
Using similar methodology, Ford (2012) analyzed the shifting ideological scripts of
white students participating in inter and intragroup race dialogues. In the IRB approved
qualitative study, researchers conducted content analysis of student papers at a private,
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predominantly white, liberal arts college in the Northeast, Ford (2012) analyzed the
writings of white students in a student of color-white student intergroup dialogue on race
and ethnicity and the writings of white students in an intragroup white student dialogue on
race and ethnicity. Both of these dialogues were consistent with the four-phase model
described in detail above; the primary difference in the two courses “was the emphasis on
learning about race (generally) and whiteness (specifically) across or within their racial
identity group” (Ford, 2012, p. 144).
Ford (2012) conducted an inductively derived qualitative analysis of white students
four-page preliminary papers and their eight-page final papers. These papers (98 total)
required students to reflect on race by specifically addressing social identities, social
structures, and their experience in the dialogue course. Ford (2012) found that white
students across both sections self-reported growth in their understanding of course
content learning and in engaging the dialogue process. While students reported growth in
their understanding of racial identity, some students also communicated aspects of
resistance. For example, one white student in the intragroup dialogue section questioned
the intra group format asking, “What can I learn from other White people?” (Ford, 2012,
146). This question is a significant one; it is even raised by students during intergroup
dialogue courses. Ford (2012) calls this an example of cognitive dissonance, or an inability
of students to process information that stands in contradiction to the world view they
possess. Ford (2012) reports that intragroup dialogue students initially exhibited
resistance in the form of denial, defensiveness, and even anger at the intragroup structure
of their course; however, at the end of the course, these white students exhibited what Ford
(2012) calls script changes by demonstrating a more nuanced perspective on whiteness,
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white privilege and white identity development. White students in the intragroup dialogue
course also demonstrated similar growth; however, their learning was often more broadly
focused on race relations instead of whiteness.
Across sections, significant themes emerged that included: white students reflecting
on how they were socialized to view/not view race, the meaning of whiteness and white
privilege, feelings of shame and guilt, intersectional awareness of multiple social identities,
and personal accountability for social change (Ford, 2012). Specifically, while many white
students in both sections began the course declaring they “do not perceive race,” their
ideological scripts shifted to include an understanding of how they were socialized to
minimize race. Similarly, students began the course unable to identify specific lessons they
were taught about whiteness, but, through the course of the semester, they learned that
whiteness isn’t “just there”; instead, the seeming invisibility of whiteness (to white people)
is a function of dominant racial hegemony (Ford, 2012, p.148). Ford (2012) reports this
theme was consistent across both dialogues; however, there was a distinction. Namely,
white students who participated in the intergroup dialogue section focused primarily on
white skin privilege and its impact on people of color, while students in the intragroup
dialogue section were “more able to articulate the meaning of white culture, independent
of a reference group…they [were] able to own the sociohistorical process of becoming
white within the U.S. context” (Ford, 2012, p. 148). The students who participated in the
intragroup dialogue were better able to describe the sociohistorical assimilative process by
which ethnic groups (e.g. Irish, German) became white. Students in both sections were
assigned readings on this topic, but, since students in the intragroup section describe the
deepest understanding of white identity development over the course of the semester, Ford
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(2012) suggests that the intragroup focus may result in more critical and focused
examination of whiteness for all students but especially for white students.
In terms of feelings of guilt and shame, students from both sections discussed these
emotions via the process of learning about privilege and inequality in both their
preliminary and final papers; students in both groups also expressed understanding that
these emotions are not productive and were making steps to resolve internal conflict (Ford,
2012). Additionally, students from both sections grew their understanding of white
privilege from their preliminary script of white privilege is “things I have that others do
not,” to white privilege being more complex and something for which the white students
felt responsibility for (Ford, 2012, p. 149). In their final papers, white students were able to
talk about their privilege in terms of their participation as beneficiaries of a racist system
that they needed to help change.
These new understandings, new ideological scripts, allowed students from both
sections to develop an awareness of the structural nature of race and racism while
simultaneously growing an awareness of individual agency and responsibility (Ford, 2012).
Ford (2012) reports that students in both sections developed an understanding of a white
ally as someone who seeks to empower (not to undermine or to do for) the groups they
strive to support. Students acknowledged the importance of not confusing advocacy with
the hijacking of subordinate groups’ messages or stories. Across sections, students began to
understand they must first understand their racial identity and privilege in order to take
steps as individuals and as members of social justice groups to bring about change (Ford,
2012).
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Ford and Orlandella (2015) extended this study (Ford, 2012) by exploring white
students’ journeys to antiracist allies in their IRB approved content analysis of white
student course writings in either an intergroup or intra white student dialogue on race and
ethnicity offered during the 2009-2012 academic years. The researchers conducted an
inductively derived qualitative analysis of 58 students’ eight-page final papers at a small,
private, predominantly white liberal arts college in the Northeast. Students were
specifically asked to critically reflect on the following questions in their final papers: “What
does it mean to you to be a white person? What, if any, has been the impact of this dialogue
on your knowledge about being a white person in the U.S.? How, if all, do you expect to use
what you have learned in the future?” (Ford & Orlandella, 2015, p. 292). While many of the
themes and findings from Ford’s (2012) study are present across papers from both the
intra and intergroup dialogues, the findings in this analysis dig deeper into students’
descriptions of coming to understand whiteness, privilege, and action taking for social
change (Ford & Orlandella, 2015). Specifically, Ford and Orlandella (2015) analyzed the
ways that white students discussed the following prominent themes across their final
papers: the defining characteristics of white allies, approaches to becoming white allies,
and the challenges of becoming white allies.
When white students discussed the important characteristics of a white ally, they
wrote about the need for white students/allies to continually reflect about their white
racial identity, which includes becoming aware of how their white racial identity impacts
their everyday lives (i.e. need to work against the social racial invisibility of whiteness in
our society) (Ford & Orlandella, 2015). Students across sections also discussed white
privilege. Namely, students identified the need to not only be aware of white privilege, that
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they have it and that it operates as “normal” in their lives, but also to understand that they
cannot escape it so it is their responsibility to work to change it (Ford & Orlandella, 2015).
As white students recognized their privilege, they also came to understand their
biases and—structurally—how their biases are related to racialized social patterns that
shield their whiteness (Ford & Orlandella, 2015). One white woman wrote, “I look at many
of those close to me who are white, and can see we are all racist…I harbor racist tendencies
because of my own race, but nothing will change if I myself do not do something” (Ford &
Orlandella, 2015, p. 294). In their final papers, students grappled with their biases, the
social nature of these biases and their responsibility to be aware and act against them.
Additionally, many white students expressed a desire to work for social change on
both individual and structural levels. Specifically, some students talked about overcoming
their feelings of guilt to use their white privilege towards working for social justice (Ford &
Orlandella, 2015). White students wrote about finding their voices and using their voices to
speak out about their privilege and about racism. As the students discussed future action
taking, students seemed to be describing two distinct approaches to becoming allies:
helping people of color or working with (not for) people of color (Ford & Orlandella, 2015).
Ford & Orlandella (2015) describe the “helping people of color” approach as well-intended,
while acknowledging it is harmful because it reinforces hegemonic notions that people of
color need to be saved or rescued by white people. Some white students were able to
understand the danger of the “helping” narrative and, instead, expressed a desire to
collaborate with people of color (Ford & Orlandella, 2015). Ford & Orlandella (2015)
describe the collaboration-focused white students as “understanding of the ways that
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systemic racism affects everyone and how challenging inequitable racist structures will
liberate” those with dominant and subordinate racial identities (p. 296).
Ford & Malaney (2012), Ford (2012), and Ford & Orlandella (2015) use content
analysis of student course documents to provide analysis on how intra and intergroup
dialogue pedagogy focused on race and ethnicity helps students develop an understanding
or race, identity, power and privilege, and action taking. They use content analysis to
explore the way students’ learning and awareness develops and deepens in students’ own
words. Content analysis allowed the researchers to discern changes in students’
perspectives and understanding through the course of a semester-long dialogue. These
analyses provide an example for how content analysis of student papers can offer insight
into how students unlearn and learn content related to the very ways in which students
relate to themselves, to members of their social groups, and to society at large. These
studies are important in following the quantitative studies summarized at the start of this
dissertation (chapter one), studies that have identified key outcomes of IGD such as
increasing awareness and understanding of structural inequality, increases in critical
thinking and perspective taking and a decrease in prejudice (Dessel & Rogge, 2008). These
studies by Ford and colleagues contribute to a newer body of research that captures key
processes and student perspectives on learning through dialogue.
Methodology
This chapter provides an analysis of course writings from an intergroup dialogue on
race and ethnicity (conducted at a private, predominantly white, mid-sized, research
institution in the Northeast) through a lens sharply focused on student knowledge
practices, construction and unlearning; combining the literature and research described in
143

this and in preceding chapters. This chapter utilizes analysis of student writing (Ford &
Orlandella, 2015; Keehn, 2015; Ford, 2012; Matias, 2013) to animate the ways in which
white students’ epistemic ignorance is surfaced, unsettled and challenged through the
process of counter story telling that occurs over the course of an intergroup dialogue on
race and ethnicity. Education researchers utilize content analysis of student writing to
explore course-based learnings and insights (Ford & Orlandella, 2015; Keehn, 2015; Ford,
2012; Matias, 2013).
Qualitative content analysis in education includes the use of document analysis (like
students’ writings), which can be used to understand themes in students’ personal views
and experiences (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). Content analysis is useful in identifying trends
and patterns across documents (Stemler, 2001). In this study of student course documents,
emergent coding (Stemler, 2001) was utilized by the author to develop codes based on
themes that emerged based on a reading of student papers. Utilizing the process of
emergent coding, the author generated initial codes and then re-read all of the papers
producing memos that expanded the codes by focusing on themes across papers (Stemler,
2001; Bowen, 2009).
Limitations. While such content analysis is significant, it is also important to name
limitations of the methodology. A limitation of this approach, content analysis of student
writing, may be that students were trying to please their facilitators (myself included) in
their papers. While this is possible, it is clear in the extended excerpts provided (below)
that students share openly about their difficulties, their complex emotions (e.g. confusion,
anger, embarrassment), and their struggles with the course and the facilitation. Students do
not generally focus on their struggles, what they are embarrassed they did not know, and
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their frustration with the instructor, when trying to impress their teacher. Additionally,
student participation was requested two years after the conclusion of their participation in
the course, so participation in this study was not advantageous in any way in terms of
student grades or relationship with the instructor. Another limitation may be researcher
bias. I am a white woman analyzing these papers written by a diverse group of students.
This process is consistent with Freirean traditions in social justice education. As Freire
argued, all educators/learners are situated and grow because of their critical reflection
upon their situations and their place in those situations. Freire (2009) wrote, “Human
beings are because they are in a situation. And they will be more the more they not only
critically reflect upon their existence but critically act upon it” (p. 109). Social justice
educators, including Tatum (1992), critically reflect on their praxis through analyses of
their student papers. This chapter does not argue that these findings are generalizable
across campuses at all times. This is one course, on one campus, at a given socio-political
moment. As such, this analysis creates a window into student learning in process – a
central focus of the dissertation.
Content analysis is often used in combination with other qualitative research
methodologies, like interviewing; however, it is not uncommon for it to be used as a standalone methodology in qualitative studies (Bowen, 2009). Specifically, Ford & Orlandella
(2015) analyzed white student’s final papers in two courses, an intergroup dialogue on
race and ethnicity and an intragroup dialogue for white students on race and ethnicity, to
explore how white students develop an identity as anti-racist ally. Ford (2012) analyzed
both preliminary and final student papers in two courses, one an intergoup dialogue on
race and ethnicity and an intra group dialogue focused on white identity, to conduct a
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comparative analysis of student learning. Keehn (2015) analyzed students’ final papers in a
social justice course focused on race and ethnicity. The course Keehn investigated focused
on racism, classism, ableism and religious oppression to help students develop the skills to
intervene and take action for social change. Matias (2013) drew on experience as a
classroom teacher to develop a history course focused on issues of race, ethnicity and social
identity. Matias (2013) then analyzed student journals using critical race theory’s practice
of counter-storytelling (Solorzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000) to debunk white students’
epistemic ignorance. Similar to Tatum (1992), Matias analyzed student work
independently, and the current study furthers this same approach in examining IGD.
This chapter’s content analysis of student papers investigates whether epistemic
shifts can be documented and described using existing course design and materials in an
intergroup dialogue on race and ethnicity co-facilitated by two doctoral students at a
private predominantly white research university in the Northeast. Whereas Matias (2013)
and Keehn (2015) use short excerpts from student papers to prompt counter-storytelling
and discussion, this paper uses longer excerpts of student papers to center the students’
own thoughts and meta-reflections. This chapter starts with the premise that the students’
thoughts reveal not only beliefs but also the stages of meta-reflection and critical discovery
empowered by the dialogic process. These data analyzed in this chapter explore not only
students initial and final papers to understand the change in students’ knowledge and
perceptions over time but also students’ weekly journal writings. By including all of
students’ course writings over the course of the semester, the findings here demonstrate
intergroup dialogue’s praxis; they capture a picture of students in the process of
participating in intergroup dialogue. Students return to pivotal moments in the dialogue
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over the course of their semester’s writing, so we see not just what they thought in the start
and what they think at the end, but how they are thinking through the interactions and
learnings throughout the course of the semester.
The papers analyzed here reflect two sections of Intergroup Dialogue on Race &
Ethnicity that I co-facilitated during the 2011-2014 academic years. My co-facilitator
preparation included a graduate degree in education, graduate course work on intergroup
dialogue research and practice, and ongoing participation in facilitator meetings and
trainings. Together, both sections enrolled an aggregate of 15 white students (11 women; 4
men) and 16 students of color (11 women; 5 men). Student participants varied across
academic grade level (2 freshmen, 3 sophomores, 2 juniors, 3 seniors). The students (n=10)
whose papers are included in this analysis include 5 white students (3 women; 2 men) and
5 students of color (3 women; 2 men); these students are all traditional college-aged (1823) and self-identify as representing multiple social identity groups including: different
class years, different socio-economic backgrounds (e.g. working, middle and upper),
sexualities (e.g. gay, bi-sexual), and faith traditions (e.g. Jewish, Christian). Analysis of
papers focused on students’ reflections on their understanding of their racial and ethnic
social identities and the role of social identities in social structures and institutions.
Students in this IRB approved analysis were recruited via email from the author
(who was also the course co-facilitator) two-three semesters after the students completed
the course; 15 students (out of 27) emailed17 confirming their consent to participate. Of the
15 students18 who responded, all of their identifying information was stripped from their
papers, and they were assigned pseudonyms. Ten study participants from the 15 who
responded were chosen at random based on social identity19. That is to say, identifying
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information was stripped so students were labeled as their self-ascribed identity and a
number. These ten students were then randomly selected based on self-reported social
identity to ensure that a particular identity group was not over-represented (hence 5
students with dominant racial identities and 5 students with subordinate racial identities
were selected; within each of these groups, a 3:2 ratio of women-men was also
maintained). The author worked to ensure no one identity group was over-represented
because across most institutions that offer intergroup dialogue courses, students are
required to apply to participate in the intergroup dialogue courses to ensure that in the
courses themselves no one identity group is over-represented (hence the make-up of the
courses described above, Gurin et al., 2013); this is an important and intentional aspect of
intergroup dialogue pedagogy that disrupts demographic dominance/isolation prevalent in
many post-secondary (and high school) classrooms, and it was important for the author
that it be represented in the data analysis. The papers stripped of personal identification
were then loaded into a qualitative research software (Dedoose). Each student’s eight to
ten page final papers and weekly two to three page critical reflection papers (9 per student;
90 papers total) were coded and analyzed by the author to develop an understanding of
how students describe the change in their social understanding, or epistemic resource.
Memos were then drafted to connect the emerging themes across student papers.
Table 4. below provides a brief self-identification from the students who are quoted
or referenced (by other students) in this paper. These identifications are not meant to be
reductive or communicate information about the students other than how they selfidentified relative to race and ethnicity during their participation in the course to help the
reader navigate the exchanges and reflections of students cited below.
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Pseudonym
Alex
Alyssa
Brice
Carrie
Hannah

Brief (Self-Identified)Description
white man
Dominican, Black woman
Black man
white woman
Black woman

Pseudonym
Jennifer
Kristin
Lee
Randy
Sarah

Brief (Self-Identified)Description
Multiracial (Black & Latina) woman
white woman
Asian man
white man
white woman

Table 4. Summary of Student Participants

Analysis
Building on methodology from earlier intergroup dialogue research studies (Ford,
2012; Thomas, 2006), themes were identified across journals. These themes are explored
using excerpts highlighting each student’s individual voice and also the dialogue occurring
across students and across semesters. In analyzing students’ papers for an understanding
of shifts in epistemic judgments or understanding that occur over the course of a semester,
the over-arching theme of new knowledge began to emerge. It became clear that students
were talking about new ways they were perceiving society and their positionality. Ford
(2012) described this development of new knowledge or new awareness among white
students as a “shifting ideological script” (p. 139). In Ford’s (2012) analysis of white
students’ papers, she describes an ideological script shift from “traditional,” or consistent
with hegemonic norms, to “revisionist,” which includes an awareness of anti-racist and ally
commitments (p.139).
Across semesters and racial identities, students appeared to hone in on critical
moments that occurred during class dialogue over and over again. The concept of a critical
moment in dialogue can be found across literature on dialogue as a social justice pedagogy.
For example, Kuby (2013) explored moments of emotional contact amongst students (5
and 6 year olds) participating in a dialogue on race; Arao & Clemens (2013) look at those
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moments in social justice dialogue courses that create “brave spaces” where students
actively engage in perspective taking that may cause them discomfort. In the analysis of
student writing discussed in this chapter, students, across social identity groups, discussed
their learning about whiteness as a social phenomenon from these critical moments in
dialogue, and, unlike previous studies, this chapter explores how students reflected on
these moments throughout the course of the semester. We see students’ reflections not
only at the end of the semester, but throughout the semester as they learn more content
and learn more about the perspectives and views of their classmates.
Finally, students reflected often on how these new knowledges would influence
their behaviors moving forward, or dialogue to action. Again, students’ focus on “what now”
or “what next” as a result of participating in intergroup dialogue is present in findings from
other analysis of student generated course writing (see for example Ford & Orlandella,
2015 and Ford, 2012). Across papers, the major themes were coded as: critical moments,
whiteness as a social phenomenon, and dialogue to action. These themes are described in
greater detail below.
New Knowing: Critical Moments
In analyzing papers from both semesters, critical moments during the dialogues
emerged as catalysts for students’ on-going reflection and interpretation. Interestingly,
instead of applying the concepts they were learning in class primarily to social institutions
in general (as was anticipated by the co-facilitators), students developed the habit of
applying weekly learning to actual incidents within the course; the students began to
actively participate in critical self and group (i.e. the class) reflection. Three key events
emerged. The first event was the caucus group session20 (Zúñiga et al., 2007); during this
150

session in intergroup dialogues on race, students are separated along self-identified racial
lines to discuss race intra-group. Facilitators in this section intentionally ask white students
to leave the classroom space, which geographically serves to hold the dialogue, and with
the white identified co-facilitator occupy a new space to discuss whiteness while students
of color remain in the regular classroom to discuss race in-group. During the caucus group,
both groups of students reflect on their racial identit(ies) in-group. Students are asked
questions like: what does your race mean for you in your daily life?, what makes you proud
of your race?, can you describe a time on campus your race was salient?
During the caucus group dialogue session, two students of color made comments
that would be returned to in many dialogue sessions and reflection papers hence. Alyssa21,
a Dominican woman who self-identifies as Black, jokingly said she was glad that for once it
was white people who were being inconvenienced, having to leave a place, as white
students left the room. Then, during the caucus groups another student, a Black woman,
shared that some days she wakes up hating white people; this was shared with the white
students during a fishbowl. The fishbowl, or sharing out activity, occurs during the class
session following caucus groups. During the fishbowl, the students of color and the white
students take turns sharing out their discussions and experiences during the caucus group.
The student groups choose to disclose as much or as little of the intra-group dialogue that
occurred as they are collectively comfortable sharing. The third catalytic experience
followed the fish bowls. During this dialogue session, two students (a student of color and
white student) disagreed on white guilt or, in their words, the nature of “feeling bad” and
whiteness during a whole group dialogue.
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Students are quoted in long excerpts without any correction to their writing to
honor the embodied and dynamic nature of their reflective process: students make
meaning while writing, and it is important we honor their epistemic production. Citing
students’ reflections within the context of their longer excerpts also acts as a safeguard
against the author co-opting students’ experiences for the purposes of developing a
particular narrative. Additionally, citing longer portion of student writing, as was done in
chapter three, allows for a richer analysis of shifts in students’ thinking. In most research
on intergroup dialogue, short quotes from students are used to demonstrate particular
outcomes. The long quotes here focus less on describing a particular outcome of dialogic
praxis, and more on exploring how students’ ways of thinking and understandings change
through the course of their participation in an intergroup dialogue on race and ethnicity.
Critical Moment 1: Caucus groups. Alyssa recalled the following about the caucus
group session:
Till this day one of my favorite Intergroup Dialogue classes had to be the caucus
groups. I truly felt like it was a turning point in the class. It was one of those classes
where not only was the tension felt in the class but you can see the discomfort. It was
one of the most honest and truly liberating moments all semester. It was also one of
the biggest moments in which we really explored the difference in what it means to be
black and white …When we broke up in to the groups I said, “yes, the people of color
stay back for once, we don’t have to get up”. Granted that was meant to be a joke but I
would be lying if I didn’t think there were some underlying truths to it. That was one of
the first things we discussed in our caucus groups.
The caucus group for the people of color felt more like a “coming to Jesus”. A “coming
to Jesus” is when you get a group of people who usually share close ties or relations
and they get off their chest how they feel about one another. Everyone is honest and no
one takes things personal. This is what our caucus discussion reminded me of. We were
brutally honest with one another about the things that bother us and the different
things we have dealt with over the years. It felt like a sense of camaraderie to just sit
around with people who look just like you and say whatever you want….In the white
caucus group they spoke about race but they danced and sugar coated around the
issue whereas the students of color laid it out completely. We presented it on a silver
platter like “this is what it is”. It made me think of the article we read by Lena
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Williams. Williams wrote: It's the little things: Everyday interactions that get under
the skin of Blacks and whites. The article expressed a lot of the sentiments and stories
that we shared with one another in the caucus group. When I mentioned it before
about how people of color can speak about race with no apprehension it is because it
more often than not stems from sitting around and telling personal stories. There isn’t
a black or brown child out there that doesn’t have a testimony when it comes to race
that they don’t remember. Children remember everything especially the things that
open their eyes and make them question and look at the world differently. Whether it
be being bullied on the playground, or the first time they were called a Nigger or being
told you’re not black or Latino enough. Those are things that stick with them for the
rest of their lives. These are the things that we want white people to know. Children
are being forced to deal and grapple with race at such a young age that by the time
you’re a teenager you don’t have a choice but to internalize and try to make sense of
these things.
Alex, a white man, shares the following reflection of the white caucus group:
The caucus group activity was also very interesting. It was perhaps one of the most
frustrating classes of the year. It was incredibly difficult to have a conversation with
just white people about race. The conversation kept swinging back to what the other
group was talking about. It was the least productive dialogue we had all semester. I
felt like I was pulling teeth trying to get people to talk at all. During the fishbowl
activity it was even worse. We just kind of stared at each other, barely making any
discussion at all. I accept responsibility for this too. I was talking far less in the
fishbowl than in the caucus. This resulted in my lowest feelings toward the class all a
year. It seemed to affirm a lot of the discussion about how things will not change
regarding race relations. We thought we had made progress, and the caucus showed
us that there is still so much to be done.
Alyssa and Alex describe two different epistemic experiences. Alyssa captures the
ways in which in-group caucus can be empowering for students of color because their
identities mobilize shared knowledge resources. Eloquently, she describes how, while of
course students of color do not have monolithic experiences, the shared racial identity
marker means they can express and make intelligible to one another what it means to
experience racism in lived daily experience. Experiencing racism is not about it being “so
sad” that this still happens, but, more importantly, an awareness of repeated social
interactions that are unfair and commonplace. Speaking together allows for a raising of
voices, a collective testimonial process that brings individuals who do not know each other
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well together as a collective. The script is shifted from what people of color are the “victims
of” to what white students cannot know. Alyssa clearly identifies that white students are
not able to discuss race with openness and with clarity in respect to systems and
widespread analysis.
Alex, a white man, is able to identify this same phenomenon in the caucus group. We
hear his shock at the inability of white students to discuss race in-group by this midpoint in
the semester. He calls the dialogue the “least productive.” He acknowledges his
responsibility in not moving the discussion forward and also understands, at this point,
that white peoples’ unwillingness and inability to discuss race is a barrier to social change.
While Alex cannot discuss the caucus group with a sense of epistemic empowerment as
Alyssa can, he does demonstrate an epistemic shift: he sees how whiteness inhibits
knowledge growth.
Also thinking about the caucus group, Lee22, an Asian man, expresses subtle
awareness of dialogic practice in an early reflection paper. He shares:
To reflect on the caucus group dialogue last time, I have a mixed feeling in my head.
One of the feelings I had was that how open and expressive my group members are. It
almost looks like my group members have kept a lot of things to themselves. For
instance, one of my group member claimed that she have given up the hope for white
people to understand them, which means white people could actually understand
black people. I partially agree to the fact that even after the civil rights movement had
long past, white people or people racially identify as white, still have little
improvement over issue with their privileges. The reason I agree with this is not
because I was subjected towards the incorrect judgment made by white people, but
from what I heard. [Summarizes fellow classmate of color sharing she was called a
racial epithet on campus.] I was furious when I heard the story but relating to the
point my other classmate make about she think it’s hopeless for white people to
understand black people, I thought the same. No matter how society as a whole
recognize the issue with race and ethnicity, there is always going to be people who still
hold unfair view against other race. The issue with racism and privilege is never going
to be completely disappeared. Although, unlike my classmate who was completely
given up hope, I still believed that as long as marginal changes were made, things will
eventually become better.
154

The caucus groups allow for students to practice in-group perspective taking. While Lee
asserts he himself has not experienced an incident where the saliency of his race produced
a sense of hopelessness for social change, he was able to understand how his classmate
would feel this because of his empathetic response to her experience of racism on campus.
As a student, through the caucus group and the dialogic practices of perspective taking and
empathic listening, Lee was better able to understand his peer’s position even though it
was different than his own even during an in-group conversation.
Kristin, a white woman, also describes reflecting on the structure and content of the
dialogue in her processing of the white student caucus group. Kristin writes:
When first asked to break into caucus groups, I did not understand what we were
doing. I completely did not understand the question at all. At first, I though class was
over, then I thought [the facilitator] was joking when she asked for the students who
identified as White to follow. It’s interesting thinking back that a request so simple
could go over my head so easily. I do not know why I did not grasp the concept of
breaking into caucus groups. I may have just not been listening. Part of me, however,
believes that I did not think breaking off into racial groups was fair, and I did not know
how to respond to it. Looking back on the caucus group exercise, I realize that talking
with groups along my racial and ethnic lines made me feel more comfortable when
talking about issues dealing with race and ethnicity.
At first, I felt awkward when put into the caucus group. I also felt awkward because I
wondered if our classmates who identified as students of color were offended that we
were separated. I did not want them to feel like I felt superior, or that I felt like we
should be separated. I felt like I noticed many different feelings expressed by my peers
during the caucus group. I think some of them also felt awkward, while others
expressed that they felt more comfortable discussing race and ethnicity issues with
classmates with the same race and ethnicity that they had. I found this interesting,
because that is how I felt at the beginning of the year. When I first joined the
intergroup dialogue course, I was uncomfortable talking about race and ethnicity with
people who shared different races and ethnicities than my own. I was worried I would
offend someone. However, as time passed, I realized that to get the most out of the
dialogue I would have to be honest with my peers, and be as comfortable with them as
possible. I realize that race and ethnicity is a very difficult topic to talk about, but I feel
that if the people you are discussing the issues with are open to discussion, questions
and understanding, you can learn a lot about other groups of people. I realized that
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being white, it is often hard to talk with other races and ethnicities about their
backgrounds because White people have privilege.
For Kristin, a white woman, reflecting on dialogic practice and learning relative to
her participation in the white student caucus group was frustrating; at the heart of this
reflection is Kristin struggling to figure out and name why the caucus group bothered her.
She shares that, at first, she assumed her white co-facilitator was playing some sort of trick
or was up to something. Initially she thinks separating by race and ethnicity is inherently
unfair; after all, the focus of intergroup dialogue is contact across differences. But then she
puts the uneasiness back on herself—“why am I uncomfortable?” She realizes it is because
there is a level of comfort in discussing race and ethnicity in-group. This realization comes
with some feelings of guilt; Kristin wonders what the students of color thought, what they
felt. This can be a way of her evaluating her own feelings, asking if her classmates of color
felt awkward or comfortable while admitting she did feel a sense of comfort.
Lee and Kristin’s reflections demonstrate students thinking about how they are
thinking during the course of participating in intergroup dialogue and specific moments,
like the caucus groups. For Lee, perspective taking and empathetic listening led to a deeper
understanding of how dialogue members who share a subordinate racial identity might feel
differently than he and share a different (in this case more pessimistic) view. For Kristin,
critical self-awareness is helping her to more deeply understand her own knee-jerk
responses; she describes feeling surprise, anger, reticence and then a degree of selfawareness. The ability to reflect critically on one’s own opinions and reactions are essential
for experiencing epistemic shifts. Both of these students describe their processes of critical
self-reflection.
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Critical Moment 2: Fishbowls. During the fishbowl activity, members of the student of
color caucus group discussed a member of their group sharing that she sometimes wakes
up hating white people. Hannah, a woman who identifies as Black, describes the
conversation about “hating white people” as follows:
In knowing a person it is important to note the similarities and dissimilarities, both in
characteristics and opinions. From the class the noticeably biggest disagreement was
about halfway through the semester when [one of the students] jokingly stated that
she wakes up and hates white people. This statement wasn’t taken so heavily amongst
the minorities because not only are we accustomed to hearing racially-fueled jokes,
but we understand the frustration that can come from the statements or actions a
white person does…. However, for non-minorities who aren’t accustomed to such jokes,
this joke didn’t go over well at all. From their perspective, [she] was saying something
terribly racist and getting away with it because she’s Black. I recall [a white woman]
saying she felt that if she herself had said she wakes up every morning and hates black
people it would be taken a far different way. And she’s right. It would have been
because there are enough instances of whites being blatantly racist, many very public
ones, that even if a white person is just joking it will still stir memories of all the times
white people weren’t joking. Some see this as a terrible double-standard, but I think
it’s a miniscule exchange for the years of oppression minorities have suffered and
continue to in America. I personally would take white privilege over the ability to
make a black joke, any day. But that’s just me.
[She] really took one for the team with the joke because though she said it, she wasn’t
the only minority thinking it. All the minorities laughed at it when she said it in front of
the class and yet, the class only credited her for having these thoughts. Not just that
one day, either. The statement was mentioned two weeks after it was said and talked
about for a while. While I feel [she] responded in a way that didn’t exactly bring more
understanding, I understand her being frustrated that people were constantly pointing
out how bad a statement they felt it was. And then after [she] had told others “I don’t
care”, [a white woman] said to her, “Oh, no. We’re not saying what you did was bad”.
But, in fact, that is exactly what everyone was doing…It’s this fear that whites have
that prevents them from saying what is on their mind and consequently that prevents
them from gaining understanding and enlightenment on race-relations.
Carrie, a white woman, reflects on the exchange and its impact on the class:
During the other session when we reflected on [the caucus groups] many classmates
expressed that they wanted to hear more honesty. They felt that our class needed to
have a break through and be more honest with one another. We talked about how we
should not have to worry about being judged and that we can ask each other questions
and that everyone has their own opinion. Before this session we were not fully honest
with one another. We talked about the fear of making bold comments and that we had
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to get over it and trust one another. People kept brining up the fact that they really
enjoyed how honest [The Black student] was when she said that she hated white
people. Another disagreement arose because of this. [She] felt that everyone in the
class was picking on her and angry for what she said. She took it the wrong way. Our
class was actually praising her for her truthfulness. People asked questions and
reassured [her] that those were not the intentions. This was huge for our class. It was
the first time that everyone was fully honest with one another…During this
disagreement I learned that it is okay to be honest and to ask questions. I also learned
that certain disagreements could help bring out and repair other conflicts that people
never discussed before.
For Hannah, this incident reveals white students’ propensity to see themselves as
individuals instead of members of a social group. Because students of color have shared
experiences of racialized oppression, they understand the feeling of “hating white people,”
even if this feeling is not reflective of their general orientation towards white people.
However, white students who see themselves as individuals, as “good whites,” (Applebaum,
2010) are hurt by the very notion that they could be hated because of their white racial
identity. White students struggle to see this articulation of hate as a socialized response;
instead, perhaps as an enactment of white privilege, they perceive this form of hate as an
interpersonal emotion directed at them just like racism is directed at people of color. It was
only after extended class-wide exploration of the statement that white students were able
to ask questions to uncover the social nature of racial animus. While white students like
Carrie found this uncovering to be helpful, students of color like Hannah describe feeling a
sense of frustration at having to explain this emotive response to white students. This
conflict is not solely about emotion—it is about epistemic resource. Because white students
do not understand what Mills (1997) calls the normative function of whiteness, they cannot
understand a socialized response to whiteness, they perceive primarily an affective
response to their white skin. It is this epistemic cluelessness that frustrates students of
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color, who clearly recognize the notion of animosity towards racial dominance as
frustration, as a defense, a method of coping.
While it is the case that students of color were better able to understand and
contextualize the comment, it is not the case that all students of color agreed with it. Brice,
a Black man, reflected on the incident in his weekly reflection paper bridging it with
disagreement over “feeling bad” that will be discussed below. Brice writes:
The one thing that was said that made me think more about race and ethnicity is
[the] statement that deep down we (people of color) do in some way hate white people.
Initially I wanted to say that not all people of color have some sort of hatred towards
white people, and then others in our group started agreeing with [it]. I perceived that
amongst our group that there was a consensus that we all do dislike white people in
some way or another. After considering this statement in my mind and reflecting on
my life experiences and experiences with race and ethnicity I asked my self, “Is there
some part of me deep down that dislikes or hates white people?” I ended up expressing
to the group that I did not and realized that I disagreed with this notion. There was a
cohesive sentiment amongst the most of the [people of color caucus] that we all do
hate whites in some way. Due to this overwhelming consensus Elizabeth Martinez’s
statement that “The task of building solidarity among people of color promises to be
more necessary and difficult than ever” (Martinez, 1995) might be coming to fruition.
It somewhat astounded me that there was an overall consensus of disliking whites. I
have always expressed my resentment at the system, white domination economically,
politically, and socially but I have never translated that resentment into a dislike of
white people. Perhaps I am naive in thinking that there is not just a common hatred
amongst people of color towards white people. I understand that there is resentment,
but the use of the word hate really got to me and up to now while I am writing this I
am examining if I have hatred towards white people. I do not know if I am blowing this
out of proportion, perhaps studying rhetoric leads me to over analyze.
After reading about how racism is institutionalized I feel that everyone has an
experience of institutionalized racism, whether we benefit from it or not….I feel that
white privilege puts others at a number of disadvantages, from economic, and
educational inequality to negative stereotypes not only does white privilege
marginalize others it also hurts white people. One aspect of white privilege that has
not often been discussed and does not appear to be a privilege is ignorance of racism
and oppression, which often leads to guilt. White privilege is often accompanied by
segregation and minimal experiences [interracial interaction] and when racial
oppression is realized by white [people,] guilt is followed by this realization
Our caucus discussed guilt and many concurred that whites should feel guilty about
their oppression. I agree that whites should recognize their privilege, but I do not know
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if guilt helps.
Brice teases out numerous features of these exchanges including how they are
interrelated. Brice is able to trouble the notion of hate as an emotion; instead, he articulates
it as a response to institutionalized inequality. Since perspective taking is emphasized in
dialogue, it is valuable to observe that Brice does not only name that institutionalized
inequality impacts those with subordinate identities; it also impacts those with dominant
identities because they do not as readily “see” or understand institutionalized inequality.
As philosophers and social theorists have long argued and documented, when white people
are forced to be aware of their structural advantages, cognitive dissonance arises (Fricker,
2007), and white people feel confused and often guilty about the privileges they are newly
aware of. As a result of intergroup dialogue, Brice is able to describe white epistemic
ignorance, albeit with different language, and to offer an analysis of his classmates’
emotions relative to this epistemic practice. What’s more, he is able to critique white guilt
as unproductive both epistemically and in terms of creating justice.
Critical Moment 3: Perspectives on white guilt. In reflecting on the caucus groups and
fishbowls, two women engaged in a disagreement about white students’ emotive response
to awareness of inequality. This interaction is described by students below.
Carrie, a white woman, wrote:
[An Asian American and a white woman] got into a big disagreement during one of the
sessions. It was during the session that occurred after our group was split up according
to color. This was a very tense and emotional time for many people. During this session
we did the fish bowl activity where the white people explained how guilty they felt
being away from the other half of the group. The people of color explained they really
enjoyed it and found it humorous and fun. I think everyone became a little tense during
it, but no one really became honest until [they] began to fight. It was a heated
argument that turned away from dialogue and into more of a debate. The two girls felt
they had to defend themselves according to their races and ethnicity. [One woman]
started off by saying she knows that she has white privilege and feels guilty because of
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it. This offended [Asian American student] because she does not want people to feel
badly for her…Now I believe that this disagreement was good for our group. It was the
first time people were honest. Both [students] explained that they resolved their
problem after the class and that they hoped that other members would have real and
honest dialogue like that.
Jennifer, a Black woman, described the same situation:
Two disagreements come to mind that we in our sessions where I might have come
across as silent but my mind was running a thousand miles a minute. The first was
when [two women] were having a “discussion” on white privilege. I think [the white
woman] was being really honest when she said something in the realms of “I can’t help
that I come from a privileged background and that I grew up in a nice neighborhood”
and [the Asian American woman] got really upset and offended then [the white
woman] got defensive. As much as I agreed with the emotions that [the Asian
American woman] had I give props to [the white woman’s] honesty and because of this
I understand where she is coming from now. It’s her comment that made this learning
community stronger in meaning and understanding.
Brice also returned to this incident when writing his final paper:
One of the most poignant moments of the dialogue came [during the fishbowls],
bordering on debate about white privilege. When [a white student] said she
recognized and understood the significance of the privilege that she had possessed in
our society due to her being white, and I thought this was one of the most courageous
and honest things that was said during the entire course. This moment sticks out to me
because many of the minority students seemed quick to point out that there is a white
privilege…Another disagreement among viewpoints that was a defining moment for
me was during the caucus group...Initially I wanted to say that not all people of color
have some sort of hatred towards white people, and then others in our group started
agreeing with [that statement]. I perceived that amongst our group that there was a
consensus that we all do dislike white people in some way or another.
This was a defining moment for me because being around people of color from all
different types of ethnicities I have heard this statement before. I have always
understood this hatred because of the way people of color feel they have been
oppressed by white people, but this was the first time that I accepted this. While I may
not feel this way a lot of people do and I should not disregard this feeling no matter
how differently I feel because in some ways this feeling is warranted.
Interestingly, even six weeks later in his final paper, Brice continues to connect the
comment about hating white people to the exchange about white guilt during fishbowls.
Why are these incidents so significant for these students? White people rarely talk in
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intergroup settings about race. People of color rarely get to hear white people’s
perspectives on race. So the lacuna in the collective interpretive framework is built on
silence: students do not know how members of other social groups make sense of race, so
how can they understand each other? For the first time, these students witnessed a woman
of color and a white woman openly describe to each other (and to the class) how white
racial dominance makes them feel. Students’ silence represents an active critical listening.
The silence asks, “what does this mean?” What does it mean for a white woman to know
she has privilege, feel badly from benefitting from an oppressive system, and yet, at the
same time, speak the words “it’s not my fault, I didn’t make the system.” What does it mean
for a woman of color to say, “save it, no one wants your sorry here.” This paraphrasing of
the silence represents a watershed moment for our students.
Engaging in this critical conversation allowed students to question what whiteness
means relative to one’s social location and position and, therefore, what does it mean for
them as individuals (white individuals and individual students of color). Perhaps this is
why Brice cannot separate the two incidents. Because understanding that some people of
color feel actual hatred towards white people means acknowledging that whiteness’
pernicious operations of power very much impact inter-personal relationships. As much as
each student wants to embody the Cartesian autonomous self, it is the case that racial
constructs matter in our perceptions of self and other. These difficult interactions forced all
students to acknowledge that even within the deliberate and reflective space created
within the intergroup dialogue classroom, social identity impacts their judgments. Could
facilitators have assigned readings from philosophy, social psychology and other
disciplines that name this? Of course. However, the depth of learning would not have been
162

as deep; what these students are describing is a way to generate theory through an analysis
of lived interaction. Because of their embodied perceptions and emotions within the
dialogue, students were able to make meaning of specific interactions that organically build
an understanding of epistemic practice.
And still there was a “third space” in response to both the comment about hate and
the subsequent exchange about guilt. Lee reflected:
To reflect upon the last class session, there are numerous things that came to my
mind. One particular was the heated discussion we had after the fish bowl. It would
seem obvious that many people would also reflect upon that event because it was so
significant. I never had or in a heated discussion with white people before, not even
once had I ever witness a group of white people talking about race. This experience
is shocking to me even though I’ve know these people for almost two month now.
For instance, one of my classmates would make jokes about how she might someday
just wake up and hate white people…I still think I understood the laughing point and
laughed. My white classmates gave a complete different response, which I actually
felt guilty because of their response. My white classmates found that joke nowhere
close to funny and see no other white people laughing as well. The moment I heard
about their reflection, I stopped laughing and a quick message come through my
mind: “Are you in a position to laugh?” I asked myself this question and I got the
answer which was a “No”. My mind told me that how could you finds it fun when
you know nothing about the reason behind their laugher. I followed this thought
and come up with the fact that how would I feel if someone would joke about them
waking up and hate Asians.
This leads to my finishing thought of that time, which I also voiced out during class,
is that we must consider the reason other say and do thing before judging. For
instance, the reason my white peers were not laughing is because they couldn’t find
it fun because of their skin is white. The reason my black peers were laughing is
because they were often oppressed because of their skin color. I should realize that I
belong to neither one of them.
Lee observes how unusual it is for students of color and for white students to discuss race
and ethnicity, especially to openly engage in tense disagreement. However, he also
expresses a sense of puzzlement. While he does not identify as Black, he was able to
immediately understand the sentiment of waking up and hating white people. However,
when white students voiced not understanding the sentiment as either funny or as an
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obvious response to oppression, Lee pauses to thinking more complexly about
perspectives. He realizes that because he neither identifies as Black nor white, he in some
ways inhabits a third space. Practicing perspective taking and a shared experience of racial
subordination allowed Lee to access the sentiment expressed and easily accessed by
students of color; however, he was also able to identify that white students were struggling
with the experience of being defined in relation to their whiteness. All of the white students
were implicated in “being hated” by being white. Lee can understand that the white
students were uncomfortable with this in part because of his experience of racialization as
other otherness, a member of neither group.
Lee is like an archaeologist excavating the layers of students’ racialization. On the
thinnest layer is social etiquette: students of color and white students rarely take up race
directly and when they do students tend to avoid conflict. Intergroup dialogue actively
engages conflict, so the second layer is an acceptance of shared in-group experiences. These
are important but can also prevent working towards understanding across difference if
students cannot simultaneously hold their sameness and difference. Lee’s position as a
member of the subordinate racial group but not the specifically targeted group (Black
students), allowed him to take up the next layer of perceiving how members of both
subordinate and dominate groups perceive their experiences relative to their racialization.
Lee is offering an example of how a student can work to hold and juggle multiple
perspectives simultaneously.
New Knowing: Whiteness as Social Phenomena
Across semesters and social identities, students articulated powerfully their
evolving understandings of whiteness.
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Kristin, a white woman, reflected again on the caucus groups session and then the
subsequent fishbowl session in one of her weekly papers:
Sharing what we discussed as white students in fishbowls and large group dialogue
was very interesting. Talking to my peers about their experiences in their own caucus
groups, I realized that we both had extremely different conversations. In my caucus
group, we did not really know how to answer many of the questions we were asked.
Most of the time, our dialogue with each other and facilitator had awkward pauses
and needed further probing before a discussion truly started. I think that this
“awkwardness” happened because many of those in my caucus group are still
uncomfortable with the issue of race and the privilege we are given as White
people…The students in the other caucus group did not have this “awkwardness”.
Instead, they had a very honest, free-flowing conversation about their race, feelings
about their race and feelings about the class. After discussing with them the
differences between our caucus groups, they told me we also bring the “awkwardness”
we brought to our caucus group into our class discussion.
I realized that they are completely right. While I love the discussion we have in class, I
realize that my White peers and myself hold back, afraid of offending the students of
color. However, isn’t thinking that way a little bit racist?… By holding back, we are
only hurting the benefit of ourselves, and others in the class. Not only did their fishbowl
conversation make me feel dishonest, but it also made me feel like a coward…. By not
asking them questions and giving my opinion, I am simply being timid and not
benefitting the group and myself. …After the fishbowl activity, I realized that simply
being White makes me a little bit racist. I’m not negative towards other races and
ethnicities, but I still feel uncomfortable talking about the oppressed pasts of different
races and ethnicities that my race or ethnicity may have had a part in. I feel like if I
was 100% not-racist, I would not feel guilty when discussing oppression. I also learned
that in a class like SOC300, students of color want White students to be honest about
race and ethnicity issues. Honest opinions are valued, because this is one of the only
places that conversations like this can be talked about so freely.
Sarah, a white woman, reflected in one of her weekly papers:
I believe that White people cannot truly understand oppression, racism and racist
tendencies as well as those who have a history of being targeted with racism, simply
because being White gives them privilege and power. Because of this lack of
experience, any racial tendencies seem grandiose to White people.
Returning to whiteness in her final paper, Sarah wrote:
Regardless of how little I know about my background and ethnicity, the color of my
skin grants me privilege, power and advantages. No matter what my potential
background may be, I look like I am white. I look like I am an all American girl with my
White complexion, blonde hair and blue eyes. Because of my appearance, and history, I
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have a far more privileged life than someone of color. Before SOC300, I never realized
how privileged I really was, after this class, I realized that my life is filled with
advantages that myself and other people with White skin share. It is a strange feeling
to have, but often times I would feel guilty in Intergroup Dialogue class. I would feel
guilty for a few reasons. I would feel guilty because I had privilege when my peers did
not, and I felt guilty when talking about personally being affected by racism, because I
never had. When I felt this guilt, I would remember Beverly Daniel Tatum’s article
when he [sic] stated “For White students, advantaged by racism, a heightened
awareness of it often generates painful feelings of guilt.” (1992, 7). So while this
meant I was learning, I also wished the feelings would go away. I also learned that
people of color have always known about this privilege that they do not have, and they
barely question it anymore. The privilege that White people have is the norm because
of history and the power that White people have granted themselves. It is not fair, but
it is a hard thing to change after so many years of the same ways society works. I
personally do not feel like this White privilege is fair. The color of peoples skin should
not determine how many advantages they have and how society treats them. I feel like
the only way to change the way White people and people of color are viewed and
treated is through education. Because of this class, I know now how much privilege I
have and how unfair it is. If other people were educated like I have been, they might
want change as well.
Alex chose to reflect on whiteness and being white over and over again in his final
paper:
Perhaps the most educational thing we did this semester was acknowledge our
identities. I think [another student] said it best when she said that she never thought
about being white before this class. She was just white. I definitely understand what
she was saying. Obviously I knew I was white and I understood the advantages that
came with it. However, I never really thought about it enough for it to have an impact
on me.…Yet, still this is a tough one for me. Perhaps it boils down to the fact that I am
not proud to be white. It’s not that I am ashamed of being white. I am not rejecting it.
I just do not identify with whiteness as something to be proud of. It is just my race.
That is how I feel and I will take ownership of that…[During the web of oppression
activity23] I was not conscience of my whiteness. I was bored because I did not want to
keep hearing these statistics. I was over it…I hesitate to criticize myself here. I did not
know what I was doing. However this type of thinking is dangerous in improving racial
problems. Just because I did not know what I was doing does not excuse it.…The
aftermath of the web of oppression was also very educational. When no one else
matched my honesty, I felt like I was left out in the dust. I felt that because I owned up
to feeling bored during the activity because I was white and no one else did, that I was
going to be vilified. Moreover I was so angry at my white classmates for being
dishonest! In the end, I am so glad this happened. When you speak out it is going to be
uncomfortable. Race is uncomfortable. The more I deal with situations like this, the
better I will become at dealing with them…It also relates to [the exchange] about how
sometimes [people of color] wake up and hate white people. Perhaps I am
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uncomfortable with this because I do not like being hated! I am trying to distance
myself from the problem. However, this is taking the easy way out. In order to make
advances, we may need to take responsibility as an identity, even if it is uncomfortable
doing so. While I may not be acutely apart of these events, I am a part of the system
they have created, thus I must hold some responsibility if we are to change it.
Carrie too focused on whiteness in her final paper:
I remember in the beginning of the semester we were asked to make identity wheels
and cultural chests. I remember that this task was a very difficult one for me. I came
into this class not knowing my own identity. I did not know how to describe myself to
other people especially when it came to discussing my race and ethnicity. I remember
thinking to myself that I am just a white and Jewish girl. I could not figure out
anything else to add. My identity had not been a big part of my life at that point and I
just could not figure anything out. I was nervous especially because I knew that our
testimonial assignment would be coming up soon. I don’t think it was until I heard the
other white Jewish girls’ testimonials and until we discussed white privilege that I truly
understood my own identity.
Tatum’s article, The Complexity of Identity: Who Am I discusses how complex and it is
to identify yourself. Tatum explains that it is a psychological process in order to
achieve self-acceptance. It took me a very long time to grasp the concept of identifying
and I definitely have come a very long way. It was a frustrating and draining process
for me. Now that I have grown I am able to explain my identity. I am white, female,
Jewish, privileged, and do not suffer from oppression. I am from the upper-middle class
and have had a pretty decent life. I do not have to worry about disadvantages that
come a long with whiteness. I now know that people who identify as a color struggle
on a daily basis with racism. I know about my classmate’s stories and their lives. I have
understanding of what it feels like to be a person of color and am educated about
many disadvantages. I never knew any of this until I sat through our class for 3 hours
each week. I would have never had any clue about other identities and I would not
have been motivated to make change. I am now confident in my knowledge and
hopefully will be able to help other people figure out his or her-own identities.
Randy, a white man, wrote extensively about whiteness in his final paper:
As was said before, I was definitely nervous about taking an intergroup dialogue class
on race and ethnicity. Considering it is a dialogue based course and the class size
would most likely be small, I knew I would have to speak a lot and that scared me. It
scared me because I did not want to hurt anybodies feelings and I did not know how to
phrase some things without being offensive. The last thing I wanted to do was make
the class awkward, so I was just a little fearful that I would slip up and alienate myself
from the group…I knew I would not truly learn anything unless I participated, so my
mission was not to do that…Part of the process of getting to know everyone so that we
could get comfortable with each other, was actually getting to know ourselves. Coming
in to this class, I had very little knowledge or desire to learn about my own
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racial/ethnic identity. Growing up, my family’s ethnicity was never a talked about
topic in our home, unlike in many other households. The extent of what I knew about
my own ethnicity was that I had Italian, German and Irish blood in me, but that was
about it. I had asked my parents before for more information, but they revealed to me
that they did not know much about their own ethnicity either…Having white skin just
happened to be a fact of life, and I never paid much particular attention to it. Being
white never created a problem or was a disservice to me, so there was never really a
reason to question it…As I got further into the class, the fact that white people were
relatively unaffected negatively by race quickly became a common trend…. Another
example of people of color being put at a disadvantage due to their social group was in
1932 with the enactment of the New Deal. Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the New
Deal to help those struggling after the Great Depression to get back on their feet
financially. However, the catch was that only white people, not people of color, could
reap its benefits. In effect, white people were given the aid needed to financially
become a part of middle class, while people of color were left to struggle on their own.
Arguably, this can be seen as a primary factor in the reason why ghettos in cities are
filled with poor people of color and the middle class suburbs outside of cities are
almost entirely filled with whites. It does not stop in the past though, as there are
plenty of examples in current times of white privilege happening.
It is not accidental that these five examples of students tackling their understanding
of whiteness come from white students. As one reads these excerpts, it is clear that each
student is at a different stage in their identity development (Tatum, 1992), but more
importantly, that whether the students are talking about whiteness during a weekly paper
or their final paper, they are in process. They are working through their understanding of
whiteness, each of them drawing from the content or interactions they found most
compelling. Randy, for example, took an individualist standpoint throughout phase one,
arguing that race might influence how people think or what they value, but not how they
experience the world. After reading the course content in phase two, however, Randy
began a critical engagement with historical fact. Only through understanding the historical
and institutional practices of racial inequality did Randy began to see whiteness as
something other than a physical characteristic. We see this in his extensive focus on
historical constructions of racial inequality in his final reflection.
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Kristin is expressing an understanding that racism is not something that is simply
“out there,” but that she too is racist and practices racist behaviors, like failing to engage
authentically with her peers who identify as students of color, to protect her own
vulnerability as a white person. Kristin also shares that she feels guilt when actively
thinking about and having to discuss her whiteness. Importantly, Kristin’s ability to
struggle with her own whiteness and share that she is struggling to own her whiteness is a
step forward from not knowing how or why she needs to talk about her whiteness. For
white students, thinking about racism often begins with accepting that they have a race and
having a race matters. Kristin is talking about recognizing she is white, that knowing she is
white in a society that privileges whiteness makes her feel guilty and conflicted and that
guilt makes her feel awkward, vulnerable. Further, she realizes safeguarding her
vulnerability by avoiding talking about race honestly or in a way that opens her up to
conflict with students of color is in and of itself an act of racism; as she admits to herself in
the course of her reflection, she is a racist white woman.
Similarly, Carrie is just coming to understand and see that people’s experiences of
social structures and systems differ dependent on social identity. She, further, is able to
infer that these systemic practices mean something for her personally. Carrie begins to
perceive that she benefits from racial advantages specifically because others, her new
friends in the class, experience disadvantage because of their racial identity. Carrie is
starting to develop an analysis of these emotions relative to systems of power and her
participation in privilege.
Alex and Sarah name the emotions that come with an understanding of the
normative role of whiteness and their participation in it. Additionally, these students also
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show an understanding of students of color’s awareness of whiteness all along. Both of
these students perceive that what is radically new knowledge for them was always known
to students of color. Additionally, these students are developing an analysis of their own
responsibility and need to change behaviors moving forward.
White students talked about whiteness as an independent phenomenon, separated
from specific interactions or behaviors. While students of color infused an understanding of
whiteness in analysis of each class dialogue or set of course readings, white students, who
are coming to understand their racial identity for the first time, need to analyze whiteness
qua whiteness. For some white students, participating in the dialogue course presented the
first time they would identify as a white person, as someone who participates in whiteness,
as someone for whom race matters in their daily perceptions and interactions. Becoming
aware of their white epistemic ignorance means taking the time to understand whiteness
so they can unlearn their racialized unknowing and misunderstanding.
New Behaviors: From Dialogue to Social Action
Students were asked to reflect in their final papers about next steps and what to do
with the information and practices they learned in dialogue moving forward.
Carrie reflected in her final paper:
I hope that other people will see the movie that we made. I want to share it with the
entire Central Campus. It is important to educate the students on segregation issues so
they can understand the impact of racism in society. In the future I hope that I can
encourage as many people as possible to sign of for the intergroup dialogue class on
race and ethnicity. I have already begun to tell my friends and family that they are
wrong for making racist comments on many occasions. I have explained to them that
they are oblivious to racism. I have even forwarded on many of the articles that we
read for our class to my parents and friends. I want to teach my children about race
and ethnicity at a very young age. All I can do is try. I am motivated and I know that I
want to see change. One day I hope I can express racism through a powerful
documentary. Film is my passion and is something I have studied at school for four
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years. I hope I can take my skills and successfully send a message to the entire world
and I hope that I encourage change.
Hannah, a Black woman, reflected in her final paper:
When I signed up for the class I thought I knew all there was to me. I was a black
woman. Sure, there were more identities if I really thought about it, but I didn’t. Of all
the identities I have, black and female are the only ones that put me at a disadvantages
from others. Why I focus on these disadvantages may be because of the many
American history lessons I’ve learned, I have taken note that I identify with the Blacks
and women. But focusing on these disadvantages aren’t so bad in the sense that I must
be aware of them first to know how to not let them get in the way of my being a
success. However, focusing on my disadvantages does take away from my realizing
that I still am advantaged in terms of my sexuality, socio-economic class, and ability. In
looking at Fletcher’s (1999) examples of privileged and oppressed groups (chart on
page 97) I noticed that I fit into far more dominant groups than I do oppressed. As
Tatum (1992) said in her article, everyone has and how in some way everyone is
dominant. Especially with ability, I am a part of the vast majority of people who do not
have a mental or physical disability and forget that that is actually a great benefit to
myself. I do wonder if those that have the disadvantages that I do not focus on theirs
and also forget of their advantages. I would imagine that we are all guilty of it at least
a small bit. Now that the class has ended I still see myself as a Black woman, but
certainly do try to remember that though I have many more identities. Some that put
me in a superior position to others and some that many others share.
Jennifer, a Black woman, reflected in her final paper:
Moving forward after this class I think of Ayvazian and “interrupting this cycle of
oppression”. I feel like I have interrupted my own cycle of oppression by coming to
terms of my race, understanding it and embracing it. Now I want to inspire others to
do the same.
Sarah reflected in her final paper:
Now that this class has concluded, I have realized that I am truly a tool that can make
change in my community. Especially after working in my ICP group, I realized that I
have good ideas, and that from Intergroup Dialogue, I have not only taken away
dialogue skills, but also implementation skills. The ICP project in particular taught me
a lot about how I can make a difference. It is amazing how every person in my
Intergroup Dialogue class was so inspiring, and if we all took that inspiration we gave
to ourselves and to others, we could really make a difference on the Central campus.
By just collaborating in small groups, we all came up with achievable ideas that would
educate others and inspire them to think differently about race and ethnicity in
society…Therefore, if interventions are not made in the problems of society, they will
continue. Just intervening can contribute to the end of problem concerning race and
ethnicity. The changes you make may have an impact on others, and at large, society
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and the community. I honestly feel that without Intergroup Dialogue, I would not have
reached the point I am at today in learning about how to be a voice for social justice. I
also do not believe I would be as educated about issues involving race and ethnicity. I
am not at my full potential as far as knowledge goes though. I can still learn more
about how to be a voice for social justice, and I can still learn more about issues in
society. Through this learning, I can learn how to stand up for the issues I care about
and ultimately make my community and society a better place. While the work may
never be done, change can always be made and the changes that are made can be very
rewarding.
Brice reflected in his final paper:
Informing others on how to talk about race is one of the most important things I will
be able to take from this class. As we heard in the video on the last day, racism is not a
scientific or quantitative entity, it something socially constructed and yet it has had
long lasting and damaging affects on our society. I have finally answered my question
of ‘What do we do now?’ And the answer for me is try to teach people how to talk
about race in a constructive manner that moves beyond white guilt and that seeks to
bridge the racial divide, no matter how few people we reach.
In reflecting on what they want to do with their new knowledge, each student, again,
describes a different place both in process and in social location, but each one expresses
that their new knowledge has impacted and changed their experience of the world. Carrie
talks about the importance of what she learned about campus segregation from working
with her ICP group. This leads to a desire to teach others and an understanding of the
impact of social identity on other’s experiences of campus (society) and her own. Hannah
developed a more nuanced understanding of her own identity. This self-understanding led
her to a greater openness to others. Sarah developed a sense of empowerment, a voice as a
social justice change agent. Brice acquired the language with which to describe his
experiences and his understanding of social practices. While each student’s learning is
different, they all shared a reorientation of their former worldview.
Implications for Epistemically Just Pedagogy
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In developing an analysis of student papers from an understanding of Mills (1997)
account of epistemic ignorance and philosophers’ account of epistemic justice, this chapter
discerns features of intergroup dialogue pedagogy that contribute to new knowledge
practices among students with subordinate and dominant racial social identities. Firstly,
through an emphasis on perspective taking and empathic communication coupled with an
engagement of interdisciplinary content, students participating in intergroup dialogue
courses are able to develop an awareness (or to deepen an existing awareness) of their
racial identity. This awareness in combination with a structural analysis of inequality
allows students, particularly white students, to perceive the intentional and malicious work
of whiteness in maintaining systems of disadvantage. At the same time, students with nondominant identities are able to center their own epistemic frameworks in a college
classroom at a predominantly white university; this de-centering of dominant frameworks
challenges normative white epistemic practices in these classrooms, on this campus, and in
the larger interactions these students have in the communities and environments they
interact with.
Additionally, students across race are able to focus on their racial/ethnic identities
as salient for the purposes of this course while also using an intersectional lens (HillCollins, 2000) to analyze their identities and their experiences. Carrie describes her racial
identity as white but her ethnic identity as Jewish. Hannah describes her race as
intersecting with her sexuality, socio-economic status and her identity as able-bodied. Both
students describe how some of their identities can be socially beneficial while others are
often accompanied by marginalization. Importantly, these intergroup dialogue students are
able to describe how their multiple identities complicate their interactions with the world.
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As described above, white students are encouraged to develop a structural
awareness through contact with the experiences of students of color that are manifested in
classroom interactions. It is not “reading about” what happens to abstract ‘others’ that
spurs white students to pause and analyze their own role in benefiting from and
reproducing white epistemic practices. Rather, it is the interplay, the exchange between
white students and students of color that disrupt previously unseen knowledge practices. It
is because white students dialogued with students of color who directly questioned white
geospatial privilege (Alyssa’s comment about white students leaving the room), white
dominance (the exchange about hating white people), and white affective distancing
strategies (the critique of white guilt) that white students were forced to consider their
own ways of knowing/unknowing. Handing undergraduate students a copy of the Racial
Contract may give them the words “white epistemic ignorance,” but participation in
intergroup dialogue facilitates their first person awareness of their own location within a
larger system they cannot help but be part of. The extensive excerpts from student essays
in this paper demonstrate students’ ability to describe knowledge practices and to unveil
whiteness as a result of dialogue.
Students like Carrie, Sarah and Randy repeatedly reflect on learning new content
(e.g. institutional practices benefit white people) that leads to an uncovering or unlearning
of former assumptions. Both Carrie and Randy admitted to having no idea that people of
color experience institutionalized discrimination on a daily basis. However, this new
knowledge did not just lead to an understanding, which is powerful in and of itself, but,
more importantly, a gestalt shift, a re-seeing of the world. Each white student reflected that
they would no longer make assumptions about others’ experiences or perspectives because
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of their experience in dialogue. These are the habits that help individuals develop the
epistemic tendencies that lead to testimonial justice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). Our
white students are describing an increased critical reflective awareness that unsettles
prejudicial identity judgments in the testimonial exchange. And, they’ve all expressed an
interest in sharing this knowledge with others.
At that same time, students of color report a sense of empowerment as a result of
dialogue providing a space within which they could use their voices to disrupt normative
knowledge practices. As Alyssa’s epigraphical quote (pg. 134) describes, white people need
to change their knowledge habits in order to change their communities. This course
provides students of color with the opportunity to speak back to racialized knowledge
scripts. Students of color can develop both counter narratives, the skills to express their
stories across racially diverse contexts, and the practice of meta-reflection (i.e. considering
what their stories mean, how their stories related to other students through an
intersectional lens). Interestingly, none of our students of color reported feeling forced into
the “teacher” role. Students of color decided when and if to share personal stories or
reflections throughout the course of the semester, and, owing to the nature of dialogic
engagement, all students used the interdisciplinary readings as a way of providing evidence
for their interpretation of society’s inequalities.
Further, students like Brice and Hannah described developing a deeper
understanding of their own identity through dialogue with their peers of color. Students
like Alyssa and Jennifer demonstrate a greater structural understanding and sense of
empowerment in terms of creating change as a result of their participation in dialogue. In
these ways, our students of color are emboldened as resisting epistemic agents. Since
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dialogue positions all students as co-inquirers, members of subjugated knowledge
communities are able to center their epistemic contributions in Intergroup Dialogue
courses; it is perhaps this empowered position as co-inquirer that leads students of color in
intergroup dialogue courses to feel more like experts and less like they are burdened by the
assumption that it is for them to teach white students about race. Although, to be sure,
students of color did express frustration (as Hannah did above) at having to explain their
feelings for/to white students. These examples of students of color learning through
intergroup dialogue are consistent with findings reported in the quantitative studies
summarized earlier (e.g., Gurin et al., 2013).
Finally, because Intergroup Dialogue courses are offered in higher education
settings, they represent an institutional step towards epistemic justice. Colleges and
universities that offer dialogue courses are making spaces for students to develop the
habits necessary for epistemic justice and to expand their understanding or critique of the
shared dominant hermeneutic resources. While this paper in no way argues that providing
intergroup dialogue courses is a means for institutions of higher education to fully respond
to educational, economic and other structural inequalities, we can see how pedagogical
practices can be part of an institutional response to transform epistemic injustices into
democratic epistemic practice.
Conclusion
As Rozas describes:
Intergroup dialogue is both a method and a philosophy. It reflects a larger dialogic
philosophy of education which emphasizes that reciprocity and equal
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representation are not ends in themselves, but rather, the means of achieving
mutuality and/or a more complex understand of self and ‘other’ (2004, p. 240).
It is a pedagogy that fosters empathic communication, understanding and mutual
understanding through shared inquiry (Nagda & Gurin, 2007). It is an open-ended process
in which participants develop meaning and ways of thinking through collaboration with
others. Intergroup dialogue is a pedagogy that can open up a space for transforming
oppressive epistemic practices.
An intergroup dialogue classroom is marked by a curriculum that intentionally
“blends theory with practice via structured interactions and activities, ground rules for
discussion, small classroom sizes, diverse groups of students, and collaborative projects for
students to practice and implement new skills” (Hopkins & Domingue, 2015, p. 400).
Consistently across studies students who participated in Intergroup dialogue courses are
shown to develop an increased development in communication and cognitive skills that
include: suspending judgments, perspective taking, voicing, working constructively with
conflict, and recognizing social identities and social oppression (Hopkins & Domingue,
2015; Dessel & Rogge, 2008). Through a combination of exposing students to rich social
science content and the personal storytelling of their peers, students develop insights
related to: students’ own unawareness, systemic oppression, and taking action for social
change (Keehn, 2015). Importantly, these intellectual, social, and communicative
developments are shown by students who are members of both dominant and subordinate
racial identy(ies) groups (Keehn, 2015).
This chapter contributes to the already robust body of research that explores the
impacts of intergroup dialogue pedagogy by describing the new knowings students develop
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while navigating shared critical moments and while learning about whiteness as a
phenomenon that lead them to new behaviors that put dialogue into action. Students of
color and white students described feeling both empowered and disempowered by the
saliency of their racial identities. Students of color were able to describe how racial
identities gave them insight into shared social experiences with other students of color,
while white students described how their white racial identity limited their ability to
discuss race as more than individual and instead as social and structural. Students also
described the emotional awareness that they began to share with each other, tackling
concerns like the ways in which white guilt limits meaningful engagement across racial
difference. White students described how they were coming to see whiteness as not just an
individual “having” or “being” white, but rather as a function of historical, social, and
structural engineering and practice. Students of color and white students alike also talked
about being agents of social change and wanting to put their new knowings into practice
moving forward.
This chapter also bridged research about intergroup dialogue pedagogy and
theorizing about epistemic injustice, a notable contribution to both bodies of research. As
previously described in great detail, Fricker (2007) describes testimonial justice as a
privileged hearer “reliably succeed(ing) in correcting for the influence of prejudice in her
credibility judgments” (Fricker, 2007, p. 5). To act against the negative impacts of prejudice
on a hearer’s credibility judgments, Fricker recommends compensating degrees of
credibility upwards during exchanges with interlocutors who are impacted by identity
prejudice. This requires the hearer to practice corrective judgments that take into account
both experience and critical reflection. More recently philosophers have expanded on
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Fricker’s (2007) theory of epistemic injustice. Summarily, Dotson (2012) expands this
theory of epistemic justice and argues that for privileged knowers to develop the habits of
knowledge justice, they cannot only correct for credibility deficits that originate from
lacunas in the shared dominant hermeneutic framework, but that they must also seek out
marginally situated hermeneutic resources. Medina (2013) contributes to theories of
epistemic injustice and expands our understanding of what is required for justice further.
Medina (2013) argues that epistemic justice requires the “restructuring of habits and
affective structures…it also involves political action and deep cultural transformation”
(Medina, 2013, p. 76). Privileged knowers must remain open to engaging the perspectives
of others (like Fricker (2007) suggests) but they must additionally develop the ability to
look at the world through multiple differing perspectives.
Collectively, Fricker (2007), Dotson (2012) and Medina (2013) argue that knowers
who are dominantly situated must develop the cognitive and affective habits necessary to
correct for epistemic injustice; specifically, for testimonial injustice with the understanding
that testimonial injustice, rooted in hermeneutical injustice, must necessarily always be
held in relation to, and not wholly separated from, hermeneutic injustice. To this end,
collectively, they recommend dominantly situated knowers (1) correct for mistakes in their
credibility judgments through critical reflection, (2) seek out new knowledge from
marginally situated interpretive resources, (3) restructure intellectual habits and affective
structures while working towards political action and transformation, and (4) develop the
ability to engage multiple perspectives. As education researchers and theorists, we must
take up philosophers’ analysis of epistemic justice and ask what this means for teaching
and learning.
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When students are challenged to critically engage issues of race and ethnicity across
race, students from dominant and subordinate social identy(ies) groups develop a deeper
awareness of and understanding of the impacts of both privilege and oppression (Keehn,
2015; Linder, Harris, Allen, & Hurbain, 2015). This chapter, in theorizing about epistemic
justice and research about students’ learning in the intergroup dialogue classroom,
demonstrated that intergroup dialogue students describe the process of developing the
four habits outlined in the paragraph above. Dominantly situated knowers who
participated in intergroup dialogue courses on race and ethnicity described correcting for
mistakes in their judgments and thinking that were based in dominant misconceptions and
errors. Students participating in intergroup dialogues demonstrate increased perspective
taking and empathetic listening, learning from the experiences and perspectives of
students across identity and power differences (Dessel & Rogge, 2008). In learning to learn
from and with others, students in intergroup dialogue courses have also demonstrated
increased action taking for social change while learning the historical significance of
working in collaboration across difference with the aim of transformation for greater
structural equity (Dessel & Rogge, 2008). Finally, multiple perspective taking is a crucial
discipline that intergroup dialogue practitioners try to both teach and practice. Students
are encouraged to share their perspectives from across their multiple identities (e.g. as a
lesbian, working class, white woman) and to understand other’s lived experiences in
relation to their multiple interlocking identities.
Owing to the goals and demonstrated outcomes of intergroup dialogue pedagogy, a
key contribution of this chapter is demonstrating that intergroup dialogue provides a
model for how curriculum and pedagogy can be catalysts for individual students to correct
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for testimonial injustice and a motivation for students to be catalysts for the structural
change necessary to address hermeneutic injustice. Students are learning about their
unawareness, developing understanding, and challenging white hegemony and epistemic
norms through participation in intergroup dialogue courses. These students are working
towards increased epistemic justice.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
“Education research suffers from neutrality sickness”
--Sonia Nieto (2012, p.1).
“Momma, you were mistaken. Columbus wasn’t a bad guy. He discovered the world
isn’t flat.” My four-year old, Ethan, recently came home from school, and, with great energy,
told me that I was wrong about Columbus. That day, he went to music class and his music
teacher (a white woman) taught them songs about Columbus’ 1492 voyage. When she told
the class they would be singing about Columbus, my four-year old raised his hand and said,
“But Columbus is a bad guy. We shouldn’t sing about him.” The music teacher responded
that she had never heard anyone call Columbus a bad guy, and that Columbus discovered
the world is round through his voyage. She then proceeded to teach the class a song about
Columbus’ ships. My spouse and I helped Ethan process his confusion at being told he was
wrong when he was not, and we also, for the first time as parents, had to face his pain at
being overwhelmed by conflicting information from two sets of adults he trusts. If parents
don’t lie and teachers don’t lie, what is he supposed to think? How is he supposed to know
what is true? And if his parents are right in telling him that Columbus caused great harm to
innocent people, then why would his teacher sing him a song of celebration?
Upset, my spouse and I e-mailed the music teacher asking for why Ethan was taught
both factually inaccurate and culturally irresponsive material. Her response was incredibly
disappointing to us:
Dear Ethan’s mom,
Thank you for your email. I had never heard anyone describe Christopher Columbus as
a “bad man.” When Ethan expressed that point of view, I replied that I had never heard
that before and that Columbus was celebrated with a holiday in his honor. I also said
that he was credited with discovering that the world was round. I realize that many
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discoveries credited to Columbus have been proven false in recent years, but this was
not a history lesson. This discussion comprised less than one minute of class time and
was simply offered as background information for the game and song.
We were learning a song about Christopher Columbus and playing a game, that the
children really love to play. The song was chosen according to musical standards for
his age level and the concept we are studying now (melody). We added a game with
toy ships (Nina, Pinta, and Santa Maria) to make learning more engaging and fun. The
musical concepts in the song reinforce pitch matching, call and response, learning Sol
and Mi in the scale, and understanding that music relates to our world by expressing
celebrations and historical events.
I hope this clarifies the lesson today and its intent. I have enjoyed Ethan and hope that
he continues to have fun learning music.
We were struck, as parents and as members of our society, that a veteran teacher could
exist during this day and time and have no idea that Columbus is responsible for genocide
and severe colonial violence (Lowen, 2008). Was our four-year old really the first person to
bring this to her attention? How could she care so little when we presented her with
information and resources about Columbus and the harm of teaching cultural irresponsive
material to simply respond by stating her lesson met the “standards”? I processed this
interaction with my friend Leslie, a Black mom, who is choosing to homeschool her sons
precisely to protect them from daily epistemic violence at school. Her response was
straight forward and to the point: “Isn’t this the point of your dissertation. You need to hop
to and finish; take the oxygen away from her fire.”
I share this story not to claim we (my child or me) experienced epistemic injustice.
To be clear, we are upper middle class white people; we did not experience epistemic harm
and, in fact, if anything, this story highlights our privilege: I do not regularly face my child
being invalidated, marginalized, and silenced at school. Instead of being an everyday
occurrence, this was an “event,” that was immediately redressed by my child’s homeroom
teacher and principal. This experience did highlight for me, however, the everyday nature
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in which students of color in classrooms across the country experience direct assaults on
their identities and histories. As a parent, I could not help but think of Ethan’s friends who
identify as Caribbean, Afro-Caribbean and Latina in his class. Did they go home singing
about the “Nina, Pinta and Santa Maria” too? Did they go home talking to their parents and
family members about the “good guy” and celebrated historical figure who brought
violence, plague, and genocide to some of the very islands their families identify as being
part of their heritages and histories? How many times a week does this happen? How many
times a week does a teacher—very likely a white, woman teacher—laugh at a counter point
they raise in class and off-handedly tell them they must be mistaken even though they are
correct? How often do their parents have to face the pain of a child being given information
at school that conflicts with what is taught at home, valued in the home? These questions
drive my desire to follow Leslie’s advice and take the oxygen away from education
practitioners, researchers and theorists who fail to recognize the centrality of epistemic
justice to our roles as participants in education institutions; Leslie’s advice is a helpful
description of the goal of this dissertation and, in particular, this chapter. This chapter
seeks to discuss the conclusions and highlight the contributions and applications of this
dissertation project.
Discussion
Epistemic injustice is omnipresent in the history, structures and practices of education
in our nation. Marginally situated knowers experience harm throughout their participation
in education institutions (pre-K through university) based on their social identities. Social
justice pedagogies like Youth Participatory Action Research (YPAR) and Intergroup
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Dialogue (IGD) pedagogy offer specific strategies for creating pedagogies and curricula
(contents) that work towards epistemic justice.
Epistemic injustice can include or be marked by the following (described in greater
detail in chapter two):
•

when a marginally situated person experiences a downgrade in her credibility due
to a prejudiced credibility judgment on the part of an interlocutor;

•

when a subject cannot make sense of her experience due to a lacuna in the shared
hermeneutical frame;

•

when a subject understands her experience and can communicate it in-group but
due to a lacuna in the shared hermeneutical resource cannot share it with the wider
community or agency;

•

when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge the epistemic tools
developed by marginally situated knowers;

•

is agential and structural as socio-political agencies (like juries) use deficient
dominant hermeneutic resources and fail to engage alternative epistemic resources
at the expense of marginally situated knowers;

•

the loss of knowledge in both dominantly and marginally situated knowers; and
when excess credibility is bestowed on dominantly situated knowers.

Educational institutions, structures, and actors contribute to and maintain epistemic
injustice. As described in chapter three, marginally situated knowers are often unable to
fully benefit from education systems, leaving out their perspectives from the dominant
hermeneutical frame and denying them the ability to have greater ability and access to
creating knowledge with others and in the public sphere (if one is unable to get a job after
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graduating, they have less access to the socio-political and economic exchanges that are
necessary to participation in capitalism-based democracy). Marginally situated knowers
are sometimes, although rarely, encouraged to give voice to their educational experiences
(within the dominant framework) through pedagogies like Youth Participatory Action
Research (YPAR). While YPAR allows students to generate public knowledge from their
perspectives about their educational experiences, this knowledge is too infrequently taken
up by powerful education stakeholders.
Students who experience the most marginalization and the least benefit in education
systems, are often either blamed or pathologized; even though, some have produced new
knowledge about the opportunity gap structurally created in society (Torre & Fine, 2011).
These features of students’ education experiences meet the criteria described above for
epistemic injustice. Students who experience structural inequality in education may not be
able to make sense of or make intelligible the ways that they are marginalized and made
unable to thrive in educational settings; the marginally situated students who are able to
make sense of their educational experience are rarely able to articulate it to the wider
public and to educational agents. Dominantly situated students are harmed too. Few will
learn about the mechanisms they personally use and that are reproduced socially to protect
them from their privileges; many will experience inflated credibility judgments that will
prevent them from authentically participating in knowledge production, and few will learn
how to develop a kaleidoscopic consciousness (Medina, 2013).
Chapter three of this dissertation described both YPAR and a YPAR/IGD fusion and
chapter four of this dissertation offered a description of intergroup dialogue (IGD) as
particular types of social justice pedagogy that can address epistemic injustice within the
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contexts of student participants and through the structure of institutional course offerings.
Specifically, participating in intergroup dialogue courses helps students to develop
increased perspective taking and a more pluralistic worldview, increased critical
consciousness and analytical skills, increased ability to practice empathy and to engage
conflict meaningfully and a greater desire to participate in action for social change. These
skills are necessary for students to engage perspectives other than their own, expand their
hermeneutic framework and to take a kaleidoscopic worldview. In other words, intergroup
dialogue puts into place the practices philosophers recommend for developing
epistemically just knowledge practices.
Moving forward, exciting research and theoretical opportunities exist for exploring the
relationship between intergroup dialogue and epistemic justice. In particular, it would be
productive to further explore the role and impact of writing in intergroup dialogue courses:
specifically, what is the role and impact of critical, reflective writing in the outcomes
studied to date. Additionally, an epistemic justice lens can be used to explore and shine a
light on action and intergroup dialogue pedagogy. Each semester, students participating in
intergroup dialogue courses work together across difference to develop and implement an
action project. What do these collaborations—their goals, approach, execution, and
outcomes—reveal about action taking as part of intergroup dialogue pedagogy and
epistemic justice? Further, do students remain engaged in action taking and how so? There
is work addressing student action taking as a result of participating in intergroup dialogue
(Ford, 2017), but more investigation would be beneficial, particularly research focused on
continued student action and work towards greater epistemic justice.

187

Contributions: We Know, Now What?
Intergroup dialogue practice and research are robustly interdisciplinary. Both
seriously take up the epistemic development and shifts of participating students. This
dissertation specifically connects research in the field of intergroup dialogue to theorizing
in the philosophical field of epistemic injustice. Philosophers have earnestly taken up the
work of epistemic injustice over the last decade; however, there is still much work to be
done in centering this theorizing in the field of education both in terms of theory and
practice. This section offers a brief review of how philosophers have applied theories of
epistemic injustice to education, and it then describes how this dissertation encourages
education stake holders to take up the call to work towards epistemic justice in education.
Robertson (2013) engages Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice when
arguing for the epistemic value of diversity. Robertson (2013) observes that diversity is
important among education researchers because, “Members of marginalized groups may
discover that the problems that concern them about the phenomenon in question are not
represented in the research” which can result in hermeneutic injustice (p. 302).
Additionally, if knowledge, in this case is generated predominantly by people who are
members of the dominantly situated group, it may be “biased in the sense of giving an
incomplete picture of the domain of study, one biased toward the interests and experiences
of the dominant group” (Robertson, 2013, p. 302). Again, the incomplete picture that
results from biased knowledge making can result in hermeneutic injustice in education.
Frank (2013) argues that it is important to move from the language of epistemic
diversity to the language of epistemic injustice in education research and analysis. Frank
begins with Fricker’s (2007) observations that marginalized groups usually have different
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perspective systems than those who are in positions of power in those systems and that
those very marginally situated perspectives may likely be invisible to those with power
(Frank, 2013). Frank realizes the role of power in knowledge making can be dangerous
concluding, “We silence large segments of the community of knowers of which we are all a
part of at our own peril. The truth of our social world will elude us until we learn what is
means to hear across the social spectrum” (Frank, 2013, p. 365). The way Frank (2013)
takes up Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice is important because it places “the
problem” not on subordinately situated knowers but on dominantly situated knowers.
Frank argues that dominantly situated educational researchers must discuss testimonial
injustice and be aware of their own subjectivity, the difficulties of listening and the need to
listen across difference. Interestingly, he argues that graduate researchers in education
need to apply the lens of epistemic injustice to existing bodies of education research,
questioning whose perspectives are privileged in existing research and why. Significantly,
Frank (2013) asks:
Can the process of learning to become an educational researcher include more
opportunities to support the development of resources within the communities
outside of the academy; can it teach future researchers to trust the individuals
developing these resources, even if they work outside of the academy; can it teach
future researchers to take a serious interest in learning what is means to use those
resources? If we see epistemic injustice as a threat that can keep us from ever
achieving a true picture of our social world, then we might be able to seriously
engage these types of questions and, in the process, rethink how educational
researchers are educated (p. 369).
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While Frank’s (2013) primary concern is truth and understanding our social world and
mine is justice and accountability for the harm epistemic injustice in education does to
marginally situated knowers, Frank’s concluding call to take up epistemic injustice in
education is incredibly important for this dissertation. In chapter three, I offered examples
of youth participatory action projects that developed knowledge from marginally situated
perspectives outside of the academic but in collaboration with invested academics. Using
examples from across the country and from my own collaborative work in the Northeast, I
provided an account in this dissertation of the type of graduate education training and the
type of academic practices that seriously take up learning from and centering nondominant perspectives. Similarly, in chapter four, I provided an example of intergroup
dialogue in the college setting that seriously engages the perspectives of non-dominant
students while providing an account of how dominantly situated knowers can learn how to
identify their privileged ways of knowing; in this chapter, students described developing
the practices for coming to know how to listen and engage with other knowers across
differences of power and social experiences.
Kotzee (2013) also focuses on the epistemic implications of epistemic injustice
(more so than the justice implications). Kotzee (2013) summarizes that justice in
knowledge making is not for everyone to have equal knowledge or to have a given right to
express their view and have it taken seriously; instead, he argues that justice is to have
one’s testimony “measured by epistemic or logical standards of credibility” (p. 344). He
then observes that hermeneutic injustice is when a group experiences disadvantage in
terms of communicating the disadvantages they suffer. Kotzee (2013) then states that in
education we can apply our understanding of testimonial injustice by acknowledging what
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the “powerless” (Kotzee’s use of powerless instead of non-dominantly situated seems to
take up a deficit perspective of knowers and traps them in a position that is defined by the
absence of power instead of in the presence of structural inequality) know. For education
to address this and to take up the issue of non-dominantly situated knowers knowing and
knowledge making, Kotzee (2013) recommends a minimum level of education that “must
place one in a position to function as a useful contributor to knowledge sharing in society”
(p. 348).
Growing from and contributing to this body of literature theorizing about education
and epistemic injustice, this dissertation argues that (1) epistemic injustice cannot be
delinked from issues concerning how power operates in education settings (as a proxy for
how power operates at large in our society), and (2) education stakeholders must consider
responsibility for epistemic justice to be inherent in their role. Firstly, we cannot ever
forget about what Ladson-Billings (2006) calls the education debt. We cannot fully discuss
educations’ role and responsibility in terms of thinking about epistemic in/justice without
considering the ways in which education has reproduced and maintained inequality
broadly and specific to knowledge making. At no time in this nation’s history have schools
been inclusive sites of knowledge making and sharing. Schools have always excluded and
marginalized students and the epistemic contributions of marginally situated knowers
(Outlaw, 2007). This matters—especially when we fully consider the structural and system
nature of hermeneutic injustice.
Kotzee (2017) focuses on if or how we know epistemic injustice exists in education.
Problematically, he is the only philosopher of education in the recently published Routledge
Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (2017), and he wrote the only chapter on education and
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epistemic injustice. In so far as a major publication represents the “state of the discipline,”
we must shift the focus to what education stakeholders and institutions must do to work
towards epistemic justice. Kotzee’s (2017) case study of epistemic injustice and education
illustrates the need for philosophers of education, specifically, to engage more deeply with
theorizing about epistemic justice. For example, when arguing we must differentiate
between “uneducatedness” and hermeneutic injustice, Kotzee (2017) relies on a dangerous
false equivalence while disregarding the theorizing of philosophers of color working in the
field of epistemic injustice (see for example Dotson, 2012 and Medina, 2013 more fully
described in chapter two). Kotzee (2017) asks whether “all learners’ experiences deserve
the possibility of articulation…Would we demand of the teacher of the white male skinhead
who despises immigrants that she makes available to him the conceptual resources or
argumentative space to articulate his views better?” (p. 332). This question and example
are very problematic applications of epistemic injustice to education. Neither Fricker
(2007) or other philosophers focused on epistemic injustice (Pohlhaus, 2012; Mason, 2011;
Medina, 2013; Alcoff, 2010) have argued that all learners’ experiences should be
articulated in the classroom or otherwise. Indeed, philosophers of education have long
discussed the politics and ethics of permitting or silencing hateful speech in the classroom
(see for example Applebaum, 2014; Sensoy & DiAngelo, 2014). Rather, those focused on
epistemic injustice are concerned with the experiences of those who are structurally
subordinated based on their social identities. So, when Kotzee (2017) says we need some
criteria for discerning if someone is experiencing a hermeneutical injustice or simply a lack
of education, it seems like he is not fulling engaging power; the criteria for understanding
whether or not someone or some group is experiencing a hermeneutical injustice is to ask
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if there is a structural dynamic involved in the naming—or inability to name—what they
are trying to say, express or do.
A white skinhead does not have his views, experiences or perspectives structurally
subordinated. A skinhead does not lose knowledge when he is not permitted to share his
perspective. A Latina student (like the one described in the vignette in chapter four) who
must write an article about a Latino thief even after raising concerns about pernicious
racial profiling is silenced, is stopped from sharing a perspective on crime, racism in the
media, and her academic experience. What is more, the skinhead does not simply present
the possibility of epistemic violence as does speech that supports and is rooted in white
supremacy; the skinhead represents the call for physical violence, physical violence that is
to be endorsed and carried about by the state (Heim, 2017). When skinheads call for the
death of Black people, for Jews to “not replace us,” and for “blood and soil” (an appeal to
Nazism), that skinhead is actively threatening the lives, calling for the death, of particular
groups of people and calling on the state to be the agent of said violence. One cannot walk
on a plane and call for the death of Black people or Jewish people without being forcibly
removed and arrested, why should one be able to do so in a classroom? He should not as
there is a clear difference between the threat of physical violence and the threat of
epistemic violence.
To be clear, I do not make this case to minimize the harm of epistemic violence; I
understand and honor the harm that can be done in both a classroom and to individual
students when a dominantly situated knower shares hateful perspectives in the classroom.
However, as a social justice educator, I understand that it is possible to engage perspectives
like, “General Lee was a hero” or “immigration is a safety concern of mine” in the classroom
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in ways that are critical, reveal misconceptions, and speak truth to power. Engaging hateful
perspectives can be informative if not transformative in the classroom. But, again, in doing
so educators must take up issues of power, center fact over misconception and bridge
misconception/bias and understanding.
Additionally, we must be wary of latent paternalistic assumptions in regard to
correcting for hermeneutic injustice. Kotzee (2017) asserts that those genuinely
experiencing hermeneutic injustice need “to be helped to express their point of view” (p.
332). While indeed facilitators and teachers do and must help students express their points
of view, we should take great care to not assume that students are not aware of and cannot
express their point of views. Rather, it is imperative that we be attentive, again, to power:
Are students welcomed to share their perspectives? Do students experience validation
when they share their perspectives? Are students’ perspectives seriously engaged by
teachers, administrators and dominantly situated students? For example, the students
participating in Spotlighting Justice were incredibly specific (yes, within the scope of being
introduced to interdisciplinary texts focused on identity and structural inequality) about
the types of dynamics existing in their school that were harming them. They could name
that not learning about Black history and contributions in our society was disaffirming and
lessening the quality and value of their education. Facilitators engaged students in critical
inquiry and in navigating relationships with administrators, but students generated the
ideas based on their shared experiences of marginalization within their school. Pedagogies
like intergroup dialogue and YPAR are so important precisely because they engage
students in content and processes that allow students to find the spaces and the intellectual
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products that allow them to reach multiple audiences, especially those outside of their
salient identity groups.
Kotzee (2013), also questions how those concerned with epistemic injustice and
education can change the epistemic social imaginary “without dishonesty” (p. 332). Is
dishonesty an issue when considering all the ways the education system routinely benefits
white students and high-income students while students of color and low-income students
do not benefit? Is using data to show disparity in treatment—take for example, the medical
field, where people of color are provided less pain medication than their white
counterparts due to practitioners being less receptive to people of color’s expressions of
pain (Chapman, Kaatz, Carnes, 2013)—not important in the school of medicine? Perhaps
Kotzee is not thinking about information for which there is connecting social science data
(although it is hard for me to think of an example) when he asks, “Is treating the views of
members of the non-dominant culture with kid gloves (i.e. too generously) not itself
unjust?” (2013, p. 332). At face value, his question is not totally problematic. Of course
failing to engage a student of color as intelligent and capable interlocutor is a problem and
a fine example of precisely the type of poor teaching that marginalizes non-dominantly
situated people as knowers. Philosophers like Medina (2013) and intergroup dialogue and
YPAR practitioners are not calling on any teachers to offer students of color disingenuous
praise.
Rather, what is called for is not structurally concealing the experiences of nondominant people. Again, let us take the medical classroom as an example. No one is arguing
that medical students—or students of history in general—should not be taught that J.
Marion Sims invented gynecological surgery; instead, people of color argue teaching about
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Sims, glorifying his achievements, without simultaneously critically engaging his inhumane
and unethical experimentation on slaves is unjust and does an epistemic harm (Wall,
2006). When the brutal experiences of Black women, slaves, are “left out” of conversations
about the birth of gynecological surgery, the shared experiences of Black women are
perniciously obscured in the shared social imaginary. The legacy of Black people, especially
Black women who to this day experience the highest mortality rates during child birth in
our country (Martin & Montagne, 2017), being harmed or experimented on in medicine is
important; it has value when we try to understand current public health crises like the high
rate of infant mortality inflicting the Black community (Carpenter, 2017). Black women
were brutally used and injured in the research that made possible current day
gynecological surgery and best practices; Black women die more often as a result of child
birth than any other group of women in the nation; Black babies are more likely to die
during the first year of life than any other group of newborns in the nation. These facts are
not unlinked; rather, they show a history of Black women being marginalized in medical
practice and, so importantly, in education-- medical education and every stage of education
that preceds it. When we leave information—historical, medical—out of the dominant
shared social hermeneutical resource, health practitioners, public health experts and policy
makers cannot make connections based on racialized experiences. Epistemic injustice is
not a question of honesty; it is a question of whose histories, whose knowledges, whose
experiences, whose perspectives, are intentionally marginalized or totally silenced in the
dominant interpretive framework in order to support the established normative role of
whiteness (Mills, 1997).
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This dissertation contributes to the conversation about epistemic injustice and
education by providing specific examples from recent education research on the ways in
which students experience epistemic injustice in education settings. Chapter three looks at
ways schools from pre-kindergarten through university do not successfully educate
students of color and low-income students as well as they do white students and upperincome students. Chapter three then offered marginally situated students’ own
interpretations, descriptions and suggestions describing their educational and hoped for
education experiences. Chapters three and four highlighted the contributions of YPAR and
IGD for mobilizing students’ identities in the classrooms that lead to demonstrated student
learning about race, structural inequality and action towards social change; these praxes
can help contribute to epistemic justice in education settings by affirming marginally
situated students as knowers, promoting understanding across dominantly and
subordinately situated students, helping students to develop an understanding of
whiteness and structurally inequality, and providing students with examples and
experiences of working across difference towards social change.
Applications
Over the last quarter century, scholars in education have largely described pedagogical
praxis and content development that leads to epistemic inclusion by developing best
practices for creating and putting culturally relevant curriculum and pedagogy into
practice (see for example Ladson-Billings, 2006; Noguera, 2009). Philosophers of race and
of epistemology have described the ways in which identity matters in knowledge making
and the ways in which the epistemic is indeed ethical. Social scientists have described how
intergroup dialogue pedagogy impacts students’ learning as related to prejudice and bias
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reduction, the practices of empathy and perspective taking and increased structural
thinking. This dissertation stands on their shoulders and seeks to honor their work by
bringing these disciplines together. In addition to arguing there is an ethical responsibility
for educational researchers and practitioners to work towards epistemic justice through
practice, policy and pedagogy, this dissertation described ways that two specific social
justice praxes, intergroup dialogue and youth participatory action research, lead to
epistemic justice; strategies used in these practices should be incorporated into
teacher/professor training and curriculum development (from pre-K through university).
Still, much more can and must be done requiring institutional and individual change
including interventions to increase contact (e.g. the hiring of faculty, staff and
administrators from across identities and the inclusion of students from diverse social
identity groups), interventions that increase critical engagement with a multiplicity of
perspectives (e.g. courses related to subordinate identity groups and experiences and
intentional inclusion of multiple perspectives and interpretations across courses) and
affective engagement (e.g. teaching students about whiteness, about white hermeneutical
ignorance and avoidant discursive moves, teaching students the habits of perspective
taking and critical self-reflection) that would hopefully create the ethical, intellectual, and
socio-political transformation called for by Medina (2013) and, as he suggested, it would
take generations. Still, it is not optional. As Fricker stated in her introduction to epistemic
injustice:
There is a limit, of course, to what virtues on the part of individuals can achieve when
the root cause of epistemic injustice is structures of unequal power and the systemic
prejudice they generate. Eradicating these injustices would ultimately take not just
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more virtuous hearers, but collective social political change—in matters of epistemic
injustice, the ethical is political (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).
Education systems have perpetuated inequality and epistemic injustice since the founding
of the United States; this participation in the establishment and maintenance of inequality
comes with an ethical debt. It is not simply a good idea for education stakeholders
(teachers, researchers, policy makers, administrators, etc.) to consider the value of
“diversity” epistemically or otherwise. We must include as essential in our work the goal of
developing a more epistemically just system of schooling and—as it is so integrated into
social structures—society at large. Working towards epistemic justice must be
fundamental to the work of education and educators. We have a responsibility to work to
correct the harms of epistemic injustice. And, if we take up this work to ensure that no
agent loses knowledge as a result of epistemic injustice, then we will also be working to
ensure that every person in our society is able “to exist, humanely, [to] name the world, to
change it” (emphasis original, Freire, 2009, p. 88).

199

REFERENCES
Aberson, C. L., Shoemaker, C., & Tomolillo, C. (2004). Implicit bias and contact: The role of
interethnic friendships. The Journal of Social Psychology, 144(3), 335-47.
Alcoff, L. M. (2007). “Epistemologies of ignorance: Three types.” In S. Sullivan & N. Tuana
(Eds.), Race and epistemologies of ignorance (pp. 39-59). Albany, NY: State
University New York Press.
Alcoff, L. M. (2010). Epistemic identities. Episteme, 7(02), 128-137.
Alcoff, L. M., & Martín, L. (2001). On judging epistemic credibility: Is social
identity relevant? In S. Morgen. & N. Tuana (Eds.), Engendering rationalities (pp. 53–
80). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Aldana, A., Richards-Schuster, K., & Checkoway, B. (2016). Dialogic pedagogy for youth
participatory action research: Facilitation of an intergroup empowerment
program. Social Work with Groups, 39(4), 339-358.
Aldana, A., Rowley, S. J., Checkoway, B., & Richards-Schuster, K. (2012). Raising ethnicracial consciousness: The relationship between intergroup dialogues and
adolescents’ ethnic-racial identity and racism awareness. Equity & Excellence in
Education, 45(1), 120-137.
Anderson, E. (2012). Epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions. Social
Epistemology, 26(2), 163-173.
Anzaldúa, G. (2015). Speaking in tongues: A letter to 3rd world women writers. In C.
Moraga & G. Anzaldúa (Eds.), This bridge called my back: Writing by radical women
of color (4th ed., pp. 165-173). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Applebaum, B. (2010). Being white, being good: White complicity, white moral responsibility,
and social justice pedagogy. New York, NY: Lexington Books.
Applebaum, B. (2014). Ignorance as a resource for social justice education? Philosophy
of Education Archive, 391-399.
Applebaum, B. (2016). Needing not to know: Ignorance, innocence, denials, and
discourse. Philosophy of Education Archive, 448-456.
Arao, B., & Clemens, K. (2013). From safe spaces to brave spaces. In L. Landerman (Ed.),
The art of effective facilitation: Reflections from social justice educators (pp. 135150). Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing.

200

Arkansas Bill Would Ban Howard Zinn Writings from Schools. (2017, March 3). Retrieved
from https://www.democracynow.org/2017/3/3/headlines/arkansas_bill_would
ban_howard_zinn_writings_from_schools
Bailey, A. (2007). Strategic ignorance. In S. Sullivan & N. Tuanna (Eds.), Race and
epistemologies of ignorance (pp. 77–94). Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Bailey, A. (2014). "The unlevel knowing field: An engagement with Kristie Dotson's thirdorder epistemic oppression." Retrieved from https://philpapers.org/rec/BAITUK
Baldridge, B. J. (2014). Relocating the deficit: Reimagining black youth in neoliberal times.
American Educational Research Journal, 51(3), 440-473.
Bogdan, R. C., & Biklen, S. K. (2007). Research for education: An introduction to theories
and methods. New York, NY: Pearson.
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2009). Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of
racial inequality in America. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative
Research Journal, 9(2), 27-40.
Bradley, C. (2005). The career experiences of African American women faculty:
Implications for counselor education programs. College Student Journal, 39(3), 518528.
Burbules, N. C. (2000). The limits of dialogue as a critical pedagogy. In P. Trifonas (Ed),
Revolutionary pedagogies: Cutlural politics, education, and discourse of theory (pp.
251-273). New York, NY: Routledge.
Cabrera, N. L., Milem, J. F., Jaquette, O., & Marx, R. W. (2014). Missing the (student
achievement) forest for all the (political) trees: Empiricism and the Mexican
American studies controversy in Tucson. American Educational Research
Journal, 51(6), 1084-1118.
Cammarota, J. & Fine, M. (Eds.). (2008). Revolutionizing education. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Cammarota, J., & Fine, M. (2008). “The Opportunity if not the Right to See”: The Social
Justice Education Project. In J. Cammarota & M. Fine (Eds.), Revolutionizing
Education (pp. 139-159). Routledge.
Cannito-Coville, M., Lopez, G.E., Nastasi, A.W., Smith, B., Villasenor, A. & Benedetto, J. (2013,
October). Learning with Youth: Listening, Dialogue, and Action in a Sustained Higher
201

Education-High School Partnership. Research presentation at the annual meeting of
Imagining America: Artists & Scholars in Public Life, Syracuse, NY.
Carpenter, Z. (2017, February 15). What’s Killing America’s Black Infants? Racism is fueling
a national health crisis. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/whatskilling-americas-black-infants
Catala, A. (2015). Democracy, Trust, and Epistemic Justice. The Monist, 98(4), 424.
Chapman, E. N., Kaatz, A., & Carnes, M. (2013). Physicians and implicit bias: how doctors
may unwittingly perpetuate health care disparities. Journal of General Internal
Medicine, 28(11), 1504-1510.
Charbeneau, J. (2013). White faculty transforming whiteness in the classroom through
pedagogical practice. Race Ethnicity and Education: 1-20.
Checkoway, B., & Aldana, A. (2013). Four forms of youth civic engagement for
diverse democracy. Children and Youth Services Review, 35(11), 1894-1899.
Code, L. (2010). Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically about Social
Knowledge. In (Eds.) A. Haddock, A. Miller, & D. Pritchard, Social epistemology, p. 2951. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Collins, P. H. (2009). Another kind of public education: Race, schools, the media, and
democratic possibilities. Boston, MS: Beacon Press.
Darling-Hammond, L. (2012). Powerful teacher education: Lessons from exemplary
programs. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons.
Delpit, L. D. (2012). "Multiplication is for White people": Raising expectations for other
people's children. New York City, NY: The New Press.
Depenbrock, J. (2017, August 22). Federal Judge Finds Racism Behind Arizona Law Banning
Ethnic Studies. NPR. Retrieved from
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/08/22/545402866/federal-judge-findsracism-behind-arizona-law-banning-ethnic-studies
Dessel, A., & Rogge, M. E. (2008). Evaluation of intergroup dialogue: A review of the
empirical literature. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 26(2), 199-238.
DeTurk, S. (2006). The power of dialogue: Consequences of intergroup dialogue and their
implications for agency and alliance building. Communication Quarterly, 54(1), 33–
51. doi:10.1080/01463370500270355
Devine, P. G., Forscher, P. S., Austin, A. J., & Cox, W. T. (2012). Long-term reduction in
implicit race bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 48(6), 1267-1278.
202

Dewey, J. (1888). The Ethics of Democracy. In J.A. Boydston (Ed.). The early works of John
Dewey (pp. 227-249). Carbondale, IL: Southern University Press.
Dewey, J. (1902). The School as Social Center. The Elementary School Teacher, 3(2), 73-86.
Dewey, J. (1944). Democracy and Education. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Dewey, J. (1954). The public and its problems. Athens, OH: Swallow Press.
Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing.
Hypatia, 26(2), 236-257.
Dotson, K. (2012). A cautionary tale: On limiting epistemic oppression. Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies, 33(1), 24-47.
Fine, M., Bloom, J., Burns, A., Chajet, L., Guishard, M., Payne, Y., Perkins-Munn, T., & Torre, M.
E. (2005). Dear Zora: A letter to Zora Neale Hurston fifty years after brown. Teachers
College Record, 107, 496-528.
Ford, K. A. (2012). Shifting white ideological scripts: The educational benefits of interand intraracial curricular dialogues on the experiences of white college
students. Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, 5(3), 138.
Ford, K. A. (Ed.). (2017). Facilitating change through intergroup dialogue: Social justice
advocacy in practice. New York, NY: Routledge.
Ford, K. A., & Malaney, V. K. (2012). “I now harbor more pride in my race”: The educational
benefits of inter-and intraracial dialogues on the experiences of students of color
and multiracial students. Equity & Excellence in Education, 45(1), 14-35.
Ford, K., & Orlandella, J. (2015). "The “not-so-final remark” the journey to becoming White
allies." Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 1(2), 287-301.
Frank, J. (2013). Mitigating against epistemic injustice in educational research. Educational
Researcher, 42(7), 363-370.
Freire, P. (2009). Pedagogy of the oppressed. (1970 ed, pp. 125). New York, NY: Continuum.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. San Diego, CA, US:
Academic Press.

203

Gewirtz, S. (2006). Towards a contextualized analysis of social justice in
education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38(1), 69-81.
Gilson, E. (2011). “Vulnerability, ignorance, and oppression.” Part of section: Epistemic
justice, ignorance, and procedural objectivity.” Hypatia, 26(2), 308-332.
Giroux, H. (1997). Race, pedagogy, and whiteness in dangerous minds. Cineste, 22(4),
46-49.
Glass, C. R., Doberneck, D. M., & Schweitzer, J. H. (2011). Unpacking faculty engagement:
The types of activities faculty members report as publicly engaged scholarship
during promotion and tenure. Journal of Higher Education Outreach and
Engagement, 15(1), 7-30.
Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. I. (2002). Pathways to knowledge private and public. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Gurin, P., Nagda, B. R. A., & Lopez, G. E. (2004). The benefits of diversity in education for
democratic citizenship. Journal of Social Issues, 60(1), 17-34.
Gurin, P., Nagda, B. R. A., & Zúñiga, X. (2013). Dialogue across difference: Practice, theory,
and research on intergroup dialogue. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Gurin, P., Peng, T., Lopez, G. E, & Nagda, B. A. (1999). Context, identity, and intergroup
relations. In D. Prentice, & D. Miller (Eds.), Cultural divides: Understanding and
overcoming group conflict (pp. 133-170). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Gutiérrez y Muhs, G., Niemann, Y. F., González, C. G., & Harris, A. P. (Eds.). (2012). Presumed
incompetent: The intersections of race and class for women in academia. Boulder, CO:
Utah University Press.
Harding, S. (1992). Rethinking standpoint epistemology: What is "strong objectivity?"
Centennial Review, 36(3), 437-470.
Harding, S. (2006). Transformation vs. resistance identity projects: Epistemological
resources for social justice movements. In L. M. Alcoff, M. Hames-Garcia, S. P.
Mohanty, & P. M. L. Moya (Eds.), Identity politics reconsidered (pp. 246-264). New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hartsock, N. C. (1983). The feminist standpoint: Developing the ground for a specifically
feminist historical materialism. In S. Harding & M. B. Hintikka (Eds.). Discovering
reality (pp. 283-310). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

204

Heim, J. (2017, August 14). Recounting a day of rage, hate, violence and death how a rally of
white nationalists and supremacists at the University of Virginia turned into a
“tragic, tragic weekend.”. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesvilletimeline
Hill-Collins, P. (2000). Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of
empowerment. New York, NY: Routledge.
Hill-Collins, P. (2010). Another kind of public education: Race, school, the media &
democratic possibilities. New York, NY: Beacon Press.
Hinkley, J. A. (2015, May 22). “An F in Civil Rights Education: Michigan to Revamp Lessons.”
Detroit Free Press. Retrieved from
https://www.freep.com/story/news/2015/05/22/michigan-civil-rightseducation/27781257
hooks, B. (1994). Teaching to transgress: Education as the practice of freedom. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Hookway, C. (2010). Some varieties of epistemic injustice: Reflections on
Fricker. Episteme, 7(2), 151-163.
Hopkins, L. E., & Domingue, A. (2015). "From awareness to action: College students’ skill
development in intergroup dialogue." Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(3),
392-402.
Howard-Baptiste, S. D. (2014). Arctic space, lonely place: “Mammy moments” in higher
education. The Urban Review, 46(4), 764-782.
Hurtado, S. (2005). The next generation of diversity and intergroup relations
research. Journal of Social Issues, 61(3), 595-610.
Katznelson, I. (2006). When afﬁrmative action was white: An untold history of racial
inequality in twentieth-century America. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
Keehn, M. (2015). “When you tell a personal story, I kind of perk up a little bit more”: An
examination of student learning from listening to personal stories in two social
diversity courses." Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(3), 373-391.
Kena, G., Musu-Gillette, L., Robinson, J., Wang, X., Rathbun, A., Zhang, J., Wilkinson-Flicker, S.,
Barmer, A., & Dunlop Velez, E. (2015). The condition of education 2015 (NCES 2015144). U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.
Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch
Kidd, I. J., Medina, J., & Pohlhaus Jr, G. (Eds.). (2017). The Routledge handbook of epistemic
205

injustice. New York, NY: Routledge.
Kotzee, B. (2013). Introduction: Education, social epistemology and virtue
epistemology. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47(2), 157-167.
Kotzee, B. (2017). Education and epistemic injustice. In I.J. Kidd et.al. (Eds.), Routledge
handbook of epistemic injustice (pp. 324-336). New York, NY: Routledge.
Kuby, C. R. (2013). ‘OK this is hard’: Doing emotions in social justice dialogue. Education,
Citizenship and Social Justice, 8(1), 29-42.
Kupenda, A. M. (2012). Facing Down the Spooks. In G. G. y Muhs, Y. F. Niemann, C. G.
Gonzalez, & A. P. Harris (Eds). Presumed incompetent: The intersections of race and
class for women in academia (pp. 20-29). Denver, CO: University Press of Colorado.
Ladson-Billings, G. (2006). From the achievement gap to the education debt:
Understanding achievement in U.S. schools. Educational Researcher, 35(7), 3-12.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876731
Lee, H. (1960). To kill a mockingbird. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
Linder, C., Harris, J. C, Allen, E. L, & Hubain, B. (2015). "Building inclusive pedagogy:
Recommendations from a national study of students of color in higher education
and student affairs graduate programs." Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2),
178-194.
Lips, H. M. (2013). The gender pay gap: Challenging the rationalizations. Perceived equity,
discrimination, and the limits of human capital models. Sex Roles, 68(3-4), 169-185.
Lopez, G. E., Gurin, P., & Nagda, B. A. (1998). Education and understanding structural causes
for group inequalities. Political psychology, 19(2), 305-329.
Lopez, G. E., & Nastasi, A. W. (2012). Writing the divide: High school students crossing
urban-suburban contexts. Equity & Excellence in Education, 45(1), 138-158.
Lopez, G. E., Nastasi, A. W., & Benedetto, J. (2012, June). Spotlighting Justice 2011-2012:
Evaluation Report. Distributed to university and local high school administrators.
Syracuse University: Intergroup Dialogue Program.
Lopez, G. E., & Zuñiga, X. (2010). Intergroup dialogue and democratic practice in higher
education. New Directions for Higher Education, 152, 35–42.
Loewen, J. W. (2008). Lies my teacher told me: Everything your American history textbook
got wrong. New York, NY: The New Press.
206

Lowry, C. (2014). Medina and Mill on Epistemic Interaction. Social Philosophy Today.
Madrid, E. M. (2011). The Latino achievement gap. Multicultural Education, 18(3), 7-12.
Retrieved from https://search-proquest
com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/docview/926978300?accountid=14214
Martin, N., & Montagne, R. (2017, December 7). From Dying in Pregnancy and Childbirth.
Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/nothing-protects-blackwomen-from-dying-in-pregnancy-and-childbirth
Margonis, F. (2007). John Dewey, WEB Du Bois and Alain Locke: A Case Study in White
Ignorance and Intellectual Segregation. In Sullivan, S. & Tuana, N. (Eds.), Race and
epistemologies of ignorance (173-195). Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Mason, R. (2011). “Two kinds of unknowing.” Part of section: Epistemic justice,
ignorance, and procedural objectivity. Hypatia, 26(2), 294-307.
Matias, C. E. (2013). Who you callin' white?! A critical counter-story on colouring white
identity. Race Ethnicity and Education, 16(3), 291-315.
McKinnon, R. (2016). Epistemic injustice. Philosophy Compass, 11(8), 437-446.
Medina, J. (2013). The epistemology of resistance: Gender and racial oppression,
epistemic injustice, and resistant imaginations. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Mills, C. (1997). The racial contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Mills, C. (2007). White ignorance. In S. Sullivan, & N. Tuana (Eds.), Race and
epistemologies of ignorance (pp. 11-39). Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Milner IV, H. R. (2013). "Rethinking achievement gap talk in urban education." Urban
Education, 48(1), 3-8.
Miller, K. (2018). The Simple Truth about the Gender Pay Gap Report. American Association
of University Women. Retrieved from https://www.aauw.org/resource/the-simpletruth-about-the-gender-pay-gap
Mohanty, C. T. (2006). Feminism without borders: Decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
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FOOTNOTES
In this dissertation, White will only be capitalized, as in this case, when it is the first word of a sentence.
Black, in reference to the social group that includes those who identify as racially, culturally, or socially Black.
As Tharps (2014) argues, Black refers to a specific social group, members of the African diaspora (para. 3).
White does not refer to a specific racial, culture or social group so the w in white is not capitalized in
reference to those with dominant social identities.
2 Intergroup dialogue is explored throughout this dissertation and is described in greater detail in chapters
one, three and four.
3 Importantly, this pedagogical exercise asks students to describe an incident in the college classroom that
they feel illustrates a racial microaggression. This example centers the student experience. While there can be
many reasons why a professor would assign any given topic, the professor’s perspective or intention is not
the focus of this example. Rather, the impact of the professor’s assignment on students, particularly students
with non-dominant racial identities, is the central case explored here.
4 Student names, course titles, and faculty names are pseudonyms here and throughout this dissertation
document.
6 Students raised the example of this particular course with this particular professor across semesters.
7 The terms “implicit” and “explicit” as used here draw from their usage in the field of social psychology.
Implicit prejudice refers to the unconscious positive or negative mental attitudes one holds towards a person
or group while explicit prejudice contrastingly refers to conscious attitudes one is aware of possessing
(Aberson, Shoemaker, Tomolillo, 2004).
7 While one can argue that Fricker explicitly states her goal is to speak to the practices of dominant groups,
hence, her emphasis on a hermeneutic injustice centered around changing individual perceptions and actions,
this goal does not excuse Fricker’s lack of engagement with alternative (e.g. not just feminist but also Black
and Black feminist) epistemologies that do center resistance and the practices of marginalized groups. By not
engaging these as a mode of knowing for dominant subjects, Fricker re-centers dominance in a way that does
not open it to alternative epistemologies.
8 The example of hermeneutical justice via the character of Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird is
described in greater detail in Chapter 2.
9 The identifier “Hispanic” will be used when consistent with the data and sources being cited. Otherwise, this
paper will use Latin@.
10 Asian American students are included throughout the demographics section but not Native American,
Hawaiian or Asian Pacific Islander students to ensure consistency across measure as not all studies include or
break down statistics to include Native American, Hawaiian or Asian Pacific Islanders; this is not done to
further marginalize marginalized students.
11 Parents highest level of education is defined as, “the highest level of education attained by the most
educated parent in the child’s household.” (Kena et al., 2015, p.65).
12 I am looking at public schools because of the implications for democratic participation and the
historic/ethical role of public education with relation to participatory democracy.
13 Consistent with practice in university-community intergroup dialogue partnerships nationally and
specifically the reports and articles associated with the Metropolitan Detroit Youth Dialogue initiative, run in
collaboration with the University of Michigan Intergroup Relations Program (e.g. Richards-Schuster & Aldana,
2013), the location of this work is identifiable. Furthermore, in keeping with the literature on publicly
engaged scholarship (Glass, Doberneck & Schweitzer, 2011), at times we have named our school partner as a
close collaborator and co-presenter/author. This also follows some of the examples of YPAR provided in this
chapter/dissertation. Finally, this practice is also consistent with a basis in program evaluation reporting.
14 In the interest of transparency, I was the intergroup dialogue facilitator during the 2011-2012 school year.
As cited, the content here is not from my reflection or personal perspective, it is from the Evaluation Report
(2012) produced by the collaborators of this project.
15 All student names contained in this paper are pseudonyms.
16 Intra-group dialogue courses are similar in structure and content to corresponding intergroup dialogue
courses, and they allow students to explore a single subordinate or dominant group identity (Ford & Malaney,
2012).
1
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Many of the students had graduated before this study started, and I did not have up to date email contact
for them.
18 Of the 15 students who responded, five identified as women of color, two identified as men of color, six
identified as white women and two identified as white men.
19 Once papers were stripped of author’s name and identifying information, they were assigned a number
instead of an author. By race/ethnicity, numbers were placed in a hat and numbers were picked at random.
20 For more detailed information on caucus groups and fish bowls, see Zúñiga et al., 2007.
21 All student identities described in this paper are self-identified.
22 Lee speaks English as a second language; while there may seem to be errors in his syntax, I believe the
intent and over-all sense of his writing is clear and made the intentional choice to honor his voice and not to
insert brackets for syntactical correctness.
23 During the web of oppression activity, all students in the class collectively hold up a large (takes up half the
room) roped spider web; all over the spider web are index cards covered in statistics about poverty, health
outcomes, education outcomes, religious bias, racial bias, law limiting the rights of those who identify as
LGBTQA, to both visually and factual represent the interlocking ways groups of people experience oppression
based on their social identities. The web is physically heavy and the statistics are emotionally exhausting;
students across race point out that it takes a lot to “hold up” the web while participating in the activity; after
the activity, they connect this physical holding to their everyday acts participation in oppression (or
privilege) as members of our shared society.
17
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Collective. Research presentation at the annual meeting of Imagining America: Artist & Scholars
in Public Life, Atlanta, GA.
Lopez, G.E. & Nastasi, A.W. (2014, April). Exploring Authentic Higher Education-High School
Collaboration toward Thick Democracy. Research presentation at the annual meeting of the
American Educational Research Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Nastasi, A.W. (Chair) (2014, March). Crossing Boundaries: Dialogic Inquiry Between
Classroom-Community Locations. Symposium at The 7th Annual Conference on Equity &
Social Justice, Social Justice Education Out of Bounds: New Frameworks and Alliances,
Syracuse, NY.
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Nastasi, A.W. (2014, March). Dialogue, Democratic Engagement & Social Justice Education.
Symposium at The 7th Annual Conference on Equity & Social Justice, Social Justice Education
Out of Bounds: New Frameworks and Alliances, Syracuse, NY.
Cannito-Coville, M., Lopez, G.E., Nastasi, A.W., Smith, B., Villasenor, A. & Benedetto, J.
(2013, October). Learning with Youth: Listening, Dialogue, and Action in a Sustained Higher
Education-High School Partnership. Research presentation at the annual meeting of Imagining
America: Artists & Scholars in Public Life, Syracuse, NY.
Nastasi, A.W. (2013, April). Spotlighting Justice: Evaluating University-High School
Collaborations for Student Initiated Social Action. Research presentation at the annual meeting
of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA.
Nastasi, A.W. (Chair) (2013, March). Voices in Dialogue: Engaging Students, Facilitators and
Communities in Learning for Social Justice. Symposium at The 6th Annual Conference on
Equity & Social Justice, Testing Our Limits: Teaching and Learning with Courage and
Conviction, New Paltz, NY.
Nastasi, A.W. (2013, March). Voices Spotlighting Justice: Youth Participatory Action through
University-Urban High School Collaborations. Paper presented at The 6th Annual Conference
on Equity & Social Justice, Testing Our Limits: Teaching and Learning with Courage and
Conviction, New Paltz, NY.
Soto, J. & Nastasi, A.W. (2012, November). Intergroup Dialogue: Understanding Diverse
Social Identities, Moving Towards Social Justice. Workshop presented at the annual National
Association for Multicultural Educators, Philadelphia, PA.
Nastasi, A. W. (Chair) (2012, May). Dialogic Practices for Social Change. Symposium at the
Conference on Rhetoric, Activism & Research, Syracuse, New York.
Nastasi, A.W., Terry, A., Brown, B., Stallings, H. & Fetner, S. (2012). Yes, you are “that kind of
white person,” but we can still work together!: Building Coalitions for Shared Social Action in
Race Dialogues. Paper presented at the Conference on Rhetoric, Activism & Research, Syracuse,
New York.
Nastasi, A.W. (March, 2012). Researching to Transgress: The Epistemic Virtue of Research
With. Paper presented at the meeting of the Philosophy or Education Society, Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania.
Nastasi, A.W., & Lopez, G.E. (April, 2011). Writing the divide: High school students crossing
urban-suburban contexts. Paper presented at the meeting of the America Educational Research
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana.
Nastasi, A.W., Nguyen, N., & Harmon, S. (April, 2011). Passionate Practice: Sustaining
Engaged Graduate
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Scholarship. Presented at Imagining America’s Publicly Active Graduate Education Conference,
Syracuse, NY.
Eatman, T.K., Weber, S.A., Nastasi, A.W., & Bush, A.S. (April, 2011). Profiles and pathways:
A mixed methods study of the aspirations and career decisions of early career publicly engaged
scholars. Paper presented at the meeting of the America Educational Research Association, New
Orleans, Louisiana.
Nastasi, A.W. (October, 2010). Engaging the student: Implementing culturally relevant
curriculum.
Paper presented at the meeting of the American Education Studies Association, Denver,
Colorado.
INVITED PRESENTATIONS
Landscape of Urban Education lecture series presents: ‘Hip Hop Genius: Remixing Pedagogy,
School Design and Leadership’ with author Sam Seidel. Invited presentation—Syracuse
University. (April 2012).
White House Young America Series; Guest Speaker: Focus on the Arts & Humanities as
Catalysts for Change—Syracuse University. (April 2012).
HED 605: The American College and University; Guest presentation at the invitation of
professor Timothy K. Eatman—Syracuse University. (March 2012).
CFE/EDU 300: Dialogue in Action: Class Matters; Guest presentation at the invitation of
instructor Meredith Madden—Syracuse University. (February 2012).
EDU 781: Institutions & Processes in Education; Guest presentation at the invitation of professor
Gretchen Lopez—Syracuse University. (October 2012).
RESEARCH INITIATIVES AND FIELD EXPERIENCE
Intergroup Dialogue Program, Research Assistant
August 2012present
§ Assist in the preparation of grant proposals
§ Develop and distribute surveys for multiple research initiatives; manage data using
Qualtrics and XCEL software; code and analyze data qualitatively; document findings
by preparing reports
§ Recruit students and manage course placements for undergraduate intergroup
dialogue courses
§ Manage Program’s social media and publications
Intergroup Dialogue Program, Cultural Voices Intergroup Dialogue on Race & Ethnicity High
School Research Collaboration, Syracuse University.
August
2012-June 2013
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§
§
§
§
§
§

Collaborated with a Syracuse City School District high school English teacher to
develop a curriculum for an intergoup dialogue on race and ethnicity with a particular
focus on community action (Cultural Voices)
Facilitated two sections of Cultural Voices (approximately 45 students)
Acted as a liaison between Syracuse University Intergroup Dialogue Program and
Nottingham High School, organizing the research team and curricular initiatives
Prepared and distributed Institutional Review Board materials, mixed methodology
pre and post test surveys, evaluations and curricular assessments
Inductively coded, analyzed and documented course outcomes
Distributed evaluation report to Syracuse University and Syracuse City School
District stake holders

Intergroup Dialogue Program, Spotlighting Justice Youth Participatory Action Research
Collective, Syracuse University.
August 2011-June 2013
§ Collaborated with a Syracuse City School District high school English teacher to
develop an after school club (Spotlighting Justice) to highlight social justice issues
and to provide dialogic action in an urban high school.
§ Facilitated and mentored Spotlighting Justice club (approximately 25 students)
§ Prepared, distributed and analyzed evaluation surveys
§ Inductively coded, analyzed and documented club outcomes
§ Distributed evaluation report to Syracuse University and Syracuse City School
District stake holders
Imagining America: Artist and Scholars in Public Life Publicly Engaged Scholars (PES)
Study, Graduate Research Assistant, Syracuse University (Dr. Timothy K. Eatman, PI).
Summer 2010-Spring 2011.
§ Conducted 20 qualitative interviews with early career publicly engaged scholars
§ Provided a grounded analysis of qualitative interviews and 200 open ended surveys
§ Generated codes, themes, and memos that explicated the profiles and pathways of
publicly engaged scholars.
Enrollment Management Affirmative Action Policies Review, Graduate Researcher,
Syracuse University (D. Saleh, PI).
May-August 2010.
§ Conducted evaluative review of Syracuse University’s implementation of affirmative
action policies
§ Designed and conducted qualitative interviews with Student Affairs, Admissions and
Enrollment Management staff
§ Documented analysis of departments’ publications/websites within the Enrollment
Management and Student Affairs divisions
§ Submitted an evaluation report documenting Syracuse University’s Affirmative
Action policies and practices
COLLEGE TEACHING EXPERIENCE
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Intergroup Dialogue: Race and Ethnicity (SOC/WGS 230 & CFE 200). Instructor.
Fall
2011-Present
Future Professoriate Program (FPP), Syracuse University
Fall
2011-Present
Philosophy of Education (CFE 601). Co-Instructor
Fall
2012
Dialogue In Action: Class Matters (CFE 600). Instructor.
Summer 2012
College Learning Strategies (CLS 105), Syracuse University. Teaching Assistant. Fall & Spring
2009-2012
First Year Experience (HDEV 105), Binghamton University. Instructor.
Fall & Spring
2005-2008

K-12 TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Community School 6 (C.S. 6), New York City Department of Education:
June
2003-June 2005
Grades 3, 5, & 6 Teacher. Created and
implemented a six subject 3rd grade
science curriculum.

curriculum and a 5th/6th

AWARDS
Democratizing Knowledge Research Grant, $200 award
2012
Future Professoriate Program, $450 award
2012

20112011-

SERVICE
American Educational Research Association (AERA) Division G, Graduate Campus Liaison.
Spring 2011-Present).
§ Plan and facilitate meetings and workshops of Division G graduate students at
Syracuse University.
Imagining America: Central New York Publicly Active Graduate Education (PAGE),
Director. August 2010-December 2012
§ Planned and facilitated programs, speaker series, and networking opportunities to
inform and develop publicly engaged graduate students in Central, NY.
§ Planned and implement an annual regional conference.
International Association for Research on Service-Learning and Community Engagement
(IARSLCE) 12th Annual Research Conference; Invited conference proposal reviewer. May 2012
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White House Young America Series on Civic Engagement, Steering committee member.
Syracuse University, April 20, 2012
Collective Impact Session on Inclusive Urban Education, Invited participant, collaborative
research project on Scholarship in Action at Syracuse University and School of Education,
led by Syracuse University Chancellor and Dean with Center for Institutional and Social
Change at Columbia University Law School. March 2012.
Cultural Foundations of Education Department, Student Representative. Selected to represent
students at faculty meetings and to provide student leadership in departmental initiatives. Fall
2011-May 2012
New York College Access Challenge Grant, Fall 2009-Spring 2010
§ Planned and facilitate workshops for first-generation rural and urban students in
Onondaga and Jefferson-Lewis Counties, New York to increase college preparedness
with an interdisciplinary team;
§ Increased college applications among first-generation students through workshops,
digital communications, and conferences;
§ Provided financial aid counseling for 12 students attending Corcorane High School
through the Say Yes to Education Financial Aid Counselor Network Initiative.
Committees
Committee on Degrees and Curriculum Member. School of Education, Syracuse University. Fall
2012-Spring 2013
Director Search Committee, Imagining America: Artist and Scholars in Public Life, Syracuse
University. Spring 2012
Intergroup Dialogue Program, High School Institute Planning Committee, Syracuse University.
Spring 2011
School of Education Tenure and Promotion Committee, Syracuse University. Fall 2009-Spring
2010
Affiliations
Philosophy of Education Society (PES)
American Educational Research Association (AERA)
American Education Studies Association (AESA)
Imagining America: Artist and Scholars in Public LIfe (IA)
HIGHER EDUCATION PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
January 2008-July 2010
Residential Life, Binghamton University, Community Director
August 2005-January 2008 Residential Life, Binghamton University, Resident Director
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